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Private Motive and Perpetual
Conditions in Charitable Naming
Gifts: When Good Names Go Bad
John K. Eason'
This Article explores the problems that often result from a charitable naming
opportunity contribution. A charitable naming opportunity contribution exists
when a donor transfers money or property to a charitable organization upon
terms that result in an individual's name being associated in some way with the
organization, its institutions, activities, or facilities. Implementing such
arrangements can become problematic as circumstances change over time.
Matters considered here include the meaning of "charity" as affected by a
donor's personal desire to perpetuate a name. This Article also highlights the
quite varied doctrinal analyses that may apply when deviation from the precise
terms of a charitable naming arrangement is suggested. The enduring nature of
naming agreements, imprecise donor-charity dealings, malleable equitable
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doctrines, and the vagaries facilitated through reverence to donor intent are
shown to contribute to this variability. Specific examples are employed to
demonstrate relevant points. Those examples include the well-publicized, but as
yet unresolved, charitable naming dispute over the Lincoln Center's Avery
Fisher Hall. Also considered is the modern spate of philanthropically inclined,
but ethically challenged, "bad actors" whose notorious names now adorn
various charitable facilities and institutions across the nation. This Article
ultimately presents suggestions for dealing with both existing and future
charitable naming arrangements where some deviation from the original
charitable naming scheme is suggested..
"[P]erpetuity in the fund-raising world is a very short time."'
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I. THE MULTI-FACETED NAMING BARGAIN
Persons contributing funds to charity often enjoy the prerequisite of a
"naming opportunity" in return for their donation. Some naming
opportunities may seem insignificant - for example, the donor's name
on the back of a seat in a theater, or on a brick in a walkway outside an
institution.2 Though nominal in terms of recognition, these "lower end"
naming opportunities can be quite effective in motivating broad-based
community financial support and providing a sense of ownership for
those so publicly supporting a charitable endeavor.3 Other naming
opportunities may be grand in scale and absolutely critical to the success
of a charity's efforts to accomplish a given objective.4 Familiar examples
include the multi-million dollar founding gift for a new hospital or
campus building, or perhaps for a less tangible institute, center, or school
that transcends any single bricks-and-mortar edifice.' As a general
I The prerequisite of having a donor's or a donor's loved one's name placed on a
memorial brick, theatre seat, etc., has become common in the charitable fundraising world.
New York's Lincoln Center, for example, promotes on its website the prospect of
"[hionoring a loved one by having a memorial nameplate affixed to the back of a seat in
Avery Fisher Hall." See http://www.lincolncenter.org/supportLC/mgfs.asp?session (last
visited July 19,2004). Other charities offer similarly creative, small-scale opportunities. See,
e.g., Eric Gibson, Giving Without Giving a Darn Who Gets the Credit, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001,
at W13 ("[The] naming ... idea has .. . been 'leveraged' by fundraisers to absurd levels. It
is commonplace to find not just an institution bearing the name of a donor, but wings,
rooms, individual seats ... [and] even steps on a staircase ..."); Mike Murphy, Workers Set
Up The Stage For a Performance at the $43 Million Ford Community and Performing Arts Center,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 21, 2002, at D3 ("Dearborn [Michigan] is offering theater seats, bricks
and trees to people willing to exchange a donation for the opportunity to have their names
emblazoned on a piece of the [new Performing Arts Center] project."); Kathleen Teltsch,
The Memorial Alumni Boulder - Colleges are Naming Anything and Everything to Get Donors'
Bucks, S.F. CHRON., July 4, 1993, at 5 (noting opportunity to name individual locker in
college men's football team locker room for $1,000).
' John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
657, 699 (2001) (noting this "ownership" aspect); J.R. Brandstrader, Your Name Goes Here:
From Benches to B-schools, It's a Buyers Market for Monikers, BARRONS, Dec. 8, 2003, at 30
(identifying "lower end" naming opportunities to include bridges, bricks, park benches,
and even trees at $250).
' See, e.g., Mike Boehm, Performing Arts Center Tries Plan B, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2000,
at B1 (noting Orange County, California's pursuit of $50 million naming gift as cornerstone
of $200 million campaign to build two new concert halls).
' See Brandstrader, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing significant naming opportunity gifts
such as, among others, $35 million for Mendoza College of Business at Notre Dame, $10
million for alternative medicine institute at Harvard Medical School); see also Karen
Herzog, Last $17 Million is the Hardest, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2001, at 1A
(providing extensive list of naming opportunities and prices relating to $100 million
expansion of Milwaukee Art Museum); Elizabeth Mullener, The Power of Giving, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 14, 1999, at Al (listing naming opportunity prices at
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 378 2004-2005
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matter, society often considers the fact that each of these enterprises will
bear the name of its most generous benefactor to go hand in hand with
the charitable mission supported by the contribution. This is so
regardless of whether such contributions are the result of altruism,
vanity, a desire for immortality, or some blend of these and other
factors.7  Whatever the donor's motivation, the longstanding and
increasing prevalence of this fundraising technique suggests that the
ability to sell naming opportunities facilitates the flow of private funds
into charitable coffers.' The technique is at least 5000 years old.9 As one
several New Orleans area universities).
6 Naming opportunities have been described as "a time-honored way of getting
public credit for a generous gift." Sarah Bryan Miller, Symphony Needs to Think Big (as in
Bucks), ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 12, 2000, at C4; see also Suzanne Muchnic, Geffen Gift:
What's in a Name?, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1996, at F1 ("[N]aming buildings and galleries for
donors is a long-established tradition at arts institutions all across the country.").
' Altruism is certainly one possible explanation for such gifts, with the name
recognition a noncritical perquisite. See, e.g., Susan Cheever, Giving Is One Thing, but
Charity's Another, NEWSDAY, Nov. 13,2002, at B2 (discussing merits of anonymous giving in
current environment of naming opportunities); Gibson, supra note 2, at W13 (discussing,
altruism versus vanity in case of naming opportunity gifts); Patrice M. Jones, Gift Has Name
For It, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at Cl (discussing naming opportunities but also pointing out
recent $300 million gift to Vanderbilt University, for which donors "asked for nothing in
return"). In fact, many naming opportunities are requested by the charity, rather than the
donor, on the theory that the donor's support lends credibility to the fundraising project.
See Gibson, supra note 2 at W13 (noting that "naming serves a useful purpose," then
quoting executive director of IUPUI's Center on Philanthropy to explain that "[tihe person
who makes that big gift adds credibility to the project,... [and if he is willing to go public]
the institution can use that gift for leverage"); Muchnic, supra note 6 at F1 (quoting
charitable consultant as stating that "[w]e have been in the position of asking people who
prefer to give anonymously if we could reveal their identities... where we think it would
have a good effect").
Professor Colombo provides a thorough review of the sociological, psychological,
and economic perspectives on "pure" altruism in connection with naming gifts as part of
his consideration of the tax implications of such transactions. Noted motivations for such
giving include reputational enhancement, derivation of personal pleasure through
enhancing the welfare of others, and "a desire to purchase some measure of immortality."
Colombo, supra note 3, at 668-78; see also Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status and Trust in the Law
of Gifts and Gratuitous Transfers, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 572-85 (1997) (discussing altruism,
status enhancement, and other donor motives); David R. Unruh, Death and Personal History:
Strategies of Identity Preservation, 30 Soc. PROBS. 340 (1983) (discussing ways in which
people can use gifts and devises to shape and preserve their identities).
' For a discussion regarding the importance of naming opportunities as a fundraising
technique, see Herzog supra note 5 at 1A (noting that addition of "donor wall" naming
opportunity inspired 30 donors to museum campaign to increase contributions to $10,000
naming level); John Gurda, Naming Rights, or Naming Wrongs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Aug. 2, 1998, at 6 ("Professional fundraisers ... will tell you that no campaign could hope
to succeed without a full range of naming opportunities."); Jones, supra note 7 at C1
("naming opportunities are an important part of attracting wealthy donors... [with
charities showing] growing reliance [on the technique]. Certainly it's likely that an
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 379 2004-2005
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writer noted in reporting on the $120 million that Ohio State University
recently raised through naming opportunity contributions, "One
constant endures: names are worth cash."10
That flow of funds, or, more specifically, the terms upon which those
funds flow from donors to charity, reflects a bargain that society has
struck with donors." Specifically, society potentially bestows several
direct legal benefits upon donors in return for a contribution to charity.
First, rules that limit a donor's ability to restrict the use of funds given to
private persons do not apply where funds are instead given to charity. A
donor might, for example, impose restraints on the alienation of property
contributed to charity, restraints which would be invalid in a private
context." Similar societal concessions permit a donor to exercise other
forms of perpetual (a/k/a "dead-hand") control over the use of
contributed charitable funds in ways that might otherwise be
foreclosed. 3 Professor Rob Atkinson explains that:
increasing number of facilities will be named for ... donors."); Muchnic, supra note 6 at F1
(quoting various charitable leaders for such propositions as "Most people, I'd say 90% of
donors, want recognition of some sort" and "Given the size of the gifts needed to build and
maintain institutions these days, recognition seems to be necessary.").
' Henry Goldstein, When Wealthy Philanthropists Put Their Mouths Where Their Money
IS, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 28, 2002, at 1 ("Since the first known donor plaque - an
engraving on a Sumerian tablet - went up 5,000 years ago, special treatment for wealthy
benefactors has been standard operating procedure."); see also Edith L. Fisch, The Cy Pres
Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L. REV. 375, 375 (1952) (discussing third century
bequest to support commemorative games).
10 Alice Thomas, Naming Rights at OSU Come in All Sizes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June
18, 2001, at Al.
"1 The term "bargain" has particular implications when speaking of the legal status of
a given donor-charity naming arrangement. See infra Part V. In the above context, the term
is used more generically to convey the idea of certain trade-offs that occur in framing the
broader charitable environment, as discussed in scholarly literature on the subject.
12 See, e.g., Quinn v. People's Trust & Sav. Co., 60 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Ind. 1945)
(discussing inapplicability to charitable gifts of rule against unlawfully accumulating
income and unlawfully restraining power to alienate property). See generally JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895). For a further
exposition on the rule against accumulations, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and perpetual
trusts, see generally Karen J. Sneddon, The Sleeper Has Awakened: The Rule Against
Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REV. 189 (2001).
13 This is particularly so where the gift gives rise to a charitable trust. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. d (2001) (explaining application of rule against
perpetuities to charitable versus noncharitable trust interests, and noting that "[a]
charitable trust is not invalid although by its terms it is to continue for an indefinite or
unlimited period of time."); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.18 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining application of Rule Against Perpetuities to
contingent future interests involving private versus charitable interests); see also Ball v.
Hall, 274 A.2d 516, 523 (Vt. 1971). In Ball, the court explains:
The State affords various privileges and immunities to a donor who is inspired to
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As a general rule, the state limits dead hand control [over property]
through the rule against perpetuities, under which property owners
can dictate the use and enjoyment of amassed societal wealth for
roughly a century after death. The rule strikes a balance between
property owners' desires to exercise control from beyond the grave
and a perceived societal interest in having the use of resources
determined by the living. In the case of gifts to charity, however,
the state strikes a more generous bargain with donors. Donors get
to extend their control indefinitely... [and] the state not only allows
[this] .. ., but monitors and enforces it. The reason.., is an implicit
quid pro quo: In exchange for perpetual donor control, society gets
14
wealth devoted to recognizably "public" purposes.
Although the Rule Against Perpetuities would make it difficult for a
donor to favor forever those of her descendants who bear her name, that
same donor could clearly endow a charitable institution to perpetually
bear her name." Other advantages might also pertain, such as a more
establish a charitable trust which are not available to trusts for private uses. Not
the least of these is the release from the rule against perpetuities and various tax
advantages. Such concessions are founded on the belief that the public interest
derives substantial benefit from such creations.
Ball, 264 A.2d at 523. For a discussion of dead hand control over property, see, for example,
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
" Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114 (1992). This
bargain is further extended in the case of charitable trusts, to which the doctrine of cy pres
might apply to permit some modification flexibility in exchange for the grant of perpetual
life. See id. at 1114-15 (extending his analysis of donor-society bargain to encompass the cy
pres doctrine); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts:
Expanding the Use of Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353,357 (1999) ("Under normative
theory, the settlor who establishes a charitable trust is viewed as entering into a contract
with the public... pursuant to which the trust is given perpetual life in exchange for the
public's right to modify the trust terms, both substantive and administrative ...."); infra
Part VI.A (discussing cy pres doctrine).
," If the donor attempted to fund a perpetual trust to favor particular descendants, the
trust would fail in those states that have not altogether joined the trend of exempting
private trust interests from the Rule Against Perpetuities. In contrast, the same trust would
be held valid if its purposes favored a perpetually named charitable organization. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRuSTS § 28 cmt. d (2001); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1304-12 (2003) (discussing basic principles
and the recent evolution of the Rule Against Perpetuities). As a practical matter, it would
be quite difficult for a donor to perpetually control consumable personal property or
fungible commodities, absent the use of a trust. This explains why "most future
interests ... are equitable interests subject to a trust, the corpus of which is likely to consist
entirely or principally of personal property such as stocks and bonds . STOEBUCK &
WHrTMAN, supra note 13, § 3.1.
With regard to the statement appearing in the text supra and the use of nontrust
conditions to control property given to private persons, a donor might attempt to control
2005]
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liberal construction of poorly articulated charitable gifts in an effort to
effect the donor's charitable designs, where in the private context the gift
would simply fail.16 Finally, society essentially subsidizes the donor's
choice of charitable cause by reducing the donor's tax liability when a
charitable contribution is made.17 This indirect subsidy is accomplished
property by imposing a condition on the recipient's right to retain the property and by
correspondingly calling for forfeiture in the event of noncompliance with the condition. If
the forfeiture in the event of noncompliance is in favor of the donor or the donor's heirs,
the gift over is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States. Id. at
§§ 3.1-3.4, 3.17-3.18. Although the condition and gift over would be valid, the call for
forfeiture would be of little consequence as an enforcement mechanism, unless the donor
were living or had other heirs who could take the property via forfeiture upon breach of
the condition. A donor without other heirs might instead provide for forfeiture to an
unrelated third party in the event of breach of the condition. Again, absent a charity as
primary beneficiary, the condition would be subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Because the condition creates an executory interest in the third party following a
noncharitable interest, subject to a contingency of indefinite duration, the third party's
interest would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities and be void. See STOEBUCK &
WHrrMAN, supra note 13, §§ 2.4-2.8. Thus, the condition would again be of little
consequence as an enforcement mechanism with regard to compliance with the condition.
As to the ongoing validity or invalidity of the condition itself in such a case, see id. With
regard to gifts over in favor of alternative charitable beneficiaries upon fqrfeiture, see infra
Parts VI.A.2.b. and VI.A.4.
16 This rule of liberal construction of attempted charitable gifts is a longstanding one.
See, e.g., Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (1 Allen) 539, 1867 WL 5527 (Mass. 1867) ("[Tlhe
words of a charitable bequest . . .are to be so construed as to support the charity, if
possible."). Where the gift is in trust, for example, the donor is not even required to
designate a particular charitable beneficiary, so long as the gift is clearly charitable.
4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 364
(1989). In contrast, the failure to designate a specific beneficiary is fatal to a private trust.
See id. (describing this as "[tihe most important distinction between a private trust and a
charitable trust").
17 The concept of a subsidy is most often stated in the context of justifying the tax
exemption granted to the charitable organization, though the policies underlying this
exemption and those underlying the contribution deduction are closely related. See, e.g.,
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS
849-68 (2d ed. 2000) ("Congress has justified the charitable deduction, like tax exemption
generally, as an efficient alternative to government support for those nonprofit
organizations providing a public benefit."); Colombo, supra note 3, at 661, 682 ("[Tlhe main
thesis of this Article is that the section 170 deduction is best explained as an indirect
government subsidy to charitable organizations ..... .. [The most widely accepted
rationale for the section 170 deduction remains that the deduction helps subsidize the
activities of charitable organizations."); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income
Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV.
419, 430-39 (1998) (explaining various theories, including subsidy theory, underlying tax
treatment of charitable organizations). For a discussion regarding the distinction between
tax exemption and charitable contribution tax deduction, see DARRYL K. JONES ET AL., THE
TAx LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (2003) and BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS § 1.2 (8th ed. 2003).
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via the grant of a charitable contribution tax deduction to donors."8 That
deduction generally serves to reduce the donor's tax liability, and the
resulting tax savings, therefore, reduce the donor's cost of funding the
chosen cause. 19
A proper evaluation of the ramifications of charitable naming
opportunities requires attention to two relationships or agreements. The
first is the immediate agreement struck at the donor/charity level, where
donees solicit specific gifts and the parties fashion their terms. The
second is the macro level "bargain" between donors and society, where
20the broader privileges afforded to charitable naming gifts are derived.
This Article considers those donor, charity, and societal perspectives in
its examination of the ramifications and proper treatment of charitable
naming contributions.
More specifically, this Article explores the conflicts that often result
from a charitable naming opportunity contribution. In furtherance of
that exploration, this Article analyzes several state law doctrines that
often affect the implementation of the terms of charitable naming
agreements. This exploration reveals that various legal outcomes are
possible under current law with regard to the long-term implementation
of charitable naming contribution arrangements. The enduring nature of
naming agreements, imprecise donor-charity dealings, flexibility in
applicable state law doctrines, and the vagaries facilitated through
reverence to donor intent contribute to this variability in outcomes. Such
variability in witnessed outcomes presents difficulties for both donor
and societal interests. Donors, for example, may be inspired to even
more strictly condition their charitable naming contributions in an effort
to foreclose judicial "meddling" with their charitable naming design.
The Article argues that the noted variability in outcomes and resulting
"s "The basic concept of the federal income tax charitable contribution deduction is
that individuals who itemize deductions... can deduct ... an amount equivalent to the
value of the contribution made .... " HOPKINS, supra note 17, § 2.5; see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(a) (2002) (authorizing income tax deduction for "charitable contribution"); 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(c)(2) (explaining that "charitable contribution" is "contribution or gift to or for the
use of" certain specified types of entities organized for purposes of furthering certain
specified purposes). A charitable contribution tax deduction may alternatively be available
under gift or estate tax provisions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2522 (gift tax), 2055 (estate tax). Title 26
of the United States Code is hereinafter referred to as the "Internal Revenue Code" or
"I.R.C."
'" See Colombo, supra note 3, at 683 ("Because a contribution is [tax] deductible, the
contributor saves the taxes that otherwise would have been due on the contribution,
making its true economic cost to the contributor lower.").
20 See infra Part V.B.3 (discussing more technical use of term "bargain" in context of
these charitable naming contributions); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20051
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donor tactics may ultimately work to the disadvantage of charities. As
explored below, the referenced tactics can result in the imposition of
onerous, inflexible, and often unclear naming conditions. Such
conditions, in turn may unduly constrain the charitable recipient from
effectively pursuing the very charitable mission that allegedly inspired
the donor's contribution in the first instance. Such constraints may arise,
for example, by forcing decisions that are tailored to preserve the donor's
naming scheme to the detriment of more logical charitable direction."
This Article presents suggestions for dealing with both existing and
future charitable naming arrangements where some deviation from the
original charitable naming scheme is implicated. The posited
suggestions respect both the donor's name perpetuation intentions and
the broader societal interest in the effective pursuit of charitable mission,
while demonstrating that the two objectives are not mutually exclusive.
Part II of this Article details the nature of the problems that charitable
naming opportunities can create. Part III explores the meaning of
"charity" as affected by a donor's personal desire to perpetuate a name.
Part IV considers the modem spate of philanthropically inclined, but
ethically challenged, "bad actors" whose notorious names now adorn
various charitable facilities and institutions. Parts V and VI discuss
relevant contract, conditional gift, and trust doctrines and the application
of those doctrines to charitable naming situations. Part VII examines the
practical contours of the various perspectives and legal doctrines at issue
here. That examination employs the important and highly publicized
ongoing dispute involving a possible name change for Avery Fisher Hall,
site of the Lincoln Center's philharmonic concert hall.u2 Part VII also
presents suggestions as to how the implicated legal doctrines might
better accommodate the competing concerns that arise when an
otherwise positive charitable name association becomes problematic.
21 With regard to the prospect of more onerous conditions and how they might affect
the pursuit of charitable mission, see infra Parts V.C and VI.A.4. "Allegedly inspired" with
regard to donor motivations is a loaded term in this context, as the judicial decisions that
evaluate charitable naming opportunity situations are replete with references to the
importance - or irrelevance - of a donor's desire to promote charitable objectives in
connection with the imposition of a perpetual naming condition. See infra Part VI.
' The dispute has made news from coast to coast, and even overseas. See, e.g., Elaine
Dutka, Avery Fisher Now, But Will It Stick, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at F2; Robin Pogrebin,
Avery Fisher Hall Forever, Heirs Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,2002, at El; David Usborne, Discord
Over Name of Orchestra Home, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 5, 2002, at 15. For a more
detailed exposition of the Avery Fisher Hall dispute, see infra Part VII.
[Vol. 38:375
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 384 2004-2005
Charitable Naming Gifts
II. CHARITABLE NAMING SITUATIONS AND THE ULTIMATE PROBLEM
The arguments and ideas pursued here require an understanding of
the particular naming opportunities and consequent problems that are
the focus of this Article. The concern is with individual donative naming
arrangements. These arrangements involve natural-person donors and
their contributions of money or other property to charitable
organizations upon terms that result in the donor's name being
associated in some way with the organization, its institutions, activities,
or facilities.23 A layman's explanation might describe the commonly
understood charitable contribution as one that results in a charitable
contribution tax deduction, only now with the added prerequisite of the
recipient charity allowing the donor some type of naming recognition.24
Another explanation would describe the naming opportunity as a "quid
pro quo" given by the charity to the donor in exchange for the donor's
contribution. 5
Not at issue here are commercial sponsorships or naming rights, such
as those that have given us "3-Com Stadium" or "Official Sponsor of the
Summer Olympics." 26 Also excluded from primary consideration are
honorary name recognitions. San Diego's former "Jack Murphy
Stadium" presents an example of both situations. Jack Murphy was a
sports columnist who played an instrumental, albeit nonmonetary, role
in helping the city to acquire a professional football franchise many years
ago.2 7 Those efforts resulted in Mr. Murphy's name adorning the city's
professional sports stadium.28 When the stadium naming rights were
sold to Qualcom for $18 million in 1997, however, replacing the Jack
n3 The name could also be a family name, or the name of a loved one of the donor. The
point is that some perpetuation of an individual or private name is required.
24 For a discussion regarding the charitable contribution tax deduction, see supra notes
17-20, infra notes 125-135, and accompanying text.
' Viewed more technically, these two descriptions suggest a potential contradiction in
that one explanation describes a gift while the other proposes an exchange. See infra Part
V.B.3. With regard to use of "quid pro quo" terminology in the context of naming
opportunity contributions, see supra note 14, infra note 127, and accompanying text.
26 For examples of commercial naming opportunities or sponsorships, see Beverly
Beyette, Welcome to Logo Land, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at El; Geoff Mulvihill, Sale of
Naming Rights Puts School in Line of Fire, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/8465851.htm?lc (last visited June
17, 2004) (discussing sale of naming rights by public schools to corporations); Doug
Saunders, No Billboard Too Small as Arts Go Hunting for Sponsors, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Dec. 28, 1996, at C17 (noting that "[like big-league stadiums before them, arts venues are
changing their look and function in order to become more attractive to big business").
27 M.L. Stein, Cash Erases Scribe's Name, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 29, 1997, at 3.
28 Id.
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Murphy name was a matter of public relations and not legal rights.
In contrast, the situations discussed in this Article involve a charitable
organization's desire or effort to deviate from naming provisions that
accompanied an individual's monetary transfer to that organization. The
prospect of deviating from those naming provisions raises numerous
legal and policy issues.
A. The Ultimate Problem Stated
The ultimate charitable naming opportunity conflict arises when the
charitable recipient seeks to rid itself of the donor's name at some point
following acceptance of a charitable naming contribution. Other
variations on this name problem exist and are collectively referred to
here as "name deviation" situations. Short of discarding a name
altogether, for example, a charity may instead desire to alter the
particular project bearing the donor's name, or perhaps to relocate or
subordinate the name within the confines of a donor's chosen charitable
pursuit. This would be the case, for instance, where a donor long-ago
contributed funds for the establishment of a named hospital wing to
treat victims of a stated disease. As time passes in this example, medical
advances ultimately dictate the avoidance of such dedicated hospital
space in light of current manifestations of that disease. Such medical
advances might further dictate that treatment of the disease is now more
effectively pursued through an outpatient facility.31 This suggests what
City officials were careful to consult with the editor of Mr. Murphy's former
newspaper to ensure that goodwill would not be undermined by the 1997 name change.
Stein, supra note 27, at 3. The playing field itself will be named for Jack Murphy, the trolley
stop outside the stadium will bear his name, and his statue will be erected outside the
stadium. Id. Qualcom acquired the right to name the stadium in 1997, and retains
those rights through 2017. See Stadium History, at http:// www.chargers.com/stadium
/stadiurnhistory.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
Similarly excluded from consideration here are those situations where the
association of a donor's name with a charity is at all times subject to removal or
modification in the discretion of some governing board or agency. An example of this
situation would be Northwestern University's football stadium, formerly named Dyche
Stadium. See Rick Morrissey, Fans, Players in Heaven Thanks to NU's Angel, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
11, 1997, at 1.
3 The general idea of a charity seeking to avoid or alter its use of a donor's name, for
whatever reason, is hereinafter referred to generally as a "name deviation."
3 These types of circumstances as affecting naming and other provisions are discussed
in detail in Parts VI and thereafter in this Article. This example will be referenced again.
For an example of how a circumstance like that noted immediately above might arise, see
In re Scott's Will, 171 N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y. 1960). In that case, the court found that the
donor had three purposes in mind when the gift was made: (1) to perpetuate his family
name through a memorial building; (2) to associate that building with a New York Church
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may be a plausible reason for deviating from the strictures of the naming
provision - perhaps in this case by transferring the name from the
hospital wing to an affiliated outpatient facility dedicated to treatment of
the disease of initial donor concern. For good or ill, however, the
hospital is constrained in reacting to these changes. Constraints arise
because any change in operations would affect the donor's specified
association of her name with a hospital wing dedicated to a particular32
purpose. When issues like this arise, charities and courts are left to
ponder whether the donor was more concerned with assisting the
particular hospital, assisting victims of the specified disease, or simply
taking advantage of both to facilitate her private name perpetuation
objectives.
B. Two Scenarios, Two Perspectives
Two name deviation scenarios emerge as particularly relevant. The
first scenario involves the surprising number of charitably inclined
malfeasants whose names now adorn various charitable institutions or
facilities across the nation.n These "bad actor" naming situations raise
questions about whether our public institutions are forever bound to
memorialize such persons. If such persons' names may, in fact, be
with which the donor had been affiliated; and (3) to assist in the treatment and care of
persons suffering from tuberculosis. Id. at 329. The provision in the donor's will that
included the gift to effect these purposes did not become effective until approximately 45
years after the donor's death, due to intervening life interests. Id. at 327. By that time, both
the cost and methods for treating tuberculosis had evolved beyond the donor's vision. Id.
As stated by the court, "the need for homes for the care of tuberculosis patients has
precipitously declined during the course of the years since the [donor's] death ...." Id.
The Arizona court confronted a similar issue three decades later in In re Estate of Craig,
where it noted that since the terms of the donor's gift were established, "[tihe incidence of
tuberculosis has greatly diminished and the methods of treating it have undergone a
revolution." In re Estate of Craig, 848 P.2d 313, 319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). In Craig, the
court dealt with a gift to establish a new hospital for treatment of tuberculosis patients.
Significant changes occurred in both the cost of the donor's desired hospital facilities and in
the manifestations and treatment of tuberculosis subsequent to the time the gift was
incorporated into the donor's will. Id. at 318.
32 Four possible outcomes include: (1) continued operation of the named hospital
wing for treatment of the stated disease, even though clearly a sub-optimal way to
approach treatment of that disease; (2) continued operation of the named hospital wing for
treatment of maladies more logically addressed in a hospital setting, with treatment of the
disease of initial donor concern (Original Disease) being moved to an outpatient facility; (3)
moving the name to an affiliated outpatient facility that focuses upon treatment of the
Original Disease; (4) closure of the hospital wing, at least with regard to treatment of the
Original Disease, and forfeiture of the donor's naming contribution due to noncompliance
with the original gift terms.
' See infra Part IV (discussing specific examples).
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avoided, a further question concerns the consequences of deviating from
the bad actor's contribution terms. The specific question is whether the
affected charity must forfeit the underlying contribution in order to
escape the name.
A second problematic charitable naming opportunity scenario centers
upon the questions that arise when the strictures of a privately
motivated, well-aged, and often imprecisely stated naming condition
confront the simple reality of evolving charitable circumstances. Such
circumstances often implicate the possible need to deviate from the
specific terms of the donor's naming condition, either directly or as
associatively intertwined with a particular charitable purpose or its
pursuit. The example noted above - involving the named hospital wing
for treatment of a specified disease and evolving circumstances that
suggest superior treatment through an outpatient facility - fits this
mold.34 Although creativity alone suggests many possible outcomes for
that hospital-outpatient facility situation,-" two general perspectives
emerge as to how such situations might be characterized.
1. The Pro-donor Perspective
On the one hand, a pro-donor viewpoint favoring strict adherence to
the terms of donor-charity dealings would demand ongoing charitable
compliance with the naming condition precisely as stated. To continue
the previous hospital-outpatient facility example, a pro-donor viewpoint
would argue that the name must continue to be associated with the
specified hospital wing for treatment of the specified disease, without
variation. 36 Under this view of the base conflict, there is simply nothing
else meriting consideration. Any charity effort to escape or vary the
naming requirements would likely be characterized as "charitable
opportunism." This implies an improperly motivated desire to escape
the donor's terms and perhaps even to remarket the naming privilege.
2. The Societal Perspective
The socially beneficial dimensions of the donor's original contribution
suggest a second view. That view would characterize the hospital-
outpatient scenario as one involving questions of charitable efficienw
' See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (regarding hospital-outpatient facility
example).
' See supra note 32 (discussing four possible outcomes).
' Outcomes 1 and 4, noted supra note 32, would be most directly suggested by the
pro-donor perspective.
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versus the negatives of perpetual dead-hand control over charitable
pursuits through donor imposition of detailed naming conditions.37 This
view would favor flexibility in the accomplishment of a charitable
mission, with a correspondingly flexible accommodation of a donor's
name association demands. The suggested prioritization recognizes that
a naming condition has nothing to do with the accomplishment of any
charitable purpose, beyond the bare premise that the naming
opportunity may have facilitated the contribution to charity in the first
instance. The name condition itself promotes only private concerns and
cannot possibly be conceived as adding anything to the meaning,
pursuit, or accomplishment of any. charitable objective. The societal
viewpoint, therefore, posits that such conditions should hold only
limited power to impede the efficient accomplishment of charitable
objectives.
3. Flexibility and Nuance
There are, of course, many nuances that affect the merits of both the
pro-donor and societal perspectives. First, there is the question of
determining the donor's preferred objective if changed circumstances
undermine the simultaneous accomplishment of both charitable and
name perpetuation goals.i Even if the donor clearly preferred to
perpetuate her name to a subordinate charitable mission, a further
question arises concerning the respect that society should afford such
prioritization. 39 That question becomes more clouded upon realization
that many courts have found alternative routes to preserve the name
perpetuation aspect of a donor's plan when the precise charitable scheme
is varied.40  Wholesale sacrifice of the donor's name perpetuation
purposes is not, therefore, a necessary incident to giving adequate
respect to society's stake in the venture.
Against this background, the doctrines, policies, and factual
circumstances that tend to dominate the realm of charitable naming
contributions present themselves for more detailed exploration.
" Outcomes 2 and 3, noted supra note 35, would be most directly suggested by a
perspective that focuses upon the public benefit associated with the donor's original
contribution. See infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing charitable efficiency).
See infra Part VI.
See infra Parts VIE, VI.
4o See infra Part VI.C.
20051
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III. A FIRST LOOK AT INTENT AND MOTIVATION IN CHARITABLE NAMING
GIFrs
From the noted societal perspective, charitable naming opportunity
problems arise when donor-charity naming conditions intersect with and
threaten to diverge from society's expectation that the contribution will
"facilitate the achievement of a general charitable purpose."41 In that
regard, and in order for the noted advantages of more enduring donor
control and tax deduction to apply, both the common law and federal tax
law insist that a contribution be made to a charitable recipient and for a
charitable purpose. "Charitable" as used in this context is a term of art
that most basically encompasses the furthering of a substantial public
interest.42 The basic distinction is between the dedication of property to
private purposes, such as to benefit a limited class of defined persons
like the donor or her heirs, versus dedication of that property to benefit a
sufficiently broad (albeit not all-encompassing) segment of the public
like the poor, the sick, or students. 43  Although there is "no fixed
standard" for determining the charitable nature of a contribution, one
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. City of Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 753 (Mass. 1970). The
policy issues relating to charitable opportunism and the potential for disregarding donor-
charity bargains are discussed more fully in infra Parts VI and VII.
42 See Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., C. 4 (1601 Eng.) (enunciating
nonexclusive list of purposes thought to be charitable in nature); Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S.
(1 Black) 465, 506 (1861) ("[A] charity is a gift to a general public use, which extends to the
rich, as well as to the poor .... Generally, devises and bequests having for their object
establishments of learning are considered as given to charitable uses ..... but that does not
make a devise good to a college for purposes not of a collegiate character, intended chiefly
to gratify the vanity of the testator .... All property held for public purposes is held as a
charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity."); Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves.
399, 405 (1804) (applying Statute of Charitable Uses); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (1 Allen)
539, 1867 WL 5527 (Mass. 1867) (expounding upon meaning of "charity" and "charitable"
gift); RESTATEMENT (TI-SRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2001) (echoing preamble to Statute of
Charitable Uses).
For the importation of common-law conceptions of "charitable" into the Internal
Revenue Code, see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983) ("[A]n
examination [of the Internal Revenue Code] reveals unmistakable evidence that,
underlying all relevant parts of the [Internal Revenue Code], is the intent that entitlement
to [charitable] tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity
- namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and
not be contrary to established public policy."). See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b), 501(a), 501(c)(3)
(2002) (regarding nature and function of recipient charitable organizations for tax
purposes.). With regard to the charitable contribution tax deduction, see 26 U.S.C.
§§ 170(a), 170(c), 2 055(a), 2522(a). See generally BORIS BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 2
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS Ch. 35 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
charitable contribution income tax deduction requirements). The terms "contribution" and
"gift" do not have distinct meanings in this context.
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a(1) (2001).
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basic criterion is that the "purposes [must be] of a character sufficiently
of interest or beneficial to the community to justify permitting the
property to be devoted forever to their accomplishment and to justify
whatever other special privileges are accorded."
A fundamental question with regard to naming opportunity
contributions concerns the characterization of such contributions as
charitable in nature. This question arises because naming contributions
clearly further two distinct purposes. On the one hand, such
contributions are clearly charitable in that they provide an immediate
flow of funds to an organization deemed charitable under the noted
standards.45 The contribution, therefore, promotes whatever public good
underlies that organization's charitable status. On the other hand,
naming contributions also exploit the recipient organization's charitable
status for private name perpetuation purposes. In so doing, the donor
avails herself of the advantages of both tax deduction and the waiver of
rules that otherwise prevent perpetual donor control over gifted
property. 46 The donor could also be described as having purchased an
identity associated with some aspect of the public good.47
Potential problems arise from this mix of charitable and private
purposes. From the donor's perspective, for example, the waiver of
certain rules and other favoritisms accorded charitable gifts may not
apply absent a sufficient charitable flavor. This could result in failure of
a donor plan that was structured to take advantage of those favoritisms.4
Id. at cmt. 1. For a discussion regarding the privileges society accords charitable
gifts, see supra Part I.
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (regarding standard for "charity").
See supra Part I (discussing waiver, in context of charitable gifts, of restrictive rules
that might otherwise limit enduring donor control over transferred property). In his
examination of the tax treatment of charitable naming opportunities, Professor Colombo
observes, "The payments that resulted in these commemorative plaques and inscriptions
almost certainly were deducted from the payer's gross income [for tax purposes]."
Colombo, supra note 3, at 658.
" See supra note 7 (discussing identity preservation as motive in charitable giving).
" For example, if a donor's gift violates the Rule Against Perpetuities as applied to
private interests, or is in trust but vague as to specified beneficiaries, the gift will fail if it is
deemed to support private purposes. On the other hand, similar gifts will be upheld if the
private purposes, like establishing some type of named memorial, are not deemed so
significant as to overwhelm the overall charitable character of the gift. See, e.g., Bills v.
Pease, 100 A. 146, 147 (Me. 1917) (confronting these issues and upholding gift as charitable
in nature); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 398 (discussing charitable and invalid
purposes). This problem is sometimes stated as that arising in the case of "mixed trusts"
(i.e., those that are both private and charitable in nature). In such cases, "[it is usually
held . . ., where there is no basis for dividing the fund . . . , that the entire trust is void
because of indefiniteness of beneficiaries and because of the perpetual or indefinite
duration of the trust." GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 372
2005]
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A troublesome issue for society surfaces upon realization that the
donor's purely private naming demands may endure well beyond the
foreseeable future and into perpetuity precisely because of the charitable
nature of the gift. Yet, subsequent failure in regard to that private
naming demand may call for termination of the charitable benefit.49
Legal doctrine, however, does not treat charitable status and name
perpetuation goals as necessarily mutually exclusive. Determination of
the charitable nature of a contribution ultimately turns upon the effect of
the gift as advancing the public welfare.50 If that end is served, the
donor's personal motivation to perpetuate her name will not defeat
characterization of the gift as "charitable" under common-law notions of
that concept."1 As summarized by one court:
The fact that the [donor] desired to have his name associated with
the charity and to perpetuate it therein, does not detract from the
charitable character of the bequest. The [donor] may have [made
the transfer] solely to satisfy his personal pride, for self-glorification,
or he may have [been motivated by] altruism; but regardless of the
reasons, a court of equity is not interested in the [donor's] motive.
We are interested only in the result of the [transfer] upon the
52community and society in general .
(rev. 2d ed. 1991). For a discussion regarding more liberal rules of construction as applied
in the case of charitable gifts, see, for example, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
I See infra Part V.B (discussing forfeiture as potential remedy for noncompliance with
donor conditions).
I See, e.g., Gibson v. Frye Inst., 193 S.W. 1059, 1061 (Tenn. 1917) ("[T]he... effect of a
gift determine[s] its character, rather than the motive of the donor."); BOGERT, supra note
48, § 366.
' See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 97 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1971) ("[Tlhe fact that
decedent may also have been motivated by a desire to perpetuate the memory of her
mother .. .does not destroy [the gift's] charitable nature."). Although some cases have
mistakenly equated "charitable" to require a particularly unselfish or pure motive on the
part of donors, this view is not correct. BOGERT, supra note 48, § 366. Professor Bogert calls
"unsound" the idea that the donor's motive is important in determining if a particular gift
is charitable. Id. If the name provision relates to memorializing a public figure of historical
significance unrelated to the donor, the question is much easier to resolve, as the name is,
in fact, part of the charitable nature of the gift. See, e.g., Smith v. Powers, 117 A.2d 844, 849
(R.I. 1955) (holding that trust established to preserve home as memorial to unrelated,
distinguished citizens of state from Revolutionary War period, was charitable in nature).
For a discussion regarding the nature of a donor's contribution as "charitable" for tax
deduction purposes, see supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
2 Heinlein v. Elyria Sav. & Trust Co., 62 N.E.2d 284, 288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945); accord,
Estate of Cambell, 97 Cal. Rptr. 726, 728 (Ct. App. 1971) ("[Tlhe fact that decedent may also
have been motivated by a desire to perpetuate the memory of her mother ... does not
destroy [the] charitable character [of the gift].").
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This result is defensible as a general proposition. Typically, naming
"motives ... do not detract from the social benefit which the [transfer]
may bring, [and the naming scenario] may . . . [also] have social
advantages by inducing others to emulate the character of the donor and
to make gifts which are in the public interest."5 3 Clearly, then, there is
ample precedent for the proposition that a naming provision does not per
se defeat the charitable nature of a donor's transfer.
For many people, moreover, the foregoing ideas and a strict view of
enforcing agreements provide clear direction 'for resolving charitable
naming disputes. These ideas suggest that naming conditions should be
honored, absolutely. 4  Such general propositions often require
qualification when examined more closely, however. For example, the
question of whether the donor's name on a plaque above a building
entrance somehow defeats the charitable nature of the educational,
artistic, or other endeavors realized through that facility is a fairly easy
one to answer, from an abstract, present tense point of view.5  The
challenge becomes more complicated and its implications more severe,
however, when burdened with the consequence that any future removal
of the name plaque for any reason may compel forfeiture of the
contributed funds. This would be the case even if the removal were
occasioned by changed circumstances and accompanied by an
alternative accommodation of the name.-6 Removal of the name plate
could thus force closure of the facility or a reduction in charitable
operations, either actually or through the practical equivalent of17
diversion of charitable funds to meet the forfeiture consequence. As
noted, however, legal doctrines that define the concept of "charity" are
not dissuaded by such arguments.
" See, e.g., BOGERT, supra note 48, § 366; Gibson, supra note 2 at W13 (discussing how
big donors add credibility and allow charities to "leverage" their participation). Of course,
in the case of bad actors like the corporate malfeasants, this rationale arguably fails on both
accounts. See infra Part IV.
See supra Part II.B.1.
" See, e.g., In re Mayer's Estate, 47 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1965) (noting that devise
called for name plates or plaques).
Forfeiture is the primary remedy for noncompliance with a naming condition. See
infra Part V.B.
17 In other words, through forfeiture or mandatory refund of the contribution, society
returns the "value" of the contribution to the donor. Even if the facility does not actually
close, society essentially repurchases the facility from the donor by operation of the
forfeiture provision. See infra Part VI.A.4 (discussing forfeiture to alternative charitable
beneficiary).
2005]
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IV. BAD ACTORS, LOGIC, AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES
An unusual, but increasingly common, situation that demonstrates the
potential dilemmas that can result from a naming contribution warrants
specific consideration. That situation involves the charitable donor who
is later revealed to have engaged in notoriously bad conduct. The focus
is upon the recent spate of corporate malfeasants who, though charitably
inclined, are alleged or proven to have engaged in clearly reprehensible
conduct as judged by the standards of the day." In this realm of name-
limited charitable contributions, the concept of public policy has a
particular role to play in the evaluation of continued adherence to these
donor-charity naming agreements.
A. Corporate and Other Malfeasants
Consider the case of Dennis Kozlowski, former CEO of Tyco
International Ltd. Kozlowski is now under indictment for tax evasion,
misappropriation of corporate funds, and illegal stock salesi9 His
conduct led Business Week to dub him "a rogue CEO for the ages." 6° For
the ages, indeed: on Seton Hall's campus sits "Kozlowski Hall," and at his
The concern here is not with long-dead corporate magnates, like John D. Rockefeller
or Andrew Carnegie, who may stand accused of using heavy-handed or now-disfavored
business practices. See, e.g., JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE MONEY GIvERS 20 (1971) ("[M]uch of
the wealth controlled by American [charitable] foundations was ruthlessly accumulated ...
by men who took full and knowing advantage of the casual, do-anything mores of the
Robber Baron era of American Business."); id. at 33-35 (discussing Rockefeller foundation
and its founder's legal troubles). Similarly excluded would be philanthropists like James B.
Duke, who endowed Duke University with tobacco proceeds - a source of wealth that
many may now condemn. See id. at 46-49 (discussing James B. Duke and his philanthropy).
In fact, those long-established names today have acquired such philanthropically or
mission-specific value in their charitable field that it is implausible to assert that the
arguments presented here will be regarded as presenting any challenge to their continued
longevity. The analysis here is simply not concerned with names that are, today, more
commonly recognized for their philanthropic or mission-specific association than for
someone's early century business tactics. It would be implausible to argue, for example,
that Duke University might now seek to change its name on the grounds that after so many
decades of association, the name now contradicts the charity's stated mission. Of course,
this raises the more philosophical issue of whether past donors should have been permitted
to purchase redefined immortality through perpetual naming gifts in the first instance.
Anthony Bianco et al., The Rise and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, BUS. WK., Dec. 23,2002, at
64. Kozlowski was indicted in 2002 on charges that he looted $600 million from Tyco
International, Ltd., the company for which he served as CEO. Id. His case ended in a
mistrial after a juror received a threatening letter but is expected to be tried again soon.
Chad Bray, Executives on Trial: Belnick's Defense Wants to Use Testimony From First Tyco Case,
Wall St. J., May 25, 2004, at C3.
6o Bianco, supra note 59, at 64.
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daughters' private prep school sits the "Kozlowski Athletic Center."6
The Seton Hall facility houses the university's business school, where
students learn how to get ahead, but hopefully also learn something
62
about business ethics. Even more oxymoronic is the professorship
Kozlowski helped endow (with tainted funds) at Cambridge University.
That professorship focuses upon the topic of corporate leadership and
accountability!63
Surely this notorious CEO is an aberration on the charitable naming
front; the odd-ball case that always lurks on the fringes to undermine
otherwise sound application of legal doctrine to achieve results that are
consistent with a straightforward pro-donor perspective. 4 That would
be the case only if one chooses to ignore the two other buildings on Seton
Hall's campus alone that are named for convicted or accused corporate
malfeasants.6 And, of course, there are many other similarly situated
former corporate executives cum philanthropists. Take, for example, the
now-indicted Richard Scrushy, former HealthSouth Corp. chairman
charged with facilitating a $3 billion accounting fraudfr6 As the Wall
Street Journal noted, "Mr. Scrushy's name adorns roads, buildings,
schools and athletic facilities . . . across Alabama."67 Also notable is
Alfred Taubman. Mr. Taubman is the price-fixing former chairman of
Sotheby's who gave $15,000,000 for Harvard's "Taubman Center for
State and Local Government," and whose name adorns the "Taubman
Center for Public Policy and American Institutions" at Brown University
and a medical center and architectural college at the University of
Michigani6 Not to be overlooked are the millions that Texas and
61 These naming opportunities were likely funded by the ill-gotten gains of
Kozlowski's criminal activities, and charges filed by Tyco assert that these naming
opportunities were purchased with Tyco funds. Christine Dugas, Tyco Sues Former Chief
Over Self-Serving Gifts, USA TODAY, Sept. 16, 2002, at B-3. Tyco is not, however, seeking to
recover those funds from the benefited charities. Id.
62 Ameet Sachdev, What's a School To Do When Fallen CEO's Name on Wall?, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 14, 2003, at 1.
Dugas, supra note 61, at B3.
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing pro-donor perspective).
John Byrne, Seton Hall's Hall of Shame, Bus. WK., Sept. 30, 2002, at 14 (noting that
recreation center at Seton Hall is named for Robert Brennan, First Jersey Securities founder
now convicted of fraud and money laundering; Seton Hall's "Walsh Library" is named for
another Tyco executive now being sued for breach of fiduciary duty).
' John R. Wilke & Chad Terhune, Scrushy May Be Indicted Today, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
2003, at A3.
67 Id.
6' Matthew Benjamin, An Embarrassment of Riches, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 30,
2002, at 36; Marcella Bombardieri, Harvard Benefactor In Furor Abroad, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
10, 2003, at Al; Sachdev, supra note 62.
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Missouri business schools accepted from former Enron chairman Ken
Lay "to create professorships and fancy-sounding programs in his
name. " 69 Lest there be any tendency still to proclaim this an isolated
phenomena, one can venture outside the realm of former corporate
executives, a/k/a mere criminals. Consider, for example, the $5,000,000
Harvard received to fund the Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and
East-Central Europe. The program is named for a telecommunications
magnate now under investigation in Greece for betraying his country as
71
a Cold War spy for communist East Germany. The mission of that
Harvard program, incidentally, happens to be the strengthening of
democracy and free market economies in the Balkans and nearby countries!2
The recent case of Stock v. Augsburg College73 demonstrates both the
reality and variability of this bad actor charitable naming situation. In
Stock, the donor and recipient college agreed that a wing in a new facility
would be named after the donor.74 Unknown to the college at the time it
accepted the gift and accompanying naming conditions was the fact that
the donor "had for years been secretly mailing anonymous letters to
families and individuals of mixed race and religion .. . denounce[ing]
mixed marriages [and] profess[ing] a viewpoint based on racial purity." 75
The donor was subsequently exposed, resulting in much unfavorable
publicity to the college by virtue of this donor relationship and the
naming opportunity.76 The college went on to construct the originally
contemplated building. The college, however, refused to name the wing
77
after the donor and refused to return the donor's money. Institutions
that dealt with the bad actors noted above faced similar prospects.7s
Carrie Johnson, Former Chairman of Enron Charged, WASH. POST, July 8, 2004, at Al;
Boert Trigaux, USF Business Dean Hopes It Is Not Too Late To Teach Ethics, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2003, at 1E. Ken Lay was indicted on July 7, 2004.
' Bombardieri, supra note 68, at Al.
71 Id.
72 Id.
I Stock v. Augsburg Coll., 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
71 Id. at *3.
7 Id.
76 Id.; see infra note 85 (using example of Vanderbilt University's decision to remove
"Confederate Memorial Hall" to discuss how negative association might pertain).
Stock, 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944, at *3.
78 See, e.g., Sachdev, supra note 62, at 1 (discussing various Universities' stances on
prospect of removing bad actor names, and possibly returning contribution); Greg Allen,
University of Missouri Under Pressure to Return a Donation Made by Former Enron Chairman
Ken Lay (NPR, All Things Considered, Sept. 24, 2004), audio available at
http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfld=3935835 (last visited Oct. 6, 2004)
(discussing calls for University of Missouri to return contribution, and University's pledge
to do so if Lay is convicted). The NPR story raises the interesting question of when,
[Vol. 38:375
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Although shamed donors have been known to accept personal
responsibility for charitable avoidance of the naming aspect of their
contribution, the donor in Stock was not so inclined.79 The Stock donor
adopted the pro-donor stance elucidated above.0 Unfortunately for
inquisitive observers, the Stock court was able to resolve the dispute on
procedural grounds; namely, the donor simply waited too long to sue.81
The court did clearly opine, however, that the donor would have been
able to recover his contribution upon showing breach of the naming
condition - forfeiture apparently being the remedy by whatever name
the action was given. 2 Clearly staking out its position on the matter, the
court concluded by suggesting that:
[I]t would be startling news to [the college's] alumni that their
college's "charitable and educational mission" includes specifically
soliciting contributions for a particular purpose, formalizing that
solicitation . ..and then claiming the power to say "Oops, we
changed our mind. We are not going to give your money back, but
instead we are going to keep it."
The court's perspective on the matter clearly reflects the donor's
preferred view of the situation. It is possible that this view will also
govern other potential disputes involving the continued name
association of the bad actor-philanthropists noted above. Further
exactly, a donor's "bad actor" status is sufficiently confirmed so as to warrant action
regarding a contribution or name. Specifically, the reporter notes that "[tihe University
administration ... did not feel that it would be fair to [Lay] to more or less convict him
until he had gone through the entire judicial process." Id. This issue is considered further
infra note 91.
' For an example of a donor acknowledging the extent of his bad acts and the
resulting potential for a negative charitable association, see Teltsch, supra note 2, at 5
(discussing Ivan Boesky's request that one of his charitable beneficiaries remove his name
"to save the school embarrassment").
I See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing pro-donor stance).
8, Stock, 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944, at *4. It would have been most insightful had the
court reached the merits of a fully briefed dispute.
82 Id at *6. The court recognized a cause of action for breach of contract, and also
addressed the matter under conditional gift doctrine. Id. at *4-7. The potential
characterization of the donor's action as one grounded in contract or other doctrine is
discussed in more detail infra Part V.B. It appears that the only possible outcome
considered by the court in Stock was forfeiture. Stock, 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944, at *3-7.
The contract analysis could have been affected by the clearly executory nature of the
arrangement, given that the name was never actually associated as agreed to at the time the
contribution was accepted. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
83 Stock, 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944, at *6. For a comprehensive treatment of
charitable solicitation of restricted gifts, see Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar
Above Twin Towers: A Federal Income Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus
Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827 (2003).
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analysis of this donor bad actor situation, however, reveals shortcomings
in an unquestioning adherence to the pro-donor perspective. In
particular, the court overlooked entirely the broader societal dimensions
of the situation.
B. The Public Policy Dimension
"Bad actor" situations raise a public policy argument both as a matter
of pure logic and legal doctrine. Most generally, public policy should
encompass concerns for whether and how charitable institutions are
affected by privately motivated naming conditions as those conditions
relate to charitable mission. Charitable organizations - often
denominated "public benefit organizations" to reflect the fact that such
organizations serve the public interest - conduct activities and provide
beneficial services in ways that neither the government nor the private
sector can match. 4 Prominent names that ultimately come to convey an
ideal that is contrary to the institution's charitable mission should
provoke a public policy inquiry as a matter of simple logic.& After all, do
we really want to enforce perpetual naming privileges for the "O.J.
See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 11-13 (2d ed.
1999) (discussing "inherent limitations" of government and private providers of goods and
services that result from market, contract, and government failures); Henry Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504-09 (1981) (comparing
nonprofit organizations to private providers); Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840-45 (1980) (categorizing nonprofits based upon their
donative, commercial, and other characteristics). See generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra
note 17, at 37-56 (discussing these authors and other theories for existence of nonprofit,
charitable sector).
Consider, for example, the situation confronting Vanderbilt University when it
decided to change the name of "Confederate Memorial Hall" to something less
"inflammatory." Confederate Hall to be Renamed, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2003, at 18. The United
Daughters of the Confederacy had given $50,000 to help fund construction of the building
in the 1930s, and they were reportedly "outraged" at the University's decision. Id.; Dahleen
Glanton, Old South Rises to Save Symbols, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2002, at 1. In response, the
group sued the University - the first time the group had been so inspired to act in its 108
year history. Id. In upholding the University's position, the judge opined that "[tihe name
'Confederate' on its building, with the stigma of the institution of slavery, is in
contradiction of [the University's] policy of diversity and makes it extremely difficult to
recruit minority faculty members and minority students." Confederate Hall to be Renamed,
supra, at 18.
As to the importance of mission consistency and negative connotations associated
with charitable naming opportunities, consider the opposite situation. Specifically, the
naming of one university's school of journalism after a prominent minority journalist has
been touted as "a magnet for black students - and a diversity lesson for white journalism
students that will prick their racial consciousness." DeWayne Wickham, A Name on a
Building-One of Several Important Strides for Black Journalists, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 2004, at
21A.
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Simpson Shelter for Battered Women" or "the Michael Jackson
Children's Home"? These suggestions might seem flippant were they
not set forth immediately after the above recitation of business schools,
professorships, and free-enterprise institutes named for headlining
corporate malefactors and alleged communist spies. Indeed, the point
has not gone unnoticed. One newspaper commentary, for example,
recently noted in connection with Seton Hall's notorious "Kozlowski
Hall" that "[a]s more and more chief executives are hauled into court in
handcuffs, business schools are trying to teach their minions not to
steal.
,8 6
In addition to undermining the force of a stated mission by sheer
contradiction, such associations can also blunt an organization's
effectiveness by bringing it into disrepute. Unless fully endowed, for
example, such institutions rely upon ongoing public support to finance.... . .. 87
their community-benefiting activities. It is not unreasonable to assume
that alumni or other donors would be hesitant about contributing to the
operating expenses or renovation costs of the "O.J. Simpson Shelter for
Battered Women," the "Michael Jackson Children's Home," or the
"[Name Your Felon] School of [Something Honorable]." The name, quite
simply, detracts from the mission for which suppgort is sought and
fosters the avoidance by others of future association.
Although many scholars recite the speculative assumption that any
curb on donor control over charitable gifts would irreparably "chill"
future charitable giving,89 refusal to enforce naming conditions on bad
actor grounds should have precisely the opposite effect. One reason is
that the "[Name Your Scoundrel] Hall" scenario devalues future naming
opportunities for all charitable institutions. Respect for the bad actor's
naming terms, in other words, carries its own "chill" consequences.
Further evidence of this contra-chill effect arises from the fact that
' The Auditor: An Inside Look at the Week in New Jersey, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Sept.
29, 2002, at 3. Similarly, some have suggested that the University of Missouri apply Ken
Lay's contribution to endow a chaired professorship in business ethics, in lieu of complying
with Lay's instruction that the funds be used to endow a named chair in international
economics. Allen, supra note 78; see supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing Ken
Lay).
87 See, e.g., Susan Gill Vardon, A New Construct for Seniors, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May
6, 2002, at A3 (noting that following $1.3 contribution for named senior center, "agency
struggle[s] each year to raise the funds to pay the $200,000 in operating costs and the
$50,000 building loan bill").
' See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing Vanderbilt University's
decision to remove "Confederate Memorial Hall").
'" See also infra notes 375-379 and accompanying text (discussing potential "chilling" of
donor contributions).
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criminal or mission-contradictory namings could impair further efforts
to raise more anonymous funds to support the now infamously named
charitable cause, as just noted.90 Ultimately, donor knowledge that only
"good" names will truly endure should enhance the lure of this
fundraising device to the philanthropic community, most of whose
members are not overly nervous about the Securities Exchange
Commission, Attorneys General, or other prying eyes discovering the
true nature of their lives.91
This line of reasoning survives the transition from layman's logic to
legal precedent. That precedent derives from established rules of
contract - cited here to dispel the simplistic "enforce the contract"
reaction seen in Stock, but nonetheless relevant whatever the
characterization given to a particular naming agreement.92 Those rules
provide that "[s]ometimes . . . a court will decide that the interest in
freedom of contract is outweighed by some overriding interest of society
and will refuse to enforce a promise or other term on grounds of public
o See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
Arguments that a more flexible public policy approach would lead to rampant
charitable opportunism should be mitigated by the fact that this public policy analysis is
not unbounded, and charities have also shown the ability to distinguish the types of bad
actors contemplated here. With regard to charities distinguishing bad actors from the more
honorable, consider the recent defense of Arthur Andersen (the man) offered by the dean
of Northwestern University's Kellogg School of Management (part of which is housed in
Andersen Hall) in the midst of questions about the continued name association following
the scandals that destroyed Arthur Andersen the firm: "We feel that [Andersen the man]
was a great contributor to management education . . . [and we] separate the individual
from the institution." Sachdev, supra note 62, at 1.
I have not attempted to precisely define the boundaries of "bad actor" conduct
beyond the idea of a name suggesting mission-inconsistency or spurring negative publicity
that demonstrably detracts from the charity's ability to accomplish its mission. Perhaps the
standard should require a criminal conviction or civil fine/liability, or perhaps such facts
should merely raise a presumption of name removability. It would perhaps be a more
straightforward matter to address if charities could be encouraged to incorporate their own
views of "moral turpitude" into their naming opportunity policies. For such a policy to
realistically work without offending donors, the terms would have to be applicable across
the institution and not simply negotiated on a case by case basis, because donors would
find offensive the suggestion of a potential for misconduct implicit in the particulars of
such individual negotiations. Unfortunately, many entities have very general policies or no
set policy at all in regards to naming opportunities. See Benjamin, supra note 68, at 36
(quoting Brown University official) ("I've never seen a moral turpitude clause in a donor
agreement," and noting that subsequent to its naming fiascos, Seton Hall, adopted policy
for name removal from facilities).
' For a discussion of the Stock case, see supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. The
potential characterization of the donor's action as one grounded in contract or other
doctrine is discussed in more detail infra Part V.B. With regard to the application of policy
reasoning in a broader context, see infra Part VII.
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policy."9 3 In this context, the public policy override should excuse the
charity's compliance with the naming condition while otherwise leaving
the contribution arrangement and more substantive conditions in place.94
As to concern for a donor's expectation that her naming provisions
would be enforced as written, the Restatement makes clear that "to the
extent [the donor] engaged in misconduct that was serious or deliberate,
[the donor's] claim to protection of [her] expectations fails."95
Along these same lines, one could further argue for excuse of the
naming condition on the grounds that a bad actor donor violates an
implicit duty of good faith by demanding a prominent and perpetual
naming opportunity while concealing or later engaging in notoriously
96bad conduct or other reprehensible bad acts. In such cases, and
regardless of the precise legal nature of the arrangement, courts should
be mindful of public policy considerations and look beyond the narrow
confines of the naming agreement to find support for deviation from the
donor's naming terms.
Bolstering such outcomes in the case of bad actors like Kozlowski and
his ilk is the idea that "a refusal to enforce the promise may be an
appropriate sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the
parties themselves or by others." 97  However, there is something
inherently wrong with allowing persons who operate well outside the
acceptable boundaries of their day to force both immortality and a
measure of redemption through a tax deductible perpetual naming
opportunity.99 Competitive fundraising pressures and the resulting
temptation for charities to accept funds without significant inquiry also
suggests that the matter should not be left entirely on the donor-charity
negotiating table.9 This is exemplified by the longstanding joke among
9, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory note at 2 (1981); see also id.
§ 178 (addressing unenforceability of contract terms on grounds of public policy).
Id. at § 185 ("[A court] may disregard the ... condition by excusing the non-
occurrence of the condition . . . and the rest of the agreement is not affected."). More
substantive terms might include, for example, the donor's stipulation that the funds be
used in support of education. Section 185 provides that a condition will be excused "unless
its occurrence was an essential part of the agreed exchange." Id.
Id. at § 178 cmt. e.
Id. at § 230 (1981) (discussing events that may excuse occurrence of conditions in
contracts).
Id. at ch. 8, introductory note at 2; see also id. § 178(3)(c) (taking into account
seriousness of misconduct).
8 Benjamin, supra note 68, at 36.
Charities are under tremendous competitive fundraising pressure, and suggesting
that they question a potential large donor's ethical background too closely is a realistic
assertion only in the case of well-known malefactors and well-endowed charities. See, e.g.,
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charitable fundraisers that the only problem with tainted money is
"there t'aint enough of it." At its core, then, resolution of conflicts in this
area should more broadly turn upon the public policy implications of
allowing donor bad actors to enforceably demand perpetual association
of their name with charitable undertakings. The matter should,
therefore, be resolved as part of the donor-society bargaining nexus, with
a clear pronouncement that bad conduct in the case of charitable naming
contributions results in donor forfeiture. The forfeited benefit, of course,
is that of perpetual naming control.10'
C. A Partial Picture
Consideration of donor bad actors provides only partial insight into
the difficulties that can result from charitable naming contributions.
Also requiring further analysis are charitable naming situations that pit
continued adherence to a naming. provision against present
circumstances that suggest change, apart from any bad actor
considerations. Further attention must also be given to the contract-gift
nature of charitable naming arrangements. Such factual and legal
nuances cloud the resolution of charitable name deviation situations, as
introduced next.
GOULDEN, supra note 58, at 21 (quoting fundraiser) ("If someone wants to give ... and if
blood isn't dripping from the check, I'll take it and give the damnedest thank-you speech
imaginable."); Brandstrader, supra note 3, at 30 ("The naming opportunity frenzy is a
natural consequence of tough times in philanthropy."); Dugas, supra note 61, at B3 (noting
that in many cases "charities had little reason to question the donation...
[alnd charities would be reluctant to probe the origin of a million dollar donation ..
Sachdev, supra note 62, at 1 ("Seton Hall's dilemma of having accepted money from
someone who went on to be accused of wrongdoing is part of a broader ethical challenge
for colleges, especially those facing budget constraints because of reduced state funding...
or declines in their investment portfolios."); see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
" See supra Part I (discussing noted donor-charity-societal bargaining nexus). If the
donor was a known "bad actor" and the charity, nevertheless, accepted the gift, this
weakens the relative merits of the charity's argument for retaining the funds while
avoiding compliance with the condition. The situation should not, however, turn solely
upon the relative donor-charity positions or any unclean hands argument in that regard.
Instead, all of the foregoing arguments should still hold sway, because as noted above,
resolution of the matter should turn upon the public policy implications of allowing donor
bad actors to forcibly demand perpetual association of their name with charitable missions.
This implicates the donor-society bargaining nexus, and, thus, the relative donor-charity
merits should not thwart this more demanding view of enduring donor control via a
naming provision.
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V. A SUPPOSEDLY SIMPLE MATITER OF CONTRACT
This part explores the tempting conclusion that donor-charity name
agreements should simply and unapologetically be enforced as a matter
of contract. This conclusion is both easily understood and often readily
adopted by even informed observers. This pro-donor viewpoint,
however, may fail to dictate outcomes in a given name deviation
situation.
A. Promises of a Future Contribution
Donors may contribute funds to charity without demanding anything
apart from the understood promise that the contribution will be
employed by the recipient in furtherance of charitable ends.' ' Apart
from this promise to apply the funds for charitable purposes, such
outright contributions are "absolute" or "unconditional" gifts without
any binding naming requirement3 2 If an unconditional charitable gift is
thus completed by delivery and acceptance, the donor may not thereafter
insist that the charitable recipient grant a naming opportunity to the
donor.1 A similar situation arises when donors "request" or state a
"desire" for some name perpetuation, or otherwise merely state that
memorial purposes motivated the gift.' T Although the charity, on its
own initiative, may recognize such donors with an honorary naming
opportunity, there is no formal obligation to adopt or to continue any
name association. Departure from a previously recognized name under
such circumstances, therefore, raises no significant legal issue.
11 See FisHMAN & ScHwARz, supra note 17, at 72-78, 122-32 (discussing charitable
organization's responsibility to employ contributed funds in furtherance of charitable
purposes).
102 See, e.g., Courts v. Annie Penn Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 867-68 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that hospital in receipt of absolute gift is not required to adhere to
donor name demands).
103 The intent to impose a naming condition must exist as of the time of the gift, and
cannot thereafter be imposed. Id. In this regard, it is often said that a gift, once completed,
is irrevocable. Id.; see also infra note 122.
104 For an example of a donor stating her desire for name recognition as a nonbinding
precatory request, see Board of Trustees of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill v.
Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d 239, 241 (N.C. 1984) ("I ask that suitable recognition of this gift be
placed in or on the building, and it is my hope, without attaching any condition, that the
building will be named the 'Lillian Prince Theatre.'"). For a case suggesting that memorial
motives alone do not give rise to a charitable trust, see Y.W.C.A. v. Morgan, 189 S.E.2d 169,
175 (N.C. 1972) ("The expression as to use is merely a statement of motive in making the
bequest .... The testatrix unequivocally gave the fund to the charitable corporation... for
its charitable purposes."). Honorary naming opportunities are discussed supra Part II.A.
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If the donor merely promises to-tnake a contribution in the future, the
accepted rule is that the donor's seemingly gratuitous promise is
enforceable by the charity, and much has been written on the subject.11J
Enforcement of these pledge agreements or "charitable subscriptions" is
generally based upon promissory estoppel. 10' Conversely, if the donor
promises to make a future contribution only upon a charity's compliance
with some executory condition - like constructing a named facility -
the charity may not enforce the donor's promise if the charity fails to
fulfill its promise. 107 In this latter circumstance, the court in Carson's
Estate I' held that where a new named facility was promised by the
charity, that charity could not seek to enforce the donor's contribution
promise upon associating the donor's name with only an older,
renovated facility.'
B. Progressing Towards -or Away from -an Operative Bargain
More developed naming opportunity contributions, however, give rise
to more enduring legal relationships and embody a greater potential for
longer term disputes. These charitable naming contributions typically
" See, e.g., T. C. Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions, 12
CORNELL L.Q. 467 (1926) (discussing matter of charitable subscription agreements); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts, 43 AM. J. CoMI. L. 359, 369-74 (1995) (same); Roy
Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of Consideration, 101 COLuM. L.
REV. 1876, 1939-47 (2001) (explaining and critiquing current scholarship on gifts and
consideration).
106 The donor is compelled to fulfill the contribution pledge regardless of whether the
charity or other donors have relied upon the donor's promise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
"o See, e.g., In re Carson's Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 491-92 (Pa. 1944) (holding that donor's
promise to contribute upon charity's beginning construction on new memorial building
gave rise to executory contract, and that charity failed to execute contract when it attached
donor's name to older, renovated facility); Rothenberger v. Glick, 52 N.E. 811, 812 (Ind.
App. 1899) (charitable subscription not enforceable against donor where charity failed to
comply with condition precedent to contribution obligation).
108 In re Carson's Estate, 37 A.2d at 491-92.
109 Id. Similarly, in Stock v. Augsburg College, the court held that if the donor delivered
the funds but the charity failed to ever associate the name, a cause of action arose for
breach of contract. Stock v. Augsburg Coll., 2002 Minn. App. WL 555944, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002); see also supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing Stock). Two
factors distinguishing both Stock and Carson from the more difficult situations discussed
infra Part VI and thereafter are that (i) in both cases, it was the charity's decision never to
honor the terms of the naming agreement - although in Stock there were new facts (i.e.,
facts within the donor's control that were revealed subsequent to consummation of the
naming arrangement) that perhaps justified that decision; and (ii) in neither case had there
been any dedication of funds to facilitate the agreed-to name association, and, thus, there
was little negative consequence or complexity in finding that forfeiture would leave both
parties in their approximate original positions.
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entail a donor's completed transfer of money or property to a charity.
That transfer is coupled with an understanding that, among other things,
the donor's name will be enduringly associated in some way with the
charity, its facilities, or its activities.1 Once the contribution has been
made and the name associated, however, resolution of charitable name
deviation disputes tends to focus upon the donor-charity agreement, but
not so strongly on the "contract." In other words, the application of
contract principles generally gives way to analysis that focuses upon the
parameters of the donor's "gift," more so than the technical bargain or
contract nature of the transaction. As a result, the parties' relationship
with regard to the contribution and enforcement of its terms is typically
addressed under property-based principles."'
10 As noted supra note 23, the name could also be a family name, or the name of a
loved one of the donor. The point is that some perpetuation of an individual or private
name is required. Of course, if the donor makes the gift and the charity thereafter
volunteers the name association, any bargained-for element would seem to be lacking,
unless the donor specifically negotiates to increase the contribution in return for a naming
opportunity (or for a naming opportunity that is more prestigious than the one originally
volunteered). See supra Part II.A (regarding honorary naming opportunities). As also
noted supra Part I.A, commercial sponsorship agreements are not at issue here.
" Although some courts reference contract principles and the possibility of a name
deviation action based on simple breach of contract grounds, there is a dearth of authority
actually resolving completed-transfer name deviation situations on such grounds. See, for
example, the case discussed in the text accompanying infra note 245, referencing "the
contract" but applying cy pres analysis. It also appears that in such cases, where a breach
of contract is found to exist in isolation from the three property-based relationships noted
in the text infra, the remedy itself would in any event be similar to that granted in the case
of conditional gifts and charitable trusts (i.e., specific enforcement, forfeiture, or perhaps
some forfeiture variation based upon a restitution theory). See, e.g., Foote Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc. v. Kelley, 211 N.W.2d 649, 662 (Mich. 1973) (noting that conveyance subject to
provision for reverter was neither contract nor trust, but simply called for forfeiture if
conditions were not satisfied - result that respects property aspect of donor-charity
dealings and which is practical equivalent of proceeding under conditional gift analysis);
Rothenberger v. Glick, 52 N.E. 811, 812 (Ind. App. 1899) (noting charitable subscription case
in contractual nature of pre-contribution subscription agreement, but proceeding to state,
without explanation, that in case of deviation from conditions of subscription after
contribution is complete, "the subscriber has his remedy"); Stock, 2002 Minn. App. WL
555944 (finding that name deviation specifically gives rise to cause of action for breach of
contract, but then finding that cause of action was precluded based upon statute of
limitations - court noted with regard to breach of contract action that donor's remedy
would be charity's forfeiture of contribution). None of this is intended to imply that the
possibility of proceeding on contractual grounds is somehow foreclosed. But see infra note
135 and accompanying text. For a discussion of property law versus contract status in the
context of donor standing to enforce charitable gifts, see Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing
to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law:
How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 622-25
(2003); John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting,
62 N.C. L. REV. 905, 910-12 (1983). Professor Gaubatz notes that "the relative paucity of
modem cases.., which [address] the question of the grantor's contractual right to enforce
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1. Absolute and Conditional Gifts
A primary consequence of this property-based analysis is that
outcomes in charitable name deviation situations tend to turn upon a
court's finding that the contribution gave rise to one of three legal
112relationships. The first possibility is that the donor made an absolute
gift with no binding or enforceable naming obligation. This possibility is
113discussed above. The second possibility is that the donor made a
"conditional gift."" 4  The remedy for noncompliance with a donor's
conditions in the case of a conditional gift is the charity's forfeiture of the
gift."' The enforcement mechanism is, therefore, encompassed within
the very terms of the donor's contribution. The third possibility is that
a trust at law . Gaubatz, supra, at 911. He also notes that "[slome cases appear to
obscure the importance of any distinction between trust and contract analysis," though he
goes on to conclude that contractually-based relief is available. Id. at 910-11, n.30.
Professor Chester also gives attention to the contractual nature of the trust relationship
itself, as advanced in John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625 (1995). See also supra note 107, for cases referencing contract doctrine where the
transfer and name association were not completed.
12 The specific finding turns upon the donor's intentions, though few donors
contemplate such matters with the level of complexity noted here. See, e.g., BOGERT, supra
note 48, at ch. 2 introduction ("Few property owners will understand the different legal
requirements or consequences associated with these various dispositions [i.e., absolute gift,
trust, or some other relationship]"). Intent is gauged as of the time of the contribution. See
supra notes 102-103; see also Courts v. Annie Penn Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 431 S.E.2d 864, 866-67
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Where the gift is inter vivos, courts look to words or acts
accompanying the transfer. Id. Where the gift is testamentary, standard rules of will
construction pertaining to ascertaining the decedent's intent apply. Wilson v. First
Presbyterian Church, 200 S.E.2d 769, 776-77 (N.C. 1973).
113 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
114 The court in In re Marceck noted, "A gift may have a charitable purpose and yet not
constitute a charitable trust... [in which case the gift] is construed as some type of absolute
or conditional gift." In re Marceck, 100 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1960); see also Dunaway v.
First Presbyterian Church of Wickenburg, 442 P.2d 93, 95 (Ariz. 1968) (reciting that naming
subscription creates bilateral contract, and then proceeding to resolve dispute subsequent
to delivery by reference to conditional gift analysis); City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert
Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 865 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that where property was given
for establishment of memorial park, possible relationships were absolute transfer, transfer
subject to condition, or charitable trust, and noting that charitable trust may be subject to
condition subsequent); Ewing v. Hladky Constr. Co., 48 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wyo. 2002)
(discussing contractual status of transfer agreement and then resolving dispute on basis of
conditional versus absolute gift principles).
115 See infra note 118. The forfeiture may be in the nature of a reversion or resulting
trust to the donor or her heirs, or the donor may expressly identify an alternative
beneficiary to take in the event of forfeiture. See infra note 123 and accompanying text; see
also LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 132 (2d ed. 1966)
(noting that reversions arose in part as means for charitable donors to maintain "strings" to
enforce compliance); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 13, § 3.17 (same).
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the donor's gift gave rise to a charitable trust."
6
2. Charitable Trust Status
An important ramification of charitable trust status is that the charity's
obligations with respect to the contribution and its terms can be
117specifically enforced.' A donor who makes a conditional charitable gift
not affected by charitable trust status, in contrast, generally cannot
compel the charity to comply with the name condition in fight of the
inherent forfeiture remedy."
8
Perhaps even more significantly, charitable trust status often permits
courts to invoke the trust doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation.
When one of those doctrines applies, a court may alter the terms or even
the precise purpose of a donor's contribution."9 This suggests flexibility
to perpetuate the name via an altered charitable association. In other
words, if a donor's charitable naming contribution is affected by
charitable trust status and one of these modification doctrines applies,
the charity may be permitted to escape strict compliance with the
naming condition without suffering forfeiture as a consequence of such
noncompliance.
116 See supra note 114 (discussing charitable trust status as relationship that may result
from donor's gift). Most basically, charitable trust status subjects the holder of property -
in this case, the charity-recipient of the donor's gift - to fiduciary duties in dealing with
the trust property for charitable purposes. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5
(2003) (distinguishing trust relationship from contracts, conditions, and other
arrangements); SCrT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 398 (discussing various definitions of
"charitable trust"); BOGERT, supra note 48, § 17 (same).
117 See infra note 118.
Il See City of Palm Springs, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 ("The transferee of a conditional
gift... has no enforceable duties. The breach of the condition may result in termination of
the transferee's interest, but it does not subject the transferee to actions for damages or to
enforce the condition."); Pennebaker v. Pennebaker Home for Girls, 163 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Ky.
1942) (noting importance of donor intent and distinguishing covenants held in trust, which
are enforceable by action of attorney general or charitable trust beneficiaries, from
conditions subsequent that entail forfeiture upon noncompliance); Foote Mem'l Hosp., Inc.
v. Kelley, 211 N.W.2d 649, 662 (Mich. 1973) (finding that deed to charity with provision for
reverter upon failure of condition did not give rise to charitable trust or contract rights, but
simply demanded forfeiture upon noncompliance); In re Marceck, 100 N.W.2d at 762 ("[T]he
distinction between a charitable trust and a conveyance on a conditional fee lies mainly in
the duties [imposed]. In the case of a charitable trust, the trustee assumes an affirmative
duty to use the property in accordance with the trust. In the case of a conditional fee, the
grantee has permissive right to use as directed and he may lose the title if he departs from
such use."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. h (noting this limitation upon
enforcement of transfers subject to conditions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt.
b (1959) (same).
19 These doctrines and their applicability are considered in detail infra Part VI.
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3. A Bargained-for Donative Agreement?
Despite the potential modification flexibility afforded by invocation of
charitable trust doctrines like cy pres and equitable deviation, property-
based principles clearly offer viable enforcement mechanisms or
remedies with regard to noncompliance with donor naming
provisions.'20  General reference to "enforcing the parties' agreement"
therefore still pertains, notwithstanding the seeming departure from
"pure" contract principles. This propensity to venture outside the
realm of pure contract doctrine, however, deserves additional attention
before proceeding with a more detailed consideration of conditional gifts
and charitable trusts.
The propensity to operate under property-based principles could
derive from a perception that once the familiar charitable subscription
agreement is fulfilled upon donor delivery of funds and acceptance by
the charity, there is a completed transfer that is thereafter governed by
the rules pertaining to gifts.'2 A related perception likely governs where
the contribution is testamentary, because conditions imposed under a
will are not so much bargained-for as simply accepted by the recipient of
the devise upon receipt of the property. The propensity to operate under
property-based principles could also reflect that many charitable
contributions involve real property and are, therefore, implemented by
deed. Thus, the terms of the contribution and consequences of
120 Specific enforcement and forfeiture are two such enforcement mechanisms that are
available where property-based analysis pertains. See supra Parts V.B.1, V.B.2.
121 For a discussion regarding the terms "agreement" and "bargain," see infra note 126.
' For a discussion regarding charitable subscriptions (i.e., pledges), see supra Part V.A.
One contracts text transitions between contract and gift doctrines as follows: "While a
promise to make a gift in the future is not an enforceable obligation under contract law
[absent, of course, the particular treatment noted supra of charitable subscriptions],
property law provides that once a gift has been 'executed' - delivered by the donor with
the intent to make a gift, and accepted by the donee - it is irrevocable ...." CHARLES L.
KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 117 (4th ed. 1999). The
term "executed" is also sometimes used to describe a contract that has been fulfilled, which
may be the perception with regard to a charitable subscription following the contribution
and name association. See, e.g., In re Carson's Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 492 (Pa. 1944) (noting in
context of unfulfilled charitable subscription that "the doctrine of cy pres has no
application because there was no executed gift to the trustees for charity. The pledge
created, at most, an executory contract."). Williston comments, however, that the idea of an
"executed" contract is a misnomer, because the notion of contract implies a promise of
future performance, which if fulfilled, places the transaction beyond the realm of contract.
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1.19
(1990). As to gift doctrine, irrevocability of a gift does not mean that a gift cannot be
subjected to conditions that will result in forfeiture if not complied with. See infra notes
130-135 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance most directly depend upon the nature of the real
property conveyance as absolute, defeasible/on condition subsequent, or
in trust7'23 Another explanation could be an outright reluctance (or
inability) to grapple with the gift versus bargained-for nature of the
arrangement, particularly in light of property law principles that provide
the basic remedial avenues to addressing complaints of noncompliance
with contribution terms.2
As to the gift versus bargained-for nature of the parties' dealings,
many naming contributions could perhaps be described as the result of a
bargained-for exchange. From a contractual standpoint, the argument
is that the donor bargained for a promise of ongoing charitable
performance that should be enforceable as a matter of contract. 26 In tax
12 The court in City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 865-67
(Ct. App. 1999) considered a conveyance of land to establish a memorial park and stated
the issue as follows: "The Deed obviously does not convey the Land . . . in fee simple
absolute. But was the Land given in trust, or in fee simple subject to a condition
subsequent?" The court goes on to discuss the various types of common-law defeasible
estates, reduced by statute in California to interests subject to condition subsequent. Id. at
867 n.4; see also HERBERT TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, 1 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 188 (2003)
(discussing special limitations, conditional fees, covenants, and trusts in context of real
property conveyances); Kevin A. Bowman, Comment, The Short Term Versus the Dead Hand:
Litigating Our Dedicated Public Parks, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 601-11 (1997) (discussing
particulars of various interests that might arise upon donor's conveyance of real property
to charitable municipal corporation); Joseph C. Cove, Gifts and Other Charitable Dispositions
to the Municipal Corporation, Mass. CLE 2002, available at Westlaw JLR database as doc MLII
MA-CLE 18-1 (discussing absolute versus restricted gifts).
The use of terms like "condition subsequent" and "condition precedent" are said to
cause much confusion in the context of contractual relations, absent further qualification.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224 cmt. a & reporter's note (1979); WILLISTON,
supra note 122, § 38.4 (discussing this point of confusion and various possible meanings use
of "condition" might imply). Condition "precedent" and "subsequent" terminology is
disavowed under the Second Restatement of Contracts, which proceeds to deal primarily
with what have traditionally been called conditions precedent to a duty of performance.
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.2 (5th ed. 2003)
(making this observation about section 224 of Second Restatement of Trusts).
124 The remedies available under property analysis are discussed supra Part V.B.1-2.
Two basic remedies are specific enforcement (in the case of a gift giving rise to a charitable
trust) and forfeiture, with forfeiture of the contribution perhaps being viewed as a near
equivalent of contractually-based restitution.
2 Professor Colombo describes naming opportunities as "quasi-purchase transactions"
in framing a tax-based analysis of these arrangements. See Colombo, supra note 3, at 661.
12 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH III FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.9 (3d ed. 2004) ("In
principle, . . . the bargain test requires that the promisor's purpose in making the
commitment be to induce some action in return -- to induce an exchange."). As set forth in
Second Restatement of Contracts:
The word "agreement" contains no implication that legal consequences are or are
not produced. It applies to transactions executed on one or both sides, and
also to those that are wholly executory .... [The word "bargain"] includes
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parlance, this grant of a charitable naming opportunity in apparent
exchange for a transfer of money or property could thus be characterized
as a "quid pro quo," meaning that the transaction possesses elements of
reciprocity or return benefit to the donor. 27 Such quid pro quos are
generally said to defeat the tax deductibility of a donor's contribution.'9
The noted bargained-for characterization would, thus, seem to negate (or
itself be negated by) a donor's claiming to have made a tax deductible
"contribution or gift." The IRS has nevertheless acquiesced in the
deductibility of donor transfers that command some form of donor
recognition.9 The donor's claim of a tax deduction does not, therefore,
agreements which are not contracts, such as transactions where one party makes
a promise and the other gives something in exchange which is not a
consideration. As here defined, it includes completely executed transactions...
although such transactions are not within the scope of this Restatement unless a
promise is made.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 cmts. a, c (1981); see also WILLISTON, supra note
122, § 1.1-1.4 (defining "contracts," "promises," "agreements," and "bargains"). The word
"agreement" is often employed in this Article, in order to generically identify donor-charity
dealings concerning the name without suggesting the precise legal characterization of that
arrangement.
127 See Colombo, supra note 3, at 662-67. Though complex in technical detail, the tax
code basically grants a deduction for a "contribution or gift" to a qualified recipient. See
generally B1TKER & LOKKEN, supra note 42, § 35.1 (discussing charitable contribution income
tax deduction requirements). "Contribution" and "gift" are synonymous for purposes of
the charitable contribution tax deduction. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 687
(1989) (stating this proposition); Jacob L. Todres, Internal Revenue Code 170: Does The Receipt
by a Donor of an Intangible Religious Benefit Reduce the Amount of the Charitable Contribution
Deduction? Only the Lord Knows for Sure, 64 TENN. L. REV. 91, 100 (1996) (same).
" Specifically, a transfer to charity in return for some benefit flowing from the charity
to the donor (i.e., "a quid pro quo exchange") generally constitutes a deductible
"contribution or gift" only to the extent of the excess value flowing to charity. Hernandez,
490 U.S. at 687. Where that return benefit is intangible or only available from a charitable
source, this greatly complicates the analysis. See, e.g., id. at 704-13 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See generally Colombo, supra note 3, at 665-67, 695-96; Douglas A. Kahn and
Jeffrey H. Kahn, Gifts Gafis and Gefts: The Income Tax Treatment of Private Charitable "Gifts"
and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts From Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 441 (2003) (discussing meaning of "gift" in context of charitable contributions and tax
deductibility); Todres, supra note 127, at 101-02 (discussing various approaches taken by
courts in construing "contribution or gift" language).
"2 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B. 432 (1968) ("Such privileges as being associated
with or being known as a benefactor of the organization are not significant return benefits
[i.e., quid pro quos] that have a monetary value [justifying denial of the tax deduction].").
The IRS noted, however, that such conclusions are dependent upon the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. Id. The reasons for this outcome are likely grounded in the
history of IRS deference, the administrative difficulties of valuing the donative versus
purchased aspects of such transactions, and the likely outcry from charitable organizations
were they to be denied the benefits of this tax-deductible charitable naming opportunity
fundraising tool. See also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, TEACHERS' MANUAL 193 (2d ed. 2000), cited
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inherently preclude the donor from asserting that the parties' "bargain"
should be enforced.
Notwithstanding the existence of an enforceable agreement, there is
clearly some donative element to these transactions1 3 Instances of
private individuals purchasing noncharitable naming opportunities, for
example, are virtually nonexistent.13 ' This suggests that a predominant
purpose underlying most naming contributions is to provide some
benefit to the charitable recipient, rather than to create a contractually-
based bargained-for exchange.1 Any such contribution, moreover, must
be affected by some objective benefit to the public good if the
contribution is to be deemed charitable in the first instance, such that the
donor might enjoy the favoritisms afforded such contributions.r3 The
conditioned nature of the contribution suggests that the donor wanted
her naming terms to be honored as an incident of the gift, but the
presence of such conditions does not necessarily imply that a strictly
contractual relationship was intended. The presence of naming
conditions, in other words, is more readily understood in substance as
"signifying that the conditions placed upon the transfer are binding on
the [recipient], rather than as creating a formal contract." 134 This view
supports the application of property-based principles to enforce
in Colombo, supra note 3, at 666 n.38 (citing Fishman Teachers' Manual as authority).
" As to a more technical use of the term "agreement," see supra note 126. Regarding
the donative nature of similar transactions, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Hernandez
recognized the difficulties with a quid pro quo analysis where return benefits are of an
intangible nature that are not comparably sold in a nondonative context. 490 U.S. at 706-08.
O'Connor noted that even if, for example, a charity were "selling" poppies at $10 each, "it
would absurdly not be true that everyone who 'bought' a poppy for $10 made no
contribution." See also Colombo, supra note 3, at 665 (relating O'Connor's dissent to tax
deductibility of naming opportunity contributions).
131 See, e.g., Eleena de Lisser, Airlines: Frequent Fliers View Awards of Jewels, Catered Feasts
as Resistible Temptations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at B1 (discussing American Airline's
promotion to put passenger's names on side of airplane in exchange for frequent flier
mileage - "The ... airline called the ... auction its 'most prestigious' ever. But no one
came forward.").
132 See supra note 126 regarding bargains, agreements, and contracts. In this regard,
there is a bargained-for exchange only if the donor made the contribution specifically in
order to induce a return promise of future performance from the charity (i.e., the ongoing
association of the name). According to Farnsworth, if the name association was simply an
incident of an arrangement undertaken to bestow a benefit upon the charity, but was not
an inducement for the gift, there is no bargain in that regard. FARNSWORTH, supra note 126,
§ 2.9.
1 See supra Parts I and III regarding "charitable" status and the favorable treatment
afforded contributions that fit that categorization.
1 Equitable Transfers of Forfeited Monies or Property, 18 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 74
(1994).
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charitable naming arrangements. This view, moreover, is frequently
encountered (though perhaps only implicitly) when a charitable name
deviation situation requires judicial resolution.1 5
C. Distinguishing the Relationships
The binding nature of the donor-charity naming agreement is most
often given force through application of conditional gift or charitable
trust analysis, as just explained. The status distinctions and resulting
analysis matter when a name deviation circumstance arises. This part
discusses the nuances and implications of distinguishing charitable trust
status from gifts subject to a nontrust forfeiture condition.
1. Stating the Condition
An initial question concerns the particular form that a donor might
adopt to express her intent to make a gift subject to a naming condition,
in lieu of making an absolute gift with no binding obligation concerning
the name. An instructive example of specific naming condition language
can be seen in Herron v. Stanton.136 In Herron, the donor made a
contribution of cash and real property to charity for the establishment of
an art school and gallery.137 The terms of the gift stated that it was
"absolutely and forever ... [p]rovided, however, [that] this bequest is
upon the condition.., that the art gallery and art school ... shall each be
designated and named by such name as will include the name of the
" See supra note 111. It is possible that contract remedies could apply to a charitable
name deviation, although such findings are rare. One case that does blend the remedy of
restitution into the concept of a conditional gift is Ball v. Hall, 274 A.2d 516, 520 (Vt. 1971).
In that case, the donor incorporated into their gift agreement a provision stating that in the
event the donor's conditions were not complied with, the "gift" would convert into a
"loan," repayable on demand. Ultimately, this is not so unlike a straightforward
conditional gift, except perhaps in that the donor's remedial specificity clarifies the
repayment terms and perhaps characterizes the nature of the remedy. In this regard, the
donor's terms led the court to conclude that "[t]he result of nonperformance ... is not a
forfeiture in the true sense of the term." Id. The case law tends to focus upon the
distinction between conditional gifts versus charitable trusts, however, and additional
subtleties affecting the possible availability and consequences of other "purely" contractual
remedies in the context of charitable name deviations are left to other scholars. For a recent
grappling with the interrelationship between conditional gifts, contractual remedies, and
claims at law and equity, see Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758, 771-77 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2003) (noting "dearth of authority" in this realm of conditional gifts and discussing
legal versus equitable nature of potential remedies available).
147 N.E. 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1920).
137 Id. at 306.
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[donor] .. .and the use of such name ... shall be perpetual.' 138 In the
context of distinguishing absolute from conditional gifts, this language
appears sufficient to go beyond a precatory "request" and, instead, to
express an intent to subject the gift to a true naming condition.'39 The
donor in Herron, however, went on to even more clearly state her intent.
After the language just quoted, she provided that "[ilf said [charity] shall
not see fit to comply with the foregoing [name] condition, or if, for
any... reason, this bequest should fail ... then ... my executor shall
distribute [the affected property] to .. .[other] religious and charitable
societies . . . ."'40 The court in Herron held that the donor's gift was
subject to a condition (subsequent) that would require divestment in
favor of the alternative beneficiary if not complied with into
perpetuity. 4' Utilization of such conditional language coupled with
express language of forfeiture is, in fact, the recommended route for a
donor who desires maximum control and assurance that her naming
desires will be met.'42
Prior to reaching its conclusion, however, the Herron court had to
address a potential problem with the noted language. The heirs argued
that the donor intended the establishment of the named art school and
gallery to be a condition precedent to the vesting of the gift in the
charitable recipient. 143 Had that been the case, the initial vesting of the
charitable interest would have been subject to a contingency of indefinite
duration, and therefore, void under the Rule Against Perpetuities (the
waiver of which requires some definitive charitable interest).'" This
would cause the gift to fail and, thus, to revert to the donor's 
heirs.'"
The court, however, applied rules of construction that favor upholding
13 Id. Note that Herron is utilized here for the clarity of language as evidencing a
conditional versus absolute gift. The court in Herron, however, was also required to
confront the heirs' assertion that the language created a condition precedent and was
therefore void as violative of the rule against perpetuities. See infra notes 143-148 and
accompanying text.
13 See supra note 104 and accompanying text regarding precatory naming requests.
" Herron, 147 N.E. at 306. For a further discussion of gifts over to alternative
beneficiaries upon forfeiture, see infra Part VI.A.
141 Herron, 147 N.E. at 309.
1 The reasons will become more apparent as discussion progresses to distinguishing
conditional gifts from charitable trusts, and then to gifts over and their effect on application
of the doctrine of cy pres.
143 Herron, 147 N.E. at 307. See supra Part I regarding the potential waiver of the Rule
Against Perpetuities in the case of contributions in favor of a charitable recipient.
'" Herron, 147 N.E. at 308-09.
145 Id.
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attempted gifts to charity as valid. 14  The court specifically rejected the
condition precedent claim and instead held that the donor made a vested
contribution that was merely subject to divestment upon noncompliance
with the condition of establishing and maintaining a named art school
and gallery. 4 7 This finding also validated the donor's gift over to other
charities in the event of noncompliance with the conditions, because the
Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to a §ift over to charity
following a valid, noncontingent charitable interest.
Consider, finally, the Herron court's statement that "[t]he purpose of
the [naming] condition was to compel continued use, and thereby the
perpetuation, of the [donor's] name in connection with [the selected
charity]." 149 Whether such conditions actually promote this purpose is a
question that should be kept in mind as the discussion here progresses.150
2. Donor Precision
Analysis to this point suggests that the donor who seeks to ensure
straightforward compliance with a naming condition should simply
specify her terms and expressly provide for forfeiture if those terms are
not met. The very premise of conditional gift status enforces this
viewpoint.51 Some might argue, therefore, that if donors would simply
be more precise in stating their charitable naming conditions, much of
the uncertainty over name deviation situations could be avoided. While
there is, no doubt, some degree of truth to this assertion, the argument
proves inadequate on a practical level for at least two reasons.
146 Id.
'7 Id. at 309. Note that the donor therefore made a completed transfer of property to
the charity, removing the case from the realm of charitable subscriptions and other
promises of afuture contribution to charity. Compare this situation with those in the cases
cited supra note 107. Here, the charity will be allowed to proceed with establishing and
naming the art school and gallery in due course, so long as the requirement is not
obviously abandoned. See, e.g., Palmer v. Evans, 124 N.W.2d 856, 865 (Iowa 1963) ("In the
case at bar the corporation contemplated by the testator has been formed. Even without
such action by the trustees the gift could have been saved by the application of the cy pres
doctrine."). The charity, in other words, will not be found in breach of the condition unless
there is "such neglect to comply as to indicate an intention to disregard the condition."
Erskine v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Neb., 104 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (Neb. 1960). Compare
Erskine, 104 N.W. 2d 285, with In re Carson's Estate, 37 A.2d 488, 491-92 (Pa. 1944)
(characterizing situation as one where "the party obligated to perform deliberately and
intentionally departs from the terms of the contract").
1 Herron, 147 N.E. at 309.
19 Id. at 305.
' This matter is revisited, with the benefit of additional legal doctrine, infra Parts VI
and VII. See infra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
1 See supra Part V.B.1.
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First, there are many previously established charitable naming
situations. More donor precision in framing these past contribution
terms is now foreclosed. Yet, many of those charitable naming
arrangements will undoubtedly present future problems because
significant time periods often pass between the framing of a charitable
naming scheme and the actual occurrence of a name deviation• , 152
circumstance. Thus, an orphanage founded and named in 1900 may be
operating without complication today, but circumstances in the coming
decades may require that the parameters of that ongoing charitable name
association be revisited - all with an eye towards a donor contribution
penned over a century ago.
Second, it is not at all clear that donors and charities can be prompted
to generally adopt a sufficient level of specificity to avoid variable
outcomes under whatever legal doctrine is deemed to govern.13 The
growing prevalence of naming agreements at smaller gift levels and
smaller charitable organzations renders it likely that many such gifts
will continue to be made with a minimal level of sophisticated (and
informed) legal counsel .5  Moreover, even large charities find it difficult
to confront prospective donors with the caveat that "your terms will be
honored into perpetuity, unless, of course, you should ultimately be
exposed as a scoundrel or your foresight should prove ill-conceived."
156
152 See, e.g., In re Estate of Craig, 848 P.2d 313, 316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (dealing with
1930 will and charitable gift that did not become effective until 1987); Burr v. Brooks, 416
N.E.2d 231, 232 (Ill. 1981) (dealing with 1898 will and charitable gift that did not become
effective until 1976); In re Downer Home, 226 N.W.2d 444, 445-46 (Wis. 1975) (discussing
1885 will and failure of charitable gift in 1960s).
15 This is true despite recent attention given to the use of detailed donor agreements,
though the prospect of increasing donor attention to such matters may ultimately result in
a more contracts-based perspective on such matters. See generally Debra E. Blum, Donors
Increasingly Use Legal Contracts to Stipulate Demands on Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
Mar. 21, 2002, at 9 (discussing examples and ramifications of fact that "[more and more
donors not only want control over the gifts they make to charity .. .but they also are
demanding that the terms of that control be put in binding, sometimes exhaustive,
contracts."); Debra E. Blum, Ties That Bind, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 21, 2002, at 7
(same). If anything, these reports highlight the potential mischief that such donor controls
might ultimately occasion. Whether such agreements will be treated as true "contracts" in
a future dispute is discussed supra Part V. See supra note 135. The rules applied in
distinguishing conditions from charitable trusts are more fully developed infra Part V.D.
154 With regard to smaller gifts and smaller charities, see Brandstrader, supra note 3, at
30 (discussing "lower end" naming opportunities).
"55 See also infra Part VII.D.1 (discussing vagaries in Avery Fisher's multimillion dollar
gift agreement with Lincoln Center).
156 On this point, however, I believe much could be accomplished in this area were
charities, on a very broad scale, to adopt general policies that permit in every instance
certain escapes from the particulars of a naming condition. A general policy would avoid
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3. Complicating the Simple Case: Good Works and Its Named
Library
The foregoing points are exemplified by the case of Good Works.
Good Works is an actual, small-town, community-based charity that
recently sought to modernize and enhance its mission and service to the
community through a facilities expansion. 157 Several decades ago, the
Good Works charity moved into what was then a new building. This
building included a library that was named for "Ms. Jones."15 8 Two years
ago, Good Works undertook a significant renovation of this building.
The renovation included the complete destruction and redeployment to
other uses of the former library space within the walls of the original
building. The project also called for the addition of an entirely new
structure that would house, among other facilities, a larger, more usable,
and interactive library space. Good Works called this new space a
"media center" to reflect the enhanced library benefits the upgrade
promised. Not surprisingly, fundraising was particularly important to
the project, and the now oft-encountered price list for various naming
opportunities was devised. The price for the "[Your Name Here] Media
Center" was set at $90,000.1
9
As the project progressed into 2004 and the economy staggered, it
became increasingly obvious that more dollars would be needed to
complete the project. Selling the library/media center naming
opportunity would be a great (if not crucial) help for this small-town
charity. However, the charity and potential donors encountered
roadblocks in utilizing a new naming opportunity gift. The problems
were due, in part, to uncertainty over the terms of the original library
naming, and, thus, over the legitimacy of renaming the new library for a
new donor. These complications arose even though the new library
represented new space in a completely new facility.16
any insinuation that the concern is with the particular donor's ethics or foresight.
However, for this line of reasoning to address the various issues discussed in this Article,
such policies would have to be widely adopted across the charitable sector. See also supra
notes 91, 99 and accompanying text.
'" The name "Good Works" is adopted here for purposes of simplicity. Information
concerning the website of the actual organization upon which this example is based, as
well as pictures of the building project discussed here, are on file with the author.
18 The library represented only one aspect of Good Works' charitable mission.
' The price list for naming opportunities within the organization is on file with the
author.
1 These concerns were actually first voiced internally by Good Works Board of
Trustees, thus blunting arguments that the renaming was a simple case of charitable
opportunism in complete disregard of prior donor dealings. The new structure is
connected to the original building by a breezeway.
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a. Reconstructing the Bargain
Good Works' charitable management and potential donors faced
initial uncertainty due simply to the age of the original gift and its sparse
documentation. Both groups were initially uncertain as to whether the
former space had been named simply in honor of Ms. Jones, or whether
the naming rights had been granted in exchange for a monetary• , 162
contribution. If we assume that Ms. Jones did make a monetary
contribution - imagine even a specific writing that referenced "the
library" in connection with her gift - an interpretive question
immediately arises: namely, to what, exactly, did the naming
contribution relate? Possibilities include binding the charity to name
only the original library housed within the original structure.
Alternatively, the name could have been intended to bind Good Works
with regard to any library (or modern media center variation) thereafter
housed within any facility operated by Good Works. Notably absent in
resolving these questions was the ability to know with any certainty
whether the long-since deceased Ms. Jones cared more about her name
appearing on a library wherever located, on only the particular former
library space, or not so much about her name being anywhere relative to
the fundamental goal of facilitating Good Works' mission both at the
time of the gift or as circumstances later dictated. In the latter case, the
library would merely reflect her preferred, but not critical, vehicle for
proceeding, and the naming opportunity would constitute a simple
lagniappe.'6
161 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162 Similar issues often confront charities even where the documentation is quite
complete, because the legal consequences of such documentation are often far from clear,
as evidenced by many of the cases discussed in this Article.
6 The analysis would change if Ms. Jones were still alive. In addition to being able to
speak to her intentions, she could also agree to a waiver or modification of the past naming
conditions. See, e.g., Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn.
1997) (applying Connecticut's version of UMIFA to case involving donor's right to enforce
terms of charitable gift); Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIFA"), 8 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 411-16 (1973) (including commentary from ABA Committee on
Charitable Giving). UMIFA is not discussed further in this article, for two reasons. First,
UMIFA does not limit application of the doctrine of cy pres, which is discussed in detail
infra Part VI. See UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(d), 7A U.L.A. 316 (1972).
Second, the "situation where an extant institution or living donor believes that the
charitable institution has not adhered to the terms of the gift . . . is rare because of the
impact it may have on other development efforts and public relations. More common is
where the contributor's descendants, after the donor is in the ground, discover that the gift
restrictions have not been upheld." FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 17, at 271-72
(discussing UMIFA and restricted gifts in notes following cited case).
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b. Donor Prescience
These are important questions, especially given doubts about whether
Ms. Jones ever conceived of more than a bound paper collection in a
given space. Consider also that Good Works sought to establish an
expanded library in a new facility that incorporated technological
innovations that, today, go well beyond (even to the point of
superceding) any traditional concept of a library.M Many in Good
Works' management and membership, sitting on both sides of the name
removal issue, rightfully wanted to know how Ms. Jones would respond
today if she knew that her name was potentially thwarting Good Works'
ability to modernize its library services. Even if Ms. Jones did conceive
of Good Works abandoning its original library space or services, it is
difficult to assert that she ever contemplated the extent to which
interactive multimedia pervades modern informational services. It is,
therefore, sheer speculation to argue that she would today reject the
prospect of associating her name with, for example, a bound paper
collection housed within a more comprehensive and otherwise named
media center.16
More generally, it seems illogical to conclude that Ms. Jones or any
reasonable donor would prefer to jeopardize a charity's mission through
obstinance over her name adorning the library in all events. Such
obstinance could force the disgorging of needed funds otherwise
dedicated to the underlying charitable mission. That outcome may
obtain by virtue of forfeiture consequences for deviation from the
donor's naming condition.' 66 This prospect could possibly lead to the
complete abandonment by Good Works of all library services, given the
added cost it would impose upon proceeding as desired. It seems
similarly implausible to argue that Ms. Jones would prefer to have her
name adorn a little-utilized facility which, because of an inability to
modernize, is left ill-suited to fulfill the very aspect of Good Works'
charitable mission that Ms. Jones originally found worthy of her support
, The twenty-six volume encyclopedia reduced to an interactive DVD or web address
represents merely one example.
" With regard to donor anticipation of changed circumstances, see the discussion of
equitable deviation infra Part VI.B. and thereafter. See infra notes 268-270 and
accompanying text. As to associating one donor's name within a larger charitable
endeavor named for a different donor, see, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. 0. M. Fisher Home,
16 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. 1938) ("Our oldest college is none the less a memorial to John
Harvard because a number of dormitories, museums, and other buildings serve also as
memorials to others.").
16 See supra Part V.B regarding forfeiture as a remedy for noncompliance with a
naming condition.
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and name association.167 As will be seen, however, the case law purports
to concern itself with a donor's actual intent, unaffected by the court's
deduction of what a reasonable donor might have wanted.'6'
Finally, even if we assume that such matters can be dealt with via
more clearly articulated donor intentions, the resulting precise and
stringent donor terms - and their consequent constraints on charitable
mission-oriented decision making - raise a more normative question.16
Specifically, one could question whether perpetual naming rights (and
attendant forfeiture conditions) should ever attach perpetually to a
physical facility that will no doubt require funds from other future
sources for maintenance, renovation, modernization, and, ultimately,
replacement. A contribution conditioned upon perpetually naming a
physical facility but inadequate to indefinitely address those concerns
simply presumes too much. Stated differently, such conditions take too
much from the societal bargaining table.
170
D. Charitable Trust Status
There are two additional reasons why a simple call for more donor
precision fails to comprehend the full dimensions of the dilemmas posed
by charitable name deviation situations. First, rules of construction and
equitable doctrines that permit flexible adherence to donor terms
demand acknowledgement in this area. The availability and malleability
of such rules and doctrines suggest that, even in the face of seemingly
clear donor naming provisions, outcomes in name deviation situations
are often much less certain than a call for more "donor precision" might
presume. Second, and perhaps representing the trade-off to such
uncertainty, is that the offered flexibility presents an adaptable approach
to accommodating both charitable and name perpetuation purposes.
Such adaptability may ultimately lead to outcomes that are preferable,
from both donor and societal perspectives, to outcomes occasioned by
rigid adherence to a narrow, decades (or centuries) old view of charitable
... Inability to modernize is suggested here in the sense that modernization requires
funds, in this case an estimated minimum $300 million. Although raising this amount
might be possible without selling the naming opportunity for the renovated concert hall, it
is not beyond reason to suggest that selling a naming opportunity can be fundamental to a
given fundraising endeavor. See also sources cited supra note 8.
" The specific legal relevance of court perceptions of donor intent is developed infra
Part VI.
" A specific example of how a naming condition might constrain charitable decision-
making is discussed infra Part VI.A.4.
70 See also infra Part VII.C. for further discussion of this point.
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possibilities.
1. Trust Status as an Avenue to Flexibility
Flexibility is particularly apt to be seen where a donor's contribution is
said to give rise to a charitable trust. A charitable trust basically entails
the idea that a donor intends for her contribution to be held and
managed for the benefit of a third party - in this case, for the benefit of
the public via application for charitable purposes."' Specific rules guide
this inquiry and focus upon the donor's intent.i7 Uncertainties
immediately appear, however, because many donors fail to contemplate
the legal distinctions noted here."7 Courts, thus, tend to focus upon the
donor's manifestation of intent as embodied in the contribution terms. 74
Interpretive flexibility is immediately apparent, as a donor's use of the
terms "on condition," "provided that," "to be used forever," or,
conversely, "in trust" are not in themselves determinative.' In fact,
"trusts can be created by words of condition."1
76
However, this inquiry is not wholly without guidelines. The ultimate
question turns upon whether the donor intended to impose an obligation
that the contribution be devoted to specified charitable purposes - in
which case a charitable trust arises and specific enforcement may be had.
The alternative is to find an intention that the property simply be
forfeited when and if the donor's specifications are not complied with -
171 City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 865 (Ct. App.
1999) (defining "charitable trust"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 11 (1959); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2,28 (2001) (defining "trust" and stating purposes that
are "charitable"); ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 348 (defining charitable trust).
Professor Bogert notes that many donors are unaware of the distinction between trust and
other legal status regarding their charitable gifts. See BOGERT, supra note 48, at ch. 2
introduction § 17. Of course, donors should not be faulted, because "the distinctions
between [these] ... relationships is not always an easy one to draw, even for the trained
lawyer." SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 23.
"n SCO'rT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 23.
173 BOGERT, supra note 48, at ch. 2 introduction, § 17; SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16,
§ 23.
174 It does not really matter if the donor understands the nature or significance of the
relationship created, because the donor's actual subjective state of mind is less relevant
than her outward manifestation of intent as gleaned from the terms of and circumstances
surrounding the contribution. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 23 ("In the interest of
accuracy . . . it is necessary ... to speak not of the [donor's] intention but of [the donor's]
manifestation of intention.").
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 cmt. a (2001); BOGERT, supra note 48, § 35; SCOTT
& FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 24.
76 City of Palm Springs, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865 (citing SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
16, § 351).
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in which case a condition will be found."77 The interpretive preference
clearly falls in favor of finding the existence of a charitable trust. 178 An
often stated rule in this regard posits that "[i]t would seem that nothing
short of express provisions for forfeiture and either a reverter, or a gift
over or a right to retake the property in the donor or [her] heirs would
enable a donor to effectively impose a condition [in lieu of being deemed
to have created a charitable trust]." 79
Courts and commentators justify the interpretive preference for
finding charitable trust status on several grounds. First, forfeiture is a
harsh remedy and, therefore, reluctantly imposed.183 Courts also favor
gifts to charity and will strain to retain funds for charitable uses.""
Recall, in this regard, that a charitable trust can be specifically enforced,
whereas bare conditional gifts are enforced through the charity's
forfeiture of the affected property. A finding of charitable trust status
is, therefore, more likely to result in continued application of the funds
for charitable purposes.
These concepts lend themselves to a related justification for preferring
charitable trust status in name deviation situations. That justification is
usually stated in terms of promoting the donor's charitable purpose.
Specifically, "a [forfeiture] condition is not a very effective method of
accomplishing the transferor's purpose to benefit third persons.""'4 This
rationale only holds in its entirety, of course, if the donor intended to
further some charitable cause in the first instance. Recall, however, that
"7 SCOTT & FRATCHER. supra note 16, § 351.
178 BOGERT, supra note 48, § 324; see also SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 11 ("Rarely
• ..will a conveyance [whether] inter vivos [or] . . . testamentary . ..be construed as
creating a condition, unless ... it is expressly provided ... that the transferee shall forfeit
[the contribution]... for breach of the condition. The disposition will usually be construed
as creating a trust.").
17 BOGERT, supra note 48, § 324.
180 See, e.g., SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 401.2 (stating this conclusion and citing
cases).
181 Id.; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. With regard to gifts over to
alternate charitable beneficiaries, see infra Parts VI.A.2.b, VI.A.4.
182 See supra Parts V.B.1, V.B.2.
18 The "other reasons" suggested include the possible application of the doctrines of cy
pres and equitable deviation, as discussed infra Part VI.
1" The benefited third party is the beneficiary class served by the charitable
contribution (e.g., the poor, the sick, etc.). ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 11. Compare
Home for Incurables of Balt. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2003)
(noting that primary charitable intent trumps operation of forfeiture condition), with Burr
v. Brooks, 416 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1981) (stating that court felt the primary purpose was more
narrow and, thus, found forfeiture to alternative charitable beneficiary appropriate). See
also supra Part VI.A regarding the prospect of continuing the name perpetuation via a gift
over to an alternative charitable beneficiary.
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even the most selfishly motivated donor must latch on to some charitable
cause in order to perpetually achieve the desired positive name
association.1 s' The availability of charitable trust doctrines to facilitate
the continuation of charitable purposes - in lieu of forfeiture -
therefore often provides an avenue to continue both charitable and name
perpetuation goals."' In contrast, forfeiture will likely defeat the name
perpetuation goal. 7
2. A Broad View of Equitable Powers
Even where the donor has clearly stated a condition coupled with the
prospect of forfeiture, leeway may still exist for a court to apply
charitable trust doctrines like cy pres or equitable deviation. In
Blumenthal v. White,"' for example, the court actually obviated the need
for finding any formal trust at all by more generally invoking judicial
equitable powers to apply trust doctrines where contributed property is
given for charitable uses. The court explained that "while a charitable
use is not a trust, it may be so ... treated by the courts ... and it has
become definitely settled that charitable uses, or public charities, as
known at the present time, are [subject to the court's] equitable .. .
powers." 9 ' Charitable recipients are frequently organized as trust
entities, moreover, and even if organized in some other form like a
charitable corporation, they are frequently deemed to hold property in
189 See supra Parts I, III.
See, e.g., infra Part VI.A.3 (discussing Zevely).
... The donor's precise name association would fail unless there were a gift over to
another charity serving the same charitable beneficiaries or mission that would accept the
same name association terms. The implications of such gifts over are discussed infra Parts
VI.A.2.b and VI.A.4. A different but ongoing name association might be accomplished if an
alternative charitable beneficiary were named and accepted the naming terms. Donors,
however, often simply provide for an alternative beneficiary upon failure of a naming
condition, without any effort to exact the same degree of name specificity from the
alternative charitable beneficiary. See, e.g., supra note 140 and the quoted language in the
accompanying text. Any forfeiture outside the charitable stream, however, would
presumptively result in complete failure of the name perpetuation goals.
683 A.2d 410 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
189 Id. at 412.
Id. at 413; see also In re Carper's Estate, 415 N.Y.S.2d 550, 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
("[Cly pres may be applied even in the absence of a properly created express trust.");
ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 11 (discussing situations where trust and conditions are
found to coexist). "Even ignoring trust doctrine, a court acting under its equity powers
may simply refuse to enforce a condition if doing so would be "inequitable." ScoTr &
FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 11. This observation is particularly relevant to the case of bad
actor philanthropist naming conditions such as those discussed supra Part IV.
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trust for the public benefit."' This also implicates judicial latitude to
invoke more flexible trust doctrine.
The Blumenthal decision reveals another twist to the foregoing
discussion of charitable trust versus condition status. As the Blumenthal
court correctly noted, "a trust and a condition ... are not exclusive of
each other. " 192 Even if a technical condition exists, in other words, a
charitable organization may hold a contribution in trust, but subject to
the condition.193 There are dual implications of this conclusion. On the
one hand, the condition may ultimately prevail, particularly if paired
with appropriate gift over or other forfeiture limitations. On the other
hand, even in such circumstances, courts may nevertheless perceive
broader donor intentions that implicate utilization of the court's
equitable modification powers. The matter ultimately turns upon the
court's perception of donor intent.
With regard to donor intentions and potential name deviations, the
specific applicability and impact of cy pres and equitable deviation must
be more directly considered. That consideration implicates the
relationship between the donor's charitable purposes and her more
personally motivated desire to perpetuate her name through a given
charitable association. 94 The discussion in Part VI, therefore, considers
such matters.
VI. MODICATION DOCTRINES, DONOR INTENT, AND PRECEDENT
The doctrines of cy pres and equitable deviation present a pervasive
means by which donees may escape or circumvent the particulars of
naming conditions. The preferred characterization, of course, depends
upon one's perspective. 95  This part directly confronts the noted
,9, See FIsHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 17, at 122-34; Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 16,
§ 348.1. Consider also the comment to section 413 of the Uniform Trust Code, where it is
acknowledged that:
The doctrine of cy pres is applied not only to trusts, but also to other types of
charitable dispositions, including those to charitable corporations. This section
does not control dispositions made in nontrust form. However, in formulating
rules for such dispositions, the courts often refer to the principles governing charitable
trusts, which would include this Code.
UNIFoRM TRUST CODE § 413, cmt. (emphasis added).
,9 Blumenthal, 683 A.2d at 412 (citing BOGERT, supra note 48, § 35).
I" Id.; see also BOGERT, supra note 48, § 420 ("A settler may create in his trustee for
charity an estate or interest on condition subsequent.").
'9 See infra Parts VIA-B.
'5 See supra Part 1.B regarding pro-donor versus societally-attuned perspectives. As to
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equitable doctrines as applied to charitable name deviation situations.
A. Cy Pres Doctrine and Name Deviations
The doctrine of cy pres empowers a court to direct the application of
contributed property to charitable purposes that differ from those
196
originally specified by the donor. Courts authorize such diversions in
order to further the donor's charitable intentions 9 7 The doctrine only
applies, therefore, where it has become "impossible, impracticable or
illegal" to carry out the donor's original charitable purpose as stated by
198
the donor. Professor Atkins characterizes satisfaction of this
circumstantial trigger as denoting a failure in the "bargain" between the
donor and society - cy pres is implicated because the donor's charitable
intent either cannot be carried out or has ceased to equate with society's
view of charitable purposes.19 Examples of such failures include
provision for the treatment of a disease that has been eradicated, or an
earlier-era scholarship fund that is permeated with now decried racially
cy pres and equitable deviation, see 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 66-67 (2003)
(discussing equitable deviation and cy pres, respectively) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 381, 399 (1957) (same).
199 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 399 (1957). The doctrine applies only where property is initially dedicated to some
charitable purpose. Recall that "charitable" purposes are not defeated by the mere
presence of a naming provision. See supra Part III. For recent scholarly commentary on the
topic of cy pres, see Buckles, supra note 83, at 1827 (discussing cy pres in specific context of
restricted gifts and proposing tax-code based solution to problems presented); Ilana H.
Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the
Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1747 (2003). Less recent treatments are exemplified by Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy
Pres: A Proposal for Change, 47 B.U. L. REV. 153 (1967); Fisch, supra note 9, at 375.
197 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
19 Id. Section 399 states the traditional cy pres rule as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and
it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the
application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor.
Id.
More recent Restatement and Uniform Trust Code articulations of the doctrine have
added the impediment of a purpose becoming "wasteful" to the circumstances that justify
application of the doctrine, though that criterion had generally been rejected under prior
law as too liberal. See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); UNIFORM TRUST CODE
§ 413 (2003).
1" Atkinson, supra note 14, at 1115-17. "Bargain" as a term of art in the context of
distinguishing charitable gifts from contractual relationships is discussed supra Part V.
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discriminatory bias.9 Where such a failure exists, a court can "save" the
charitable nature of the contribution by directing its application to
201
alternative but similar charitable uses.
Naming conditions complicate the analysis, for two reasons. First,
such alternative charitable applications may implicate an association of
the name in a manner that differs from that stated by the donor. Second,
a court may view the donor's naming provisions as having some bearing
upon the breadth of the donor's charitable intentions.
1. The Presence of General Charitable Intent
Cy pres modification flexibility reflects society's stake in the donor-
charity venture, but only applies if certain requirements are met. One
pivotal requirement supposedly respects the donor's stake in the
venture, requiring that the donor possess a "general charitable intent"
before cy pres will apply.2 2 A donor possesses general charitable intent
if, upon confronting the failure of her express charitable designs, she
would nevertheless have preferred that the funds be dedicated to some
similar charitable purpose.2 3 A donor, alternatively, possesses a more
narrow, specific intent if she instead prefers that her charitable designs
simply terminate if they cannot be carried out precisely as originally
contemplated.
Despite the proffered distinction, the general intent requirement is
perhaps the most rhetorically cited but variably applied of the cy pres
criteria.204 The general intent requirement and its consequent impact
2: Atkinson, supra note 14, at 1117-18.
20 See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003) (noting that diversion shall
be "as nearly as may be" to donor's original scheme). Application of cy pres also requires
that a charitable trust exist, and that its purpose has become "impossible, impracticable, or
illegal" to carry out. See supra note 198. For a recent expansion of these criteria, however,
see infra Part VI.D.
202 See 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
203 The Restatements and other articulations of the cy pres rule as cited supra notes 198
and 202 make this clear. See also Atkinson, supra note 14, at 1117-18 (discussing this
requirement and what it means in terms of donor's desired course of action where original
charitable objective fails); Venessa Laird, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable
Intent in the Application of Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 978 (1987) (reducing
inquiry to ascertaining which of two outcomes donor preferred); Craft v. Shroyer, 74 N.E.
2d 589, 592-93 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (discussing requirement).
204 See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over? The Search for Coherence in Judicial
Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 46 (1989) ("[T]he general intent
requirement is not only unclear but mischievious in its use to prevent the application of cy
pres .... [Tihis requirement should be completely abandoned .... [Tihe concept is worse
than useless .. "); Johnson, supra note 14, at 383 ("[Alsking an interpreter who is extant in
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upon cy pres results has thus been roundly criticized by scholars as a
"legal fiction"208 that thwarts even "diligent)udges 2 0 6 in applying cy pres
in any consistent or predictable manner. The inquiry is factual and
courts acknowledge the limited value of precedent - apart, of course,
from demonstrating the potential range of outcomes possible under the
doctrine.20 Perhaps it is such observations that led the drafters of the
recent Restatement (Third) of Trusts to describe the inquiry as "artificial
and speculative." 2 0  Charitable naming situations do little to dispel such
criticisms, though several observations are in order.
2. Relating Charity to the Name
The naming contributions at issue here all imply some minimal level
of charitable intent as demonstrated by the association of some charitable
cause with the name. This is so even though the donor's motivations
may be wholly selfish.210  Unless the donor was unusually specific in
today's society whether [a long dead donor] had a general or specific intent. . . is largely
indeterminate .... "); Laird, supra note 203, at 977 (opining that general intent requirement
as applied does little to further donor's intentions).
205 Terri R. Reicher, Assuring Competent Oversight to Hospital Conversion Transactions, 52
BAYLOR L. REv. 83, 129 (2003).
2o' Laird, supra note 203, at 977.
See, e.g., In re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524, 531 (Cal. 1946) ("The cy pres doctrine has
meant many things to many courts and its limits have rarely been defined."); Quinn v.
Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 60 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 1945) ("[Cly pres decisions.., have not
been free from contradiction and confusion). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003) (noting that "[miuch criticism has focused on the artificial and
speculative inquiry whether the settlor had a 'general' charitable intent .... ); Johnson,
supra note 14, at 380 ("[C]ourts have no principled basis for the application of the cy pres
doctrine .... "). Once again, the fact that a contribution is made "upon condition ... does
not necessarily indicate the absence of a more general charitable commitment."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
208 See, e.g., Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church, 200 S.E.2d 769, 779 (N.C. 1973) ("[N]o
two cases are exactly alike .... Consequently, it is not possible to reconcile all of the
decisions of the various courts, even where the circumstances are quite similar."); Craft, 74
N.E.2d at 595 ("It will serve no useful purpose to discuss at length the numerous cases...
in which the cy pres doctrine has been invoked."). Demonstrative of the strength of this
criticism is Professor Bogert's observation that "directly opposite results in cases where the
facts are similar prove the unsatisfactoriness of the search for the settlor's intent." BOGERT,
supra note 48, § 436. Courts have acknowledged this reality by noting, for example, that
"[a] line of demarkation [between specific and general intent] is not well-defined... [and]
research . . . does not disclose any particular tests which have been applied." Craft, 74
N.E.2d at 593.
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b, reporter's note (2003).
210 See supra Part III regarding the necessarily charitable effect of a charitable naming
contribution. The inquiry noted here is much more donor-intent dependent and subjective
than that concerning the "charitable" nature of the donor's gift, which is gauged by
reference to the objective effect of the gift.
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 426 2004-2005
Charitable Naming Gifts
stating, "I care absolutely nothing about the associated charitable cause,"
there will remain an invitation for courts to consider the scope of the
donor's charitable intentions. Variable outcomes in name deviation
situations are the demonstrated consequence of this invitation.
a. General Intent and Charitable Naming Opportunities
In this regard, a donor's express purpose to perpetuate her name
through charitable association does not alone negate a finding of general
charitable intent.21' Application of cy pres is, therefore, not per se
precluded by the presence of a naming provision. Numerous courts
have reached this conclusion."'
In Hardy v. Davis,211 for example, the donor included provisions in her
214
will for a named orphanage. Operation of that facility later became
impracticable, and the trial court refused to apply the doctrine of cy pres
on the basis of its finding that the donor possessed only a narrow or
specific charitable intent. The appellate court reversed that decision,
reasoning that:
The fact that [donor] wished to name the home after herself is not
regarded as a controlling consideration in the matter of whether her
charitable intent was general as distinguished from restricted,
narrow, exclusive or particular. It is difficult to assume that [the
donor] had no interest in orphan children, apart from [operation of
the specific named facility].
21 See supra note 210.
212 See, e.g., Rogers v. Att'y Gen., 196 N.E.2d 855, 860 (Mass. 1964) ("Her dual desire to
have the property thus used [for charitable purposes] and to have the family name
perpetuated does not foreclose the court from finding a general charitable intent."); Village
of Hinsdale v. Chi. City Missionary, 30 N.E.2d 657, 664-65 (111. 1940) (emphasizing general
charitable purposes over clear memorial purposes); Quinn v. Peoples Trust & Say. Co., 60
N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind. 1945) (applying cy pres doctrine despite clear memorial purpose for
gift); In re Petition of Downer Home, 226 N.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Wis. 1975) (emphasizing
general charitable purposes over clear memorial purposes). Of course, factual distinctions
may always affect a court's perception on such matters. See, e.g., Nelson v. Kring, 592 P.2d
438 (Kan. 1979) (noting that donor was familiar with hospital's operation prior to his death
and refusing to apply cy pres when hospital closed; however, donor also specifically
provided that principal should never go to hospital); Hardy v. Davis, 148 N.E.2d 805 (111.
App. Ct. 1958) (specific home was not in existence or operation prior to donor's death, thus
reducing likelihood of specific attachment to that institution versus its beneficiaries more
generally).
213 148 N.E.2d 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958).
214 Id. at 807.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 813.
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On the other hand, naming circumstances have been referenced in
findings of specific intent where cy pres was accordingly held
217inapplicable. In Nelson v. Kring, for example, the donor devised funds
to support a hospital that he had founded and named after himself while
living. "' When the hospital failed several decades later, the court
refused to apply cy pres to divert the funds to more general healthcare
219
purposes. On the matter of general charitable intent, the court found
that the donor "intended to support the particular hospital which bore
his name in his small town and had no broader charitable intent." °20 The
court did not, however, clarify whether the name simply identified a
preferred and limited charitable objective, versus the name on the
hospital being in and of itself important in finding only a specific
charitable intent.221
Name perpetuation took on an added degree of relevance in Wilson v.
First Presbyterian Church.2M In that case, the court determined that the
donor was only interested in perpetuating her brother's name via
establishment of a new church in his home community, because it was
only in that community that the brother, a former sheriff, would be
remembered most fondly.m Thus, when circumstances precluded the
building of a new church in that community bearing the brother's name,
the court refused to apply cy pres to allow some similar charitable object
224to perpetuate the name. The court also refused to permit the donor's
contribution to be diverted to an existing church for application in the
donor's community of choice - an outcome that could easily have been
tailored to foster the donor's name perpetuation purposes.2 On the one
... 592 P.2d 438 (Kan. 1979).
Id. at 440-41.
219 Id. at 443.
220 Id. at 444.
" A better conclusion would be that the presence of a gift over upon failure of the
designated hospital was provided for, along with clear language negating any intention to
have the principal of the gift fall to general heathcare uses. Id. at 441, 443-44.
200 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1973).
22 Because the court further found that the donor did not have an intention to foster
religion generally, a church in another community or a diversion of funds to an existing
church in the community was not possible under cy pres. Id. at 776.
24 Id. at 779.
See Rogers v. Attorney General, wherein the court stated that: "[allthough a donor
may clearly manifest a desire to have the trust serve as a memorial, the doctrine of cy pres
may still apply. Some effort, however, should be made to frame a scheme so as to include,
in some appropriate and practical manner, a suitable reference to the donor's family."
196 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Mass. 1964); accord, Wilson, 200 S.E.2d at 782 (Branch, J., dissenting).
See also infra Part VI regarding alternative means of perpetuating a donor's name where cy
pres or equitable deviation is held applicable.
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hand, Wilson seems to reflect the court's more general impression that
the donor lacked any intention to benefit religion generally, in light of
her specificity as to the location and nature of the benefit (i.e., only a new
226
church on the donated land). On the other hand, the case could be
viewed as more directly implicating the potential importance of a
naming condition as a factor in discerning general charitable intent for cy
pres purposes. In this regard, Wilson has been distinguished on the
grounds that "[t]he terms of the Wilson gift mandated a 'memorial,'
while the [gift in the distinguishing case] specified no such narrow,
limited intent."22 7  The suggestion is that the presence of a naming
condition was central to the outcome in Wilson. At a minimum, then, the
foregoing cases reveal that the oft-criticized and malleable nature of the
cy pres gneral intent requirement holds true in name deviation
situations.
b. Gift Over Provisions
There is an additional factual distinction that may strongly influence
outcomes across the doctrine of cy pres. Specifically, a donor may clarify
the general or specific nature of her charitable intent by expressly
providing for a gift over to alternative beneficiaries in the event the
stated charitable purpose fails.229 Many courts and statutes regard such a
provision as conclusive evidence of a specific intent that precludes
application of the cy pres doctrine.2 Such deference to a donor's gift
over provision is not without its critics, however, 2 ' and there are courts
that consider such a gift over as merely one of several factors to be
232
considered in gauging general charitable intent. In any event, it is
200 S.E.2d at 777-79.
Bd. of Trs. U.N.C. Chapel Hill v. Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d 239, 244 (N.C. 1984).
See supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text regarding such criticisms.
See generally Chester, supra note 204, at 45-47 (1989) (discussing effect of gift over as
negating general charitable intent).
ZV See, e.g., Burr v. Brooks, 416 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ill. 1981) ("It is... well established that
cy pres will not apply if provision is made for an alternate charitable gift."); Chester, supra
note 204, at 47 (discussing "no cy pres in the face of a gift over" rule). Regard for such
provisions addresses to some degree the criticisms of the general charitable intent
requirement and its malleability.
21 See, e.g., Chester, supra note 204, at 44 ("The concept [of general charitable intent] is
worse than useless and should be abandoned... [in which case] any mandatory use of the
gift over rule is dead.").
2 Such courts, in other words, may apply cy pres even though the donor provided for
an alternate disposition in the event her conditioned charity should fail. See, e.g., Home for
Incurables of Bait. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 756 (Md. 2003)
("[T]he presence or absence of a gift over is merely one factor among many in determining
20051
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worthy to note that such a gift over provision is widely viewed as a cy
pres "opt out," in that the donor specifies alternative uses (charitable or
noncharitable) in the event that her original purpose fails.233  This
directive potentially obviates the need for further inquiry into the
parameters of the donor's intent.
3. A Culmination of Doctrines
Despite its perceived strength as intent-indicative and forfeiture-
mandating, however, a gift over provision by no means guarantees that
the precise naming conditions of a donor's contribution will be carried
out. Also not guaranteed is the conclusion that forfeiture will result from
the failure of or noncompliance with a seemingly clear condition
regarding a name association. The case of Zevely v. City of Paris 
2M
provides an instructive example of cy pres inspired analysis affecting the
court's treatment of a donor's particular institutional name association
provision. The case also demonstrates how a court's perception of a
donor's charitable intentions can affect a court's insistence upon
compliance with the precise terms of a donor's desired name association.
More specifically, the donor in Zevely entered into an agreement to
endow a room in the city-run W.M. Massie Hospital.rn The agreement
provided that the room would be made available for the treatment of
young men and would bear the name "Green Clay, Jr.," in honor of the
donor's deceased son.2 The donor expressly provided that "[i]n case
the W.M. Massie Hospital should permanently cease to be used as a
hospital, the [contribution] is to be returned to [the donor] or her
heirs."237 A seemingly logical inference is that the donor intended that
her naming objectives be carried out only in association with a specific
charitable institution. Failing to adhere to that scheme, the charity was
whether the testator had a general charitable intent."). For a good discussion of other
factors affecting the determination of whether the donor possessed a general charitable
intent, see Bd. of Trs. U.N.C. Chapel Hill v. Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d 239, 243-44 (N.C.
1984).
See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 1120 (discussing gift over as cy pres opt-out).
' Zevely v. City of Paris, 298 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1956). The court described the donor-
charity agreement as a "contract." Despite that moniker, however, the case clearly turned
upon application of charitable trust doctrine, at least in the eyes of the majority.
' Id. at 13. The gift was made during the donor's lifetime, and the legal enforcement
action was subsequently brought by the donor's heir. The heir sued "on grounds that there
was a reverter." Id. Thus, whether contract or gift on condition, the matter can be reduced
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to forfeit the contribution.
Over forty years later, the W.M. Massie Hospital was in fact closed
and its facilities were sold.2  A new hospital was opened in a different
location, bore a different institutional name, and was operated by a
different government entity. 39 The new hospital did, however, include a
wing adorned with the "W.M. Massie" name. 240 It was proposed that this
wing in the new hospital house the donor's dedicated memorial room
bearing her son's name, in lieu of forfeiture of the donor's gift .241
The donor's heir brought an action alleging that these changes
triggered the gift over/forfeiture provision. Despite the apparent
clarity of the donor's terms, the lower court invoked cy pres doctrine to
continue the donor's charitable and memorial purposes. 24 The appellate
court upheld that continuation, but on different reasoning. 244 Utilizing
language that reflects the contractually inspired but property-based
analysis often employed in such cases, the appellate court specifically
determined that:
[The donor's] purpose in creating the trust was to provide a free
hospital room for needy young men in memory of her son .... This
purpose is being carried out by the new county hospital. There is
nothing in the contract which discloses any intent on the part of [the
donor] for any particular building [to house the room]. Her
paramount purpose was not to benefit the hospital, but to benefit
needy young men and provide a memorial for her son ....
Obviously, since the purpose of the trust is being carried out, cy
pres need not be invoked. There has simply been no breach of trust
in this case . . . . [A] free room ... inscribed "Clay Green, Jr.




24 Id. Note the altered use of the "W.M. Massie" name as identifying the hospital, and




2143 Id. The court specifically invoked the doctrine of cy pres.
2, Id. The reported decision references the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which was the
name given to the highest court in Kentucky at the time of the Zevely decision.
21 Id. Note the court's reference to "the contract," while proceeding under cy pres
analysis. A court, in considering cy pres analysis and its implications, may avoid operation
of the gift over provision by refusing to find a failure of the donor's original purpose. Even
in the context of conditional gifts not burdened by charitable trust status, courts may
2005]
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Under the rubric of cy pres analysis, the court simply refused to find
any violation of the naming condition that might trigger the gift
over/forfeiture provision - thus avoiding any need to invoke cy pres at
all. The court did this by finding that the donor's primary intentions
were broadly charitable and, thus, still being served. Consistent with
this inquiry, the court could just as easily have found general charitable
intent and adequate service to that intent via a named room in the new
hospital wing - the ultimate result being the same, in either case, as
demonstrated by the lower court's invocation of cy pres to preserve the
charitable memorial room. Ultimately, by either route, the outcome
indicates that the broader a court's perception of a donor's charitable
purposes, the broader will be that court's permitted variation in the
donor's proffered name association scheme.
The Zevely dissent, however, objected to the majority's cy-pres-
inspired analysis by emphasizing the clarity of the donor terms.24 The
dissent pointedly observed that:
The designation of the wing of the new hospital and the naming of a
room is a too obvious attempt to avoid the [forfeiture] condition ....
The old building was sold and the proceeds used for the
construction of a nurses home on the new hospital site. The
language of the [forfeiture] provision is plain and unequivocal. It
describes the happening of a definite event or condition, to wit: the
permanent cessation of the use of the W.M. Massie Hospital as a
hospital. The term "W.M. Massie Hospital" was used to describe a
known institution comprised of definitely identified premises at a
certain location. Can there be any question that the hospital known
to [the donor] as the W.M. Massie Hospital has ceased to exist?
247
The contrasting views reflect the uncertainties that name deviation
circumstances present for donors and charities, both in planning for and
resolving potential conflicts. A pro-donor view would no doubt find the
Zevely dissent convincing and the departure from the donor's express
terms unwarranted. A broader perspective - perhaps more attuned to a
societal view - would find the ultimate outcome defensible.
24
Regardless of which Zevely perspective holds more sway, it is apparent
similarly take a strict view of what constitutes breach of a condition. This obviously
matters a great deal, because in the absence of breach of the condition, there is no basis for
forfeiture or cy pres modification, as applicable.
24 See supra Part V.B.1 regarding the operation of forfeiture conditions.
298 S.W.2d at 14.
24 Note in this regard that the Zevely majority saved both the charitable and name
perpetuation aspects of the gift. See also supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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that courts often invoke the noted equitable doctrines to craft contrary,
but quite defensible, perspectives on the proper treatment to be accorded
a donor's charitable and name perpetuation directives.
4. Alternative Charitable Beneficiaries: Good Works Revisited
Such variability is no doubt exacerbated by doctrinally-mandated
divinations of donor intent.2 49 As noted earlier, one donor response to
such outcomes might be to attempt a more precise articulation of
intentions regarding the desired charitable and associative name
perpetuation objectives.2' ° As also noted, donors typically proceed here
by imposing perpetual naming conditions that, by their very terms, call
for forfeiture upon noncompliance.25 Putting aside practical limitations
on a call for more donor precision as a panacea for the name deviation
circumstance 2 donors may craft naming provisions that clearly call for
forfeiture to an alternative charitable beneficiary in the event of
noncompliance.5 3 This enforcement mechanism at least ensures society
that the contributed property will remain in the charitable stream even if
the naming provision is enforced as stated against the original 
charity.2
The prospect of forfeiture in favor of a second charity upon
noncompliance with a naming provision shows that judicial crafting of
some alternative name association is not the only approach that
potentially appeases both donor and societal interests. s
Despite the continued public benefit, however, such forfeiture
provisions do not satisfactorily resolve the problems that naming
contributions often create.2" The shortcomings of such provisions can be
seen if we consider, again, the case of Good Works and its desire to
upgrade an existing library into a larger and more useful media center
249 Such divinations are mandated in the search for legal status as discussed in Part V,
as well as under doctrines like cy pres and equitable deviation, as discussed in Part VI.
' See supra Part V.C.
251 Id.
252 See supra Part V.C.2.
In Zevely, the property would have gone to the donor's heirs had the dissent's view
prevailed. Zevely v. City of Paris, 298 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Ky. 1956).
' Even such provisions are subject to variable enforcement, regardless of applicable
doctrine, on such basic matters as whether the forfeiture trigger has been met. See
discussion of Zevely supra Parts VI.A.3 and VI.C.
255 See supra Part II.B regarding donor and societal perspectives in the context of name
deviation circumstances.
' For a discussion regarding the Uniform Trust Code's recent distinction between gifts
over to private individuals versus gifts over to an alternate charitable beneficiary, see infra
Part VI.D.
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that includes more than traditional paper resources.Z7 Assume, in that
case, that the original naming donor, Ms. Jones, included a gift over to a
community hospital "upon breach of the condition that the library
perpetually bear my name." Although the alternative beneficiary upon
forfeiture by Good Works is now also charitable, difficulties remain.
Specifically, the current charitable beneficiary, Good Works, must now
perpetually make mission-oriented decisions cognizant of the threat of
forfeiture. The naming provision, in other words, motivates
management to pursue charitable goals in a potentially suboptimal
manner to preserve the precise name association and, thus, avoid
possible forfeiture of the affected funds.58 That forfeiture and the
decisions it inspires are premised solely on the basis of a private name
condition that has little, if anything, to do with the objectives that Good
Works charitable management should be weighing in its pursuit of the
entity's mission.259  While some might argue that this is simply an
acceptable consequence of society's motivating Ms. Jones to dedicate her
property to charitable uses, that justification overlooks the possible
extent of the resulting charitable constraints, the potential for
undermining Ms. Jones's desired positive name association. It also
overlooks the availability of more flexible alternatives for
accommodating Ms. Jones's name perpetuation objectives as
circumstances change.
With regard to charitable constraints and the undermining of Ms.
Jones's desired positive name association, the gift over provision
assumed for Ms. Jones's gift, for example, would clearly provide an
The Good Works situation is explored in detail supra Part V.C.3.
Of course, the argument that a court will not upset a charitable scheme simply to
accomplish more effective philanthropy is well-known. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 872-83 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing this
issue and citing multiple cases and commentaries). The point here is not so much to upset
that perspective, but rather, to challenge that perspective where the only impediment to
more effective philanthropy is a donor's private name perpetuation requirements. The
Uniform Trust Code and Restatement incorporations of "wasteful" into the triggers for cy
pres and equitable deviation standards also support this perspective. See supra Part VI.D.
Also, in many cases the true likelihood of forfeiture will be difficult, if not impossible, for
the parties to accurately gauge in advance, thus further clouding the charitable decision-
making matrix. For example, the degree of suggested variation from the donor's naming
scheme, the availability of interested parties (such as the donor's heirs) to challenge a
proposed name deviation, and the willingness of a given court to effect a forfeiture might
all complicate decision-making in this area.
I To say that management should pursue that mission without regard to financial
consequences is unrealistic, and, therefore, a nonstarter. For a discussion regarding the
relationship between a naming provision and "charitable" mission, see supra Parts III and
VI.A.2.
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incentive for Good Works management to favor choices that hinder the
very mission and service to the public with which Ms. Jones originally
associated her name. The specific management incentive is to simply
maintain the inadequate and outdated Good Works library. Doing so
would preserve Ms. Jones's gift and avoid not only forfeiture, but also
potentially costly litigation and public relations issues. This is
particularly so where it is apparent that major fundraising - easily
conceived as greatly facilitated by the availability of a new naming
opportunity for what is, in essence, a new facility - is going to be
critical to the modernization project's success. 261 In light of the potential
forfeiture, however, Good Works is better off focusing its modernization
and fundraising efforts on other aspects of its expanded facilities project.
The difficulty from a societal standpoint arises because such a decision is
likely to be heavily influenced by Ms. Jones's decades-old vision of
acceptably associated charity. The ultimate consequence of a name
provision calling for a gift over to another charity upon any name
change, then, is to allow a private name to serve as a vehicle for re-
allocating from charities to donors significant long-term control over
charitable decision-making - all in service only to the donor's private
name perpetuation demands.
These consequences extend across the charitable sector. Consider the
named hospital-outpatient facility example first introduced in Part 1.261
Only the most blind subservience to rhetorical property rights rationales
could support allowing a required name association to force the
continuation of a hospital wing for victims of the donor's chosen disease
- or the termination of such care altogether - where modern science
clearly dictates the transition from hospital to outpatient care for those
victims. A transfer of the name and any accompanying assets or
endowment to an affiliated outpatient facility seems sensible,
particularly from a societal standpoint. Such outcomes would also
appear to serve any donor contribution scheme that references name
perpetuation, a hospital, or specified disease care - much less some
combination of those goals. No one proposes disregarding the donor's
plan by associating the name with, for example, a homeless shelter.
Instead, the proffered association contemplates service to the same
charitable beneficiary class, as affected by the same disease, and via
functionally equivalent methods or facilities.
' See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text (discussing importance naming
opportunity might have to large-scale charitable undertaking).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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It takes no great imagination, however, to see how the threat of
forfeiture could inspire a different outcome. Even if forfeiture is carried
out via a gift over to another charity, viable choices that envision some
modified deference to a required name association may be practically
foreclosed to the current beneficiary if such choices threaten forfeiture of
the affected funds. Simply stated, where the forfeiture threat derives
from a required name association that is based upon a now-aged
perspective on charitable mission, legal doctrine should more clearly
embrace flexibility in accommodating the name. A key route to effecting
such flexible alternatives is found in the doctrine of equitable deviation,
which is discussed next.
B. Equitable Deviation and Private Name Perpetuation
The doctrine of equitable deviation permits a court to authorize a
departure from a donor's directions. The departure is said to be
warranted if, owing to some change in circumstances, continued
compliance with the donor's directions would "defeat or substantially
impair the accomplishment of the [donor's] purposes." 262 As applied,
equitable deviation and cy pres can be difficult to distinguish and are
often confused by courts. 63 The traditional difference between the
doctrines is, however, at least easily stated. Specifically, cy pres presents
a more narrowly invoked but sweeping power to alter the actual
charitable purpose of a gift (traditionally described as a "substantive"
deviation). In contrast, equitable deviation provides a more liberally
applied but narrower power to deviate not from the charitable purpose
itself, but from particular donor directions relating to carrying out that
... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66 (2003). The changed circumstances may, but need not, result in cy pres
equivalent "impossibility, impracticability, or illegality." See, e.g., In re Estate of Craig, 848
P.2d 313, 320-22 (Ariz. App. 1992) (contrasting cy pres as grounded in failure of charitable
purpose, versus equitable deviation as grounded in changed circumstances); Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. City of Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745, 751-52 (Mass. 1970) (same).
' Many cases purport to apply cy pres doctrine, but recite what seems to be equitable
deviation analysis in concluding that cy pres does or does not apply. See, e.g., Chester,
supra note 204, at 58-59 ("The blurring of the distinctions between cy pres and equitable
deviation has gone far enough."); Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in Application
(Report of ABA Committee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations), 8 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 391, 398-403 (1973) (noting judicial confusion in applying doctrines); Johnson, supra
note 14, at 376, 379-80 ("The distinction between cy pres and equitable deviation is specious
and without merit."); Roger J. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable
Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REv. 635,645 (1988) ("[Clourts have used the
deviation doctrine to yield results that resemble modifications of purpose under the cy pres
doctrine, and vice versa.").
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charitable purpose (traditionally described as a departure from an
264
"administrative" term).
The more liberal rules for application of equitable deviation are
particularly noteworthy. The accepted rules hold that equitable
deviation may be invoked to continue a charitable purpose "even though
there is a provision for a gift over and the [donor] may not have had an
intention to aid charity in general."26 In other words and unlike cy pres,
the presence of a gift over provision and the absence of geneal
charitable intent will not alone defeat application of the doctrine of
equitable deviation to continue charitable uses.266
Donor intent remains relevant however. Application of the equitable
deviation doctrine is at its core desined to facilitate accomplishment of
the donor's charitable purposes. Traditional statements of the
doctrine, moreover, purport to authorize deviation only where the
261
circumstances necessitating change were unanticipated by the settlor.
This latter requirement, however, is not as powerful as these statements
make it appear. Two observations by the ABA Committee on Charitable
'" Burr v. Brooks, 416 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ill. 1981) (discussing both doctrines and their
distinctions); In re Estate of Craig, 848 P.2d at 320-21 (same); Craft v. Shroyer, 74 N.E.2d 589,
598 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 cmt. a; see also Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 263,
at 398-400 (noting distinctions between two doctrines). Confused application of the two
doctrines may be evidence of the illusory nature of the administrative/substantive
distinction, but those distinctions and confusions are less important here than the ultimate
impact of the name deviation analysis under whatever guise presented. For criticisms of
the administrative versus substantive distinction, see, for example, Johnson, supra note 14,
at 375 (noting that distinction is difficult, if not impossible, to make).
2 In re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524, 532 (Cal. 1946); see also Cy Pres and Deviation, supra
note 263, at 399 (noting use of equitable deviation to avoid effect of gift over if cy pres
doctrine were applied). It is also important to note that equitable deviation can be invoked
under a court's general equity powers, even if the jurisdiction disavows cy pres altogether.
See In re Estate of Craig, 848 P.2d at 320-21 ("At the present time, cy pres has not been
adopted in Arizona .... We believe this is a compelling case for the application of equitable
deviation.").
' For example, the court in Craft, 74 N.E.2d at 597, found cy pres to be inapplicable
upon concluding that it "cannot conceive of . . . a trust which would contain more
restrictions and a more narrow and specific intent than that found [here]." The court,
nevertheless, went on to apply equitable deviation. Id. at 598-99.
267 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a ("The objective of the rule ... is to
give effect to what the settlor's intent probably would have been had the circumstances in
question been anticipated."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 cmt. a.
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 38, cmt. e (1959); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
16, § 167 ("If it appears that the settlor did, however, anticipate the circumstances and
clearly provided that the trustee should nevertheless have no power to act in such a way as
to prevent the failure of the trust, it would seem that the court would not be justified in
permitting the trustee so to act, unless the provision is against public policy.").
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Trusts and Foundations are particularly relevant in this regard. These
observations are also relevant to the noted potential blurring of cy pres
269and equitable deviation analysis. Specifically, the ABA committee first
observed that:
The general judicial tendency ... is to authorize deviation from the
terms of a trust in the presence of changed circumstances where
adherence to those terms is possible but impracticable to some
a degree. With this there seems to be little discussion as to whether
the changed circumstances involved were foreseen or unforeseen by
the [donor] .... [I]t seems to be a rare case where the court dwells
on whether the changed circumstances were unforeseen by the
[donor] .270
The committee then goes on to observe that:
"[als a practical matter ... in those cases where, because of a gift
over or some other circumstances, application of one doctrine [e.g.,
cy pres] would lead to a result different from the use of the other
[e.g., equitable deviation], it is probable that the result which the
court feels is equitable will control the court's choice of doctrine."27'
With these observations in mind, equitable deviation presents a
particularly potent and perhaps unpredictable doctrine where the
resolution of a charitable name deviation situation is concerned.
For a discussion regarding judicial confusion and criticisms of cy pres versus
equitable deviation, as well as the administrative versus substantive distinction, see supra
note 263 and accompanying text.
27 Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 263, at 401, 403. As another commentator pointed
out, "The [donor's] purpose appears irrelevant to the analysis." Martin D. Begleiter,
Administrative and Dispositive Powers in Trust and Tax Law: Toward a Realistic Approach, 36
FLA. L. REv. 957, 966, 969, 981-83 (1984) (noting but criticizing departure from requirement
that settlor not anticipate changed circumstances). Professor Begleiter went on to similarly
observe that "a settlor may, by specific direction ... provide that his directions shall not be
deviated from in a certain manner .... Most courts faced with this problem have held that
deviation is permitted in these circumstances in spite of the settlor's directions." Id. at 982.
While the Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 66 purports to adhere to this "unforeseen"
requirement, the Uniform Trust Code has expressly removed the inquiry from equitable
deviation analysis. UNiF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (2003). That section states in its entirety:
"The court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its
existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust's administration."
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. a, reporter's note (discussing both statements
of rule).
"n Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 263, at 401; accord, Johnson, supra note 14, at 400
("[TIhe doctrine of equitable deviation may be manipulated to create or result in
substantive outcomes that are not allowed or warranted by narrow application of the cy
pres doctrine .... Furthermore, courts consider the results generated by the application of
each doctrine before determining which doctrine to apply....").
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Specifically, there is ample precedent holding that required name
associations, of varying degrees of exactitude and seeming importance to
272the donor, are administrative terms. Such terms are, therefore, subject
to modification under equitable deviation principles when changed
circumstances call into question continued compliance with those
conditions. Characterizing naming provisions as administrative (i.e., as
relating to the implementation of charitable designs, but not
substantively imperative to those designs) is perhaps one way that
courts articulate a conclusion that name perpetuation purposes (or some
specific name association) were of secondary importance to a donor,
273relative to a primary charitable objective.
In any event, this administrative characterization clearly opens a
pervasive route to escaping or circumventing a donor's seemingly
restrictive name association demands. In the charitable naming
opportunity context, then, this practical reality transcends disputes over
the reality of the administrative-substantive distinction or donor
274prescience as to changed circumstances. When paired with the
Blumenthal court's statement as to the broad applicability of equitable
275doctrines, the ultimate consequence is a clear potential for judicialmodification of the donor's specified charitable naming scheme.
C. The Inevitable Demise of the Named Facility
Prominent institutions, undertakings, and facilities often fail. The
previously noted Zevely case, for example, evidences that common
272 See, e.g., In re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524, 531 (Cal. 1946) ("The fact that, in making
a gift to establish an institution that is otherwise charitable, the donor provides that the
institution shall be named for him or some other party... is regarded as part of the scheme
of administration .... "); First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Elliott, 92 N.E.2d 66, 73-74 (Ill. 1950)
(same); Vill. of Hinsdale v. Chi. City Missionary Soc'y, 30 N.E.2d 657, 664-65 (Ill. 1950);
Palmer v. Evans, 124 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 1963) (concluding that memorial aspects of gift
were "an administrative tool in the accomplishment of [the donor's charitable] purpose");
Wesley United Methodist Church v. Harvard Coll., 316 N.E.2d 620, 624 (Mass. 1974)
(concluding that memorial aspect of gift was mere "mechanism" to charitable object of
providing scholarships); Ranken-Jordan Home v. Drury Coll., 449 S.W.2d 161, 166 (Mo.
1970) (implicitly concluding that name provision was part of administrative scheme such
that change in named charity's operations did not warrant forfeiture); Adams v. Page, 79 A.
837, 838 (N.H. 1911) ("[Tlhe name . . . was merely a part of her scheme for
administration."); Petition of Downer Home v. Downer Home, 226 N.W.2d 444, 448 (Wis.
1975) ("[T]he home name [was] 'a mere agency for administrative purposes."').
273 See infra note 325.
74 See supra note 264 and accompanying text (regarding criticisms of this
administrative-substantive distinction).
275 See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Blumenthal
decision.
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dilemma. 276 Actually, the Zevely case presented two names that were
affected by the demise of the hospital. In addition to the donor's son's
name and the alleged requirement that it adorn a dedicated memorial
room in a particular hospital, the other name involved in the case was
"W.M. Massie." That name went from adorning an entire hospital to
denoting a mere wing in a completely different facility.Y Although this
altered use of the W.M. Massie name was not directly before the Zevely
court, other courts have addressed such matters directly through
invocation of equitable deviation or similar analysis operating under the
guise of cy pres.
For example, the donor in Adams v. Page w envisioned a new "Proctor
Hospital." When that goal was thwarted by the intervening formation of
another hospital in the community, the donor's heirs claimed that the
contribution should revert to them.28' Though cy pres was seemingly
invoked, the court echoed equitable deviation principles when it opined
"that the provision in respect to the name was merely a part of [the
donor's] scheme for administering the charitable trust." 2 2 Based upon
this characterization and its legal implications, the court held that the
donor's contribution should not be forfeited, but could instead be used
to support the "Proctor Ward" of the existing hospital.m
Cases like Adams and Zevely raise the issue of whether inexact and
often less prominent compliance with a naming provision is sufficient to
avoid forfeiture or other outcomes. In this regard, judicial flexibility has
also permitted the association of a name with a less ambitious facility,
284
276 Zevely v. City of Paris, 298 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956). For a more detailed
discussion of the Zevely case, see supra Part VI.A.3.
277 Zevely, 298 S.W.2d at 13.
2 The court offers no insight as to the transfer of the W.M. Massie Hospital name to a
mere wing of the new hospital. Id. at 12. It could be that a prior naming gift for general
hospital use in the county was the catalyst. It could be that the W.M. Massie name was
merely honorary and those associated with the new project wanted to continue the honor.
Unfortunately, both Google and Yahoo searches for any history in this regard proved
unproductive.
27 For a discussion regarding judicial blurring of cy pres and equitable deviation
doctrines, see supra notes 263-271 and accompanying text.




In re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524, 532-33 (Cal. 1946) ("It is a reasonable modification
of the trust to enforce the gift for a smaller [named] hospital rather than to allow the
testator's intentions to provide a hospital in the town to fail entirely."); Adams, 79 A. at 838;
cf. In re Estate of Craig, 842 P.2d 313, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding though not name
case, "trial court erred in requiring the needless construction of the building [as required by
[Vol. 38:375
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a facility with substantially altered means of pursuing related charitable
purposes,2 88 and a subordinately named component within an already
named charity.28 This judicial approach has also permitted complete
rejection of the need for name association with any particular facility.
Courts have accomplished this latter result by diverting the contribution
to a named fund to be applied in pursuit of the donor's stated charitable
objectives.2 7 The court in Grant Home v. Medlock, for example, wasdirect in stating that:
Although [the donor] certainly wished to preserve her husband's
memory [by her gift to help the poor via a now failed institution
named for him], her intent does not require the use of the specific
Home [she and her husband] established, or of any physical structures
at all. A charitable trust that distributes money to house the needy
can serve equally well as a memorial to [the donor's husband's]
philanthropy.
Outcomes like this are quite sweeping in that they permit the
association of a name with a mere fund, where the donor seemingly
contemplated something more grand. Divergent results can be found, of
course. The outcome in Adams v. Page,290 for example, might have been
different if the donor had clearly limited her charitable intentions to her
named institution and clearly foreclosed community healthcare, more
generally, as one of her goals.2 91 On the other hand, it could be argued
that the donor in Zevely did exactly that with regard to the named room
in a precisely described hospital, but to no avail. Perhaps this suggests
that greater donor precision in crafting naming conditions and their
the donor, but instead the charity] should [have] been allowed to use the [contribution] to
renovate... existing facilities .... ).
" Ranken-Jordan Home v. Drury Coll., 449 S.W.2d 161, 166-67 (Mo. 1970).
Old Colony Trust Co. v. 0. M. Fisher Home, 16 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. 1938); see also
supra note 165 and accompanying text.
2"7 Grant Home v. Medlock, 349 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); cf. Rogers v. Att'y Gen.,
196 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Mass. 1964) (holding that where donor's desired named home could
not be established, cy pres applied to permit use of gift to benefit intended class, but that
"[slome effort ... should be made to frame a scheme so as to include, in some appropriate
and practical manner, a suitable reference to the donor's family.").
Grant Home, 349 S.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 658 (emphasis added); see also In re Ashbridge's Estate, 61 Pa. D. & C. 279
(1948) (authorizing devise intended to establish widows' home to be maintained instead as
fund to pay for admission of members of charitable class to established institutions).
2 Adams v. Page, 79 A. 837, 837 (N.H. 1911).
2" The Adams court considers the memorial possibility when attempting to discern the
donor's primary purpose. Id. at 838.
' For a discussion about the Zevely case, see supra Part VI.A.3.
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consequences would alleviate some of the problems raised by name
deviation circumstances, if only courts would more consistently respect
such provisions. Although this would provide some added degree of
certainty going forward, problems such as those relating to charitable
constraint and the prospect of dual service to naming and charitable
goals as circumstances inevitably and unpredictably change, remain
unaddressed. 3
In any event, other courts have specifically rejected the proposition
that a named fund is an acceptable substitute for a named facility or
institution. The court in Scott's Will,294 for example, confronted an
instruction to use a contribution for a named home to care for
tuberculosis patients under church supervision, which was no longer
295achievable due to changed circumstances. In response to the argument
that the court dispense with the association of the name with a physical
facility, the court opined that "[n]aming a charitable fund after the
[donor's] family on the records of whatever institution might administer
this fund is of a different order of magnitude from causing a building to
bear [that family] name." 296  The court then went on, however, to
dispense altogether with the healthcare aspect of the donor's plan by
holding that a portion of the contributed funds could be applied to other
nonhealthcare related buildings maintained by the supervising church
297entity - so long as the name was attached to the buildings. Though
the court in Scott's Will no doubt concluded that the donor intended to
benefit the church entity apart from its healthcare mission, it should be
noted that courts have conversely found that continued name
recognition will not, alone, support a deviation from the donor's stated
charitable purposes, absent sufficient changed circumstances or
impossibility, etc. affecting those purposes.
8
Taken together, the foregoing sampling of cases demonstrates the
malleability of judicial modification doctrines where a name deviation
29 For a discussion regarding both donor precision in crafting naming provisions, as a
panacea to the name deviation circumstance, and the impossibility of predicting the nature
of changes that might prompt a name deviation, see supra Parts V.C.3 and VI.A.4.




' See, e.g., In re Succession of Milne, 89 So. 2d 281, 288 (La. 1956) (holding that
operation of named home for orphan boys will not be expanded to include operation as
named asylum for delinquent boys); In re Ashbridge's Estate, 61 Pa. D. & C. 279 (1948)
(refusing to permit gift for establishing home for indigent women to be diverted to other
organizations with divergent missions, despite proposal that such organizations would
give adequate recognition to name).
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circumstance exists. That malleability, as well as fact-intensive decision-
making, reveals a degree of unpredictability in the interpretation and
effect of charitable naming provisions. That unpredictability is, at least
in part, attributable to the often elusive concept of donor intent. Donor
intent in these circumstances is variously presumed, manufactured, or
clearly stated but sometimes seemingly ignored by courts. Although
these ideas have particular application to charitable naming situations,
many of the noted problems permeate the doctrines of cy pres and
equitable deviation more generally. Recognition of these issues has
prompted two recent revisitations of those doctrines. Those revisitations
attempt to address some of the noted concerns, as discussed next.
D. Recent Articulations of Cy Pres and Equitable Deviation Doctrines
0
Consideration of cy pres and equitable deviation doctrines would be
incomplete without mention of two important and recent revisitations of
those doctrines. Specifically, both the new Uniform Trust Code
("UTC")N9 and Restatement (Third) of Trusts ("Restatement")30 liberalize
the cy pres "impossible, impracticable, or illegal" triggering requirement.
They do this by adding to the acceptable triggering events the
circumstance that continued adherence to the donor's design has become
"wasteful.-101 The Restatement comments explain that "it is against the
policy of the . . . law to permit wasteful or seriously inefficient use of
resources dedicated to charity."0 2 With regard to equitable deviation,
the UTC provision adds this trigger and also expressly omits any need to
show that the circumstances leading to this determination were
unanticipated by the settlor.30 Though the Restatement appears to be
less sweeping with regard to equitable deviation parameters, the
Reporter's Notes do indicate that traditional doctrine "was considerably
more restrictive" than that embodied in the new Restatement. 3 In any
event, addition of the "wasteful" trigger for application of these
modification doctrines clearly supports the argument that a required
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 412-13 (2003) (delineating rules for equitable deviation and cy
pres, respectively).
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 66-67 (2003) (delineating rules for equitable
deviation and cy pres, respectively).
1' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (discussing cy pres); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§§ 412(b), 413(a) (discussing deviation and cy pres, respectively).
' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b; see also DUKEmINiER, supra note 258 at
872-83 (discussing matter of charitable efficiency and cy pres modification).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 reporter's note.
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name association should not be allowed to force the clearly suboptimal• 305
utilization of charitable resources.
Both the UTC and Restatement continue to promote the donor's intent
as the ultimate consideration. In the context of cy pres, however, both
treatments presume the presence of a general charitable intent, thus
requiring some specific evidence to negate that important cy pres
determinant. The Restatement requires that such evidence come in the
form of an express provision in the trust instrument, while the UTC
merely states the.existence of the presumption. Both articulations of cy
pres doctrine continue, however, to defer to gift over provisions where
the original charitable purpose fails. Significantly, though, the UTC
limits the durational effect of such a provision to twenty-one years where
the gift over is to a noncharitable beneficiary, such as the donor's heirs.3
The period is extended to include the longer of twenty-one years or the
donor's life, where the gift over is in the form of a reversion to the
donor.30 Gifts over to charitable beneficiaries, however, remain
perpetually effective under the UTC, and the Restatement omits
altogether any new durational limitations regardless of the alternateb .. i , 310
beneficiary's nature.
As yet, there is little case law indicating the true significance these
doctrinal updates will have where followed. It is unclear, for example,
whether courts will continue to divine whatever general or specific
intent comports with the court's view of a proper outcome, regardless of
See supra Part VI.A.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 reporter's note to cmt. b; UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 413 cmt. Some have asserted that the Uniform Trust Code eliminates the general
charitable intent requirement altogether. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Modification and
Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 37
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 706-07, n.48 (2003) ("Solutions [to problems caused by the cy
pres general charitable intent requirement] have included presuming that the settlor had a
general charitable intent, or, under the new UTC [§ 413], eliminating the requirement
altogether."). Contra UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (noting that "similar to Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 67 ... [UTC § 413] modifies traditional doctrine by presuming that the
settler had a general charitable intent"). This may have been the general presumption
under prior law, anyway. See, e.g., Ball v. Hall, 274 A.2d 516, 521 (Vt. 1971) ("[T]he law
presumes that if the benefactor had realized it would be impossible to carry out his first
intention, she would have desired that the property be applied as nearly as possible to the
initial purpose, rather than have the trust fail altogether. This is the established
doctrine....").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt.
UNiF. TRUST CODE § 413(b).
3o Id.
310 Id; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
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stated presumptions."' The UTC's limitation on the durational
effectiveness of gifts over to noncharities does represent progress in
terms of society's stake in the donor-charity venture, although the UTC
312
drafters cite only administrative convenience as supporting the change.
Even with that change, donors still possess the power to perpetually
control charitable decision-making under both the UTC and Restatement
based solely on private name perpetuation desires. They can do this by
simply calling for a gift over to a different charitable organization if the
name condition is not strictly adhered to forever.313
While it is easy to seize upon doctrinal distinctions like the presence of
a specific condition or a gift over, those important factors are by no
means consistently determinative where a charitable naming
opportunity is at issue.314 The focus upon the particulars of various
factual distinctions or the vagaries of donor intent, moreover, obscures
more important normative questions.
E. Relative Purposes and Exploitation of the Charitable Moniker
An important normative question concerns whether a donor's demand
for perpetual control is given too much weight relative to society's
interest in ensuring that the donor-charity arrangement serves charitable
ends. Scholars have long debated this issue in general terms.
Charitable naming cases are particularly noteworthy in the context of
this debate. One reason is that name deviation cases bring into specific
focus the manner in which society allows private concerns, wholly
unrelated to any concept of charity or public good, to undermine
316society's stake in the donor-charity naming venture. Another reason is
the perpetual nature of the naming condition as compared to the
potentially duration-limited benefit fostered by the naming
contribution.117  The discrepancies in outcomes where the analysis
311 For a discussion regarding the criticism of the cy pres general intent requirement,
see supra notes 204-209 and 269-271 and accompanying text.
312 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt.
313 See supra Part VI.A.4 (discussing limiting effects of any gift over provision, even if
gift over leaves property in charitable stream by designating alternative charitable
beneficiary in event of forfeiture).
... See, e.g., supra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
... For more general recognition of this normative issue, see, for example, Atkins, supra
note 14, at 1114-15, DiClerico, supra note 196, at 154-55, Eisenstein, supra note 196, at 1761-
66, Fisch, supra note 9, at 380-85, Laird, supra note 203, at 987, and Sisson, supra note 263, at
648-51.
311 See also infra note 352 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 84 and accompanying text; infra Part VI.C.
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concerns a naming provision also raise concerns at the donor-charity
level. One concern is exactly how donor-charity agreements should be
conceived, given the prospects as to how those agreements might be
implemented over time. That concern, as noted, may lead to even more
restrictive donor commands.1 8
The reasoning in a pair of related Ninth Circuit cases aptly
demonstrates how these normative issues play out in the charitable
naming context. In Pedrotti v. Marin County319 a naming provision
figured prominently in both the Ninth Circuit and district court
decisions. The donor in those cases had contributed a parcel of land to
the county government so that the income could be applied for
charitable uses.320 The donor expressly called for forfeiture if the land
were ever sold, and further provided that the property should be named
in memory of the donor's deceased wife.321  An eminent domain
proceeding later forced a sale of the land and thus thwarted continued
operations as the donor had envisioned.
The district court first determined that the donor's forfeiture
requirement upon "sale" did not encompass an involuntary disposition
occasioned by eminent domain. 323 The district court then reduced the
dispositive issue to a single question grounded in the particulars of the
name association. That question was "whether preservation of the ranch
as a memorial is such an essential object of the [donor's design] that its
impossibility will cause the [charitable gift] to fail . . . [or whether the]
paramount purpose [was] charitable."
3 24
See supra Part I.B.3.
319 Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853
(1946), rev'g United States v. 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Cal. 1944). The two
cases clearly involve the same parties and the same facts, although the Ninth Circuit
decision mentions that it is an appeal from the District Court decision only in its headnote.
Id. at 829.
' Id. at 830.
321 Id. Worthy of note is that the forfeiture provision preceded the memorial statement
and was not expressly linked to the forfeiture condition. For a case interpreting such
provisions based upon the placement of the conditional language in the gift instrument, see
State v. Rand, 366 A.2d 183, 195 n.20 (Me. 1976).
' Id. The base dispute thus concerned the town's retention of the condemnation
award proceeds for charitable uses, versus forfeiture of those proceeds to the donor's heirs.
Id. Although one could characterize Pedrotti as a simple case of donor-specified location or
property, the resolution of the eminent domain issue and the District Court's framing of the
issue suggest the importance of the donor's memorial purposes to the outcome.
3 Id.; 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. at 693.
3 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. at 693. The question no doubt related to utilizing the
particular ranch as the memorial. That nuance is encompassed by the general focus here
upon the particulars of a given name association.
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Many courts confronted with naming circumstances have similarly
focused upon the donor's primary versus secondary purposes, whether
325
proceeding under cy pres or equitable deviation analysis.32 The district
court in Pedrotti proceeded under a cy pres analysis.326 The district court
concluded that the donor's desired name association could be
adequately served by attaching that name to a memorial fund that would
serve the donor's intended charitable beneficiary class. 27 The fund was
viewed as an alternative charitable scheme that facilitated the
continuation of the donor's paramount charitable intentions,
notwithstanding the disassociation from the specified ranch. 32 As often
seen in charitable naming cases, the court concluded that the specified
name association was merely "a mode of executing" the charitable
design.329 This is one way of stating a conclusion that the particulars of
the name association were of secondary importance relative to a primary
3" See, e.g., Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1946) (refusing to apply cy pres
where "the apparent dominant purpose of the trust was not the. . . charitable
beneficiaries . . . but the continuance of the . . . Memorial Fund in perpetuity"); Burr v.
Brooks, 416 N.E.2d 231, 236 (111. 1981) (holding cy pres inapplicable where donor's
"primary charitable object" was limited to particular named facility); First Nat'l Bank of
Chi. v. Elliott, 92 N.E.2d 66, 73-74 (111. 1950) (saving gift under cy pres/equitable deviation
analysis based on conclusion that charitable purposes were "substance of the gift," whereas
naming provisions were "mere incident" thereto); Vii. of Hinsdale v. Chi. City Missionary
Soc'y, 30 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ill. 1940) ("[A] secondary purpose will not prevail where the
primary charitable objective of the donor can be attained by a different method. The fact
that the donor directed use of the funds in connection with a specific institution, or for the
construction of a new building, will not prevent an application of the funds in an
association different from the one named.") (citations omitted); Quinn v. Peoples Trust &
Sav. Co., 60 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (Ind. 1945) (relegating naming provision to administrative
status and applying cy pres/equitable deviation analysis to preserve donor's "dominant
intent and purpose"; namely, education of children); Pennebaker v. Pennebaker Home for
Girls, 163 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942) ("[Ilf... it was the intention of the donor that
in all events the property was to be maintained and used for a charitable purpose and that
the manner of carrying out that purpose . . . was not the paramount object . . . such
direction will be construed not to be a condition .... "); Briggs v. Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 81
N.E.2d 827, 835-37 (Mass. 1948) (considering charitable benefit "dominant object" of gift,
with memorial merely means to end); Old Colony Trust Co. v. 0. M. Fisher Home, 16
N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. 1938) (noting that "dominant purpose was charitable, and was none
the less so because the charity was also intended as a memorial," and then proceeding to
permit named building as part of otherwise named home); Bd. of Trs. Univ. of N.C. Chapel
Hill v. Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d 239, 244-45 (N.C. 1984) (finding donor's objectives to
benefit charity were paramount to memorial purposes); Grant Home v. Medlock, 349
S.E.2d 655, 658-59 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (applying equitable deviation to save gift where
"primary intent" was to benefit charitable class, as opposed to establishing memorial at
specified home); see also supra note 273 and accompanying text.
326 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. at 693-94.
327 Id. at 694.
32 Id.
329 Id.
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charitable objective.330 Such characterization also implicates the possible
application of more liberal equitable deviation principles, had the gift
over provision been deemed an impediment to finding in favor of
continued charitable application.33'
The foregoing explanation of the district court decision in Pedrotti is
informative with regard to the application of judicial modification
doctrines where naming provisions significantly affect the analysis. The
focus here, however, should remain fixed on the larger normative issue
of ceding too much of the public welfare to donor control. In that
regard, the Ninth Circuit in Pedrotti took a different view of the donor's
name perpetuation goals by promoting the particular name association
to paramount status 332  The Ninth Circuit aptly captured society's
capitulation to donors in this context when it denied application of cy
pres, permitted the proceeds to revert to the donor's heirs, and
specifically concluded that "this donation.., for charitable uses was not
the main purpose of the trust but only an incident designed to make
more certain that . . . the [property] be kept as a memorial to the
testator's deceased wife .. . ."3 In other words, the donor adopted a
minimally sufficient "charity" to foster private name perpetuation
purposes. The court and legal doctrine, then, quite willingly allowed the
donor to prostitute the charitable moniker in pursuit of private name
perpetuation ends, irrespective of the ultimate consequence to the
public's stake in the venture. m This is unfortunate, in that existing cases
and current legal doctrine provide adequate guidance to employ a
different approach to charitable naming contributions and the issues that
arise in name deviation circumstances, as considered in Part VII.
' See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
"' 263.5 Acres of Land, 54 F. Supp. at 694; see supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text
(discussing gift over provisions and equitable deviation).
' Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1946); see supra note 319
(discussing procedural relationship between Ninth Circuit and district court decisions).
' Pedrotti, 152 F.2d at 831. Other courts have similarly accepted such use of charitable
institutions for name perpetuation purposes. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church,
200 S.E.2d 769, 779 (N.C. 1973), as distinguished by Bd. of Trs. Univ. of N.C. Chapel Hill v.
Heirs of Prince, 319 S.E.2d 239, 244 (1984) (distinguishing Wilson case on basis that "The
terms of the Wilson gift mandated a 'memorial.' .... [In contrast, the donor in Prince] did
not attempt to use the University as a conduit for more paramount [memorial] purposes.").
' There is little indication that the new Restatement or the Uniform Trust Code
formulations of the relevant doctrines would change the divergent outcomes of the two
courts in this matter. See supra Part VI.D.
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VII. CHARITABLE EFFICIENCY, CHARITABLE OPPORTUNISM, AND THE
NAMED FACILITY
A well-publicized, but as yet unresolved, charitable name deviation
dispute highlights the practical contours of the various perspectives and
legal doctrines considered in this Article. Specifically, New York's
Lincoln Center is currently embroiled in a dispute with the family of
Avery Fisher, one of the Center's past major benefactors. The dispute
concerns the continued perpetuation of the Avery Fisher name. The
considerations affecting that dispute implicate the many policy issues
that should influence application of the noted legal doctrines. Those
considerations also present an appropriate vehicle for examining
changes in current doctrine that might be warranted. Such matters are
the subject of this part.
A. Objective Background
Avery Fisher was, by all accounts, a successful and ethical
businessman, and a highly regarded patron of the arts.i His 1973
contribution of $10.5 million in support of the Lincoln Center permitted
renovations to the philharmonic concert hall that, in essence, saved the
facility as a haven for the performing arts.3 ' That contribution, however,
referenced use of his name "in perpetuity." 337 Three decades later, the
facility is again in desperate need of major renovations or rebuilding,
estimated to require (at the low end) some $250 to $300 million of new
funding.i Absent such renovations or rebuilding, the concert hall faces
the very real prospect of losing its major artistic tenants.339 However,
' See Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El (discussing background to Mr. Fisher's gift and
current dispute). The particular spin of the law firm representing the Fisher family in the
dispute is set forth in its entirety in the text accompanying infra note 346.
' Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El. A detailed history of the Lincoln Center and its
various renovations and acoustical problems can be found in Justin Davidson, Creating a
Cultural Commons, Part II, NEWSDAY, Jan. 23, 2002, at B6.
" See, e.g., Dutka, supra note 22, at F2 ("Fisher ... gave $10.5 million in 1973 to rebuild
the acoustically flawed building ...on the condition that it be named after him in
perpetutity."); Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El ("In a 1973 Pledge Agreement, Mr. Fisher set
forth the conditions of his gift ... including the stipulation that Avery Fisher Hall 'will
appear on tickets, brochures, program announcements and advertisements and the like,
and I consent into perpetuity to such use."').
' See Dutka, supra note 22, at F2 (putting price tag at $300 million); Robin Pogrebin, It's
Time to Face the Music for New York Philharmonic, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2003, at 6 (discussing
financial particulars of Lincoln Center and Avery Fisher construction and renovation needs
and putting Avery Fisher Hall renovation at $250 million).
' There has been much angst over whether and which tenants might depart Avery
Fisher Hall, in large part because of the state of those facilities. For insight into these tenant
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such huge philanthropic undertakings in the modem era of fundraising
almost by definition anticipate a major donor who will likely expect
prominent name recognition for her contribution.4 Likely cognizant of
this, the Lincoln Center has refused to assure the Fisher family that the
Avery Fisher name will continue to adorn its concert hall once that hall is
rebuilt or extensively renovated.3' The family has responded with
342threats of litigation based on the original 1973 contribution agreement.
The ongoing public dispute is said to have both charitable organizations
and major donors "on the edge of their seats,"4 as the outcome is
anticipated to "have enormous bearing on future dealings between
philanthropists and the cultural institutes they support.
" 3
U
B. A Textbook Pro-donor Perspective
As suggested earlier, most charitable name deviation situations are
susceptible to a clearly pro-donor perspective that is easily articulated,
and, for many, readily adopted. 345 The Avery Fisher Hall dispute is no
exception. Consider, for example, the simple appeal of the following
spin derived from the website of the law firm representing the Avery
Fisher family:
A few years ago, Lincoln Center announced its intention to
redevelop its campus, and this past year it took widely publicized
steps towards implementing plans to either renovate or raze and
rebuild Avery Fisher Hall. Representatives of Lincoln Center
issues, see Pogrebin, supra note 338, at 6; Pierre Ruhe, New York Philharmonic, ASO Playing
Similar Tune, ATLANTA. J. CONST., June 15, 2003, at Ml; Usborne, supra note 22, at 15.
' See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text; Dutka, supra note 22, at F2 (commenting
that "most of the ... $300 million for Avery Fisher Hall... must come from private donors
who like their name on things"). The donor may "expect" the naming opportunity as a'
mere accompaniment to the gift, as a bargained for quid pro quo, or as philanthropically
proper precisely because others have enjoyed similar privileges.
41 What's in a Name, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2002, at A-1.
a Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El; Neal Travis, Short Lease on Lights, N.Y. POST, May 28,
2002, at 11 ("From what I hear, they [the Fisher family] will not be mollified and lawsuits
will be flying....").
3 David Brancaccio, Marketplace: Avery Fisher Hall and Lincoln Center Debate Over
Naming Rights (NPR radio broadcast, June 4, 2002) (transcript available at LEXIS, News
Library, All News File) ("The stakes are so high that donors and officials at other
performing arts centers are on the edge of their seats.").
', Travis, supra note 342, at 11; see also Dutka, supra note 22, at F2 ("The outcome of the
dispute, analysts say, could set a precedent for how philanthropist and cultural
organizations negotiate naming rights.").
" See supra Part ll.B.1. As noted earlier, the pro-donor perspective on a charitable
name deviation situation is both the most straightforward to grasp and the most immediate
perspective of those presented with a bare outline of the dispute.
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refused to give assurances to the family of Avery Fisher (who was
then deceased) that the building housing the Philharmonic would
continue to bear the name Avery Fisher Hall in perpetuity, whether
the existing hall were to be renovated or were it to be razed and
completely rebuilt. Lincoln Center wished to try to lure a big donor
into making a lead (perhaps $75-100 million) gift to Lincoln Center
for its reconstruction efforts by offering to place that new donor's
name on the outside of a new building for the Philharmonic. (Query
what donor would trust Lincoln Center to abide by the terms of that
donor's gift when Lincoln Center would have violated the clear terms of
Avery Fisher's prior gift?) As a result, we were retained by the Fisher
family to ensure that the terms of Mr. Fisher's gift are fulfilled by
Lincoln Center regardless of the extent of the changes made to the
existing hall. Our discussions and negotiations with Lincoln Center
continue. 346
This recitation not only demonstrates a pro-donor characterization of the
naming situation, but also raises many additional points that warrant
further consideration.
C. The Requested Remedy
Assuming for the moment that Avery Fisher's contribution was clearly
conditioned on perpetual name association, it would seem that the most
likely remedy for the Lincoln Center's noncompliance would be
forfeiture.347 From the above law firm recitation, however, it appears that
the family's primary negotiating stance is to force specific performance
of its interpretation of the agreement, rather than pursuing a forfeiture.m
' This description appears on the website for law firm of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, at
http://www.srz.com/avery-fisher-hall.asp (last visited May 20,2004) (emphasis added).
See supra Part V.B.1 (discussing conditional gifts and forfeiture remedy).
See Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El (discussing enforcement of agreement versus
possible forfeiture). Seeking specific enforcement of the naming condition is actually a
commendable position by the heirs in that it removes the heirs' potential monetary self-
interest from the equation. It could also be an acknowledgement of the difficulties of
applying a forfeiture (or even a contractually-based restitution) remedy decades after the
date of the gift and utilization of both the funds and the naming opportunity. Despite the
apparent simplicity of saying "forfeit the contribution if you don't comply," many
questions could be raised. For example, should any forfeiture be discounted to reflect the
efforts and contributions of the public in maintaining the charitable cause so as to ensure
(for 30-plus years) an ongoing positive association for the name? Should some amount be
withheld from the forfeiture repayment to reflect the 30-plus years that the donor did, in
fact, enjoy a prominent association? If not, then why should the name display now be
regarded as so singularly important that we would allow it to work a complete forfeiture to
the detriment of the overriding charitable task? A simple pro-donor "that was the deal"
answer has merit, but ignores completely the charitable dimensions of the donor's
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Reported cases suggest that such a remedy would be unlikely, absent a
finding that the Lincoln Center held the gift in trust such that it can be
compelled to perform.349  Note, however, that even if specific
performance is an available remedy, the request would require that
Avery Fisher's name adorn any substantially renovated or even new
concert hall that ever graces the Lincoln Center campus. The pro-
donor perspective would no doubt embrace the argument that it is
sufficient that the contribution did some immediate and future (though
limited in duration) good and was accepted. From the standpoint of
society's stake in this venture, however, such an outcome concedes too
much to Mr. Fisher.
Any semblance of foresight suggests that facilities require upkeep and,
ultimately, replacement, both of which cost money and require flexibility
and other sources of prospective public support. The further point here
is that if naming rights are, in fact, a valuable charitable fundraising tool,
then future generations are shortchanged by a grant of enduring naming
rights for a contribution that is limited in effectiveness to a single
construction project. To allow a current donor to dictate that all future
facilities will bear her name, else the charitable endeavors (formerly)
pursued in some version of that facility will end or suffer forfeiture upon
failing to appease that vanity, seems both unnecessary and short-sighted.
While this view promotes what some may see as an unacceptable
deviation from an established agreement, there is legal precedent for
avoiding such donor restrictions where future circumstances show them
to be privately motivated and counter-productive to charitable
objectives. Specifically, after recognizing the various and often confused
legal routes that might be invoked to avoid a donor forfeiture provision
where charitable interests are at stake, the court in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. City of Quincy50 ' aptly captured the essence of the issue relevant
to all naming disputes when it opined that:
The justification for allowing a charitable gift to continue
indefinitely, without regard to the Rule Against Perpetuities or
related rules, is the public benefit from achievement of important
charitable objectives. The same justification does not ... apply to
subordinate details . . . particularly those which tend to unduly
restrict adapting use of the gift to changing conditions. In some
contribution, not to mention the policy implications of allowing donors to effect such harsh
consequences far into the future.
349 See supra Part V.B regarding the application of a specific performance remedy.
See Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El (regarding heirs' desire for this outcome).
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. City of Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. 1970).
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cases, indeed, subordinate provisions may have been imposed, not
to facilitate the achievement of a general charitable purpose, but for
the personal gratification of the donor in respects wholly irrelevant
to any effective execution of a public purpose. There is strong
ground for disregarding such subordinate details if changed
circumstances render them obstructive of, or inappropriate to, the
accomplishment of the principal charitable purpose.
A naming provision fits squarely within the court's description of a
provision that is in itself irrelevant to the effective pursuit of any
charitable purpose. Of course, the court's language seems to imply some
further conclusion that the condition at issue can be relegated to
subordinate status, which again raises the specter of discerning donor
intent. Still, three additional points support application of the Dartmouth
court's policy-based approach to charitable naming situations.
First, any charitable name association provides the donor with much
by way of recognition, status, identity definition (or redefinition), and
other personal pleasures. This holds true even if the precise association
does not endure into perpetuity. The prospect of future flexibility
regarding the particulars of the name association, therefore, does not
eviscerate the motivational force of the naming contribution as a
valuable fundraising tool.
Second, deviation from the precise strictures of a naming provision
can be achieved without upsetting important aspects of the donor-
charity agreement. Precedent noted earlier demonstrates that some
courts find alternative ways to accommodate a donor's name
353
perpetuation desires. Examples include applying the name to an
alternate facility serving the same or a related charitable class or
purpose, or, similarly, creating a named fund to serve those ends.5
Although the compromise these outcomes reflect necessarily falls short
of a name perpetually adorning some specific physical edifice, the
balancing of donor name perpetuation objectives and the public's
interest in charitable objectives is a commendable outcome. In the case
of Avery Fisher Hall, for example, can anyone truly say that after thirty
years of recognition, Mr. Fisher would (or should) not be satisfied with
an ongoing prominent display of his name and the history of his
contribution in the lobby of a substantially renovated and renamed
concert hall, perhaps amplified by special annual performances
32 Id. at 753 (citing DiCerico, supra note 196).
See supra Part VI.C.
See supra Part VI.C.
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specifically commemorating his contribution? In fact, an annual
performance to commemorate Mr. Fisher's gift could easily recur into
perpetuity and would actually embody the very essence of his obvious
charitable desires.35  Moreover, such a tribute would arguably call
attention to his interests and efforts in a manner comparable, if not
superior, to that occasioned by letters etched in cold granite above a
slowly deteriorating doorway. Ultimately, long-delayed but carefully
tailored deviations from the particulars of a past naming contribution do
not deprive donors of substantial returns on their contribution
"bargains."
A third and final point revives the normative question raised
previously.i Specifically, if Mr. Fisher would not, today, accept any
compromise regarding the display of his name, the real question that
society should ask is whether charities should ever be permitted to give
so much away in the first instance, when the lure of immediate dollars
may readily threaten to overwhelm thoughtful concern for the future




The ultimate conclusion should be that society ought not to allow the
immediate pursuit of charitable dollars to mask the potential future
consequences of naming conditions whose operation is functionally
unrelated to any shared vision of charity. A greater emphasis on the
policy implications of adhering to a privately-motivated name condition
is one route to giving greater weight to those consequences when
determining outcomes in name deviation situations.
. It seems apparent that Mr. Fisher had charitable inclinations and not just a bare
desire to perpetuate his name. For a discussion regarding Mr. Fisher's charitable
objectives, as proffered by the Fisher family or as might otherwise be debated, see supra
note 348 and infra notes 358-363 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text; text introducing supra Part VI.E.
This is not to suggest that charities are without restraint. The need for such restraint
is more evident, however, where from the inception of the contribution proposal a donor's
terms provide a more immediate and more blatant challenge to charitable mission or
flexibility. Thus, gifts have been refused where the donor wanted the right to designate the
people who would teach a proposed college curricular area, where the donor insisted that
plaques featuring Bible verses be displayed prominently around campus, or where
corporate benefactors insisted that they be featured in a museum exhibit on the history of
American manufacturing. See Blum, Ties That Bind, supra note 153, at 7. The naming
provisions at issue here, in contrast, appear to be fairly routine and wholly beneficial to all
in the beginning, and it is only later - often decades later - that the constraining aspects
of the condition begin to surface.
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D. Avery Fisher's Paramount Intentions
The Avery Fisher Hall dispute also highlights the unpredictable
malleability that results from the emphasis upon the paramount
importance of donor intent where naming provisions are concerned.3
8
The Fisher family's law firm explains what Mr. Fisher's original gift
accomplished. Specifically, the law firm notes that the "gift literally
saved the Philharmonic for the Lincoln Center - since the Philharmonic
was otherwise considering leaving."359 Thus, it seems quite fair to say
that Mr. Fisher wanted to enable the Lincoln Center to take actions
necessary to overcome facilities deficiencies that threatened the Center's
artistic mission through loss of this important tenant. Now consider that
the current rebuilding of or renovations to Avery Fisher Hall are needed
precisely because a crumbling, accoustically unsound facility has once
again led to specific threats of loss of tenants critical to the Center's
artistic mission - specifically, the Philharmonic and the Opera.3 No
one has alleged that the facility is adequate in its current state or that
management is trumpeting a non-issue with regard to the need for a
facilities upgrade.
1. The Fisher Dilemma
It is reasonable to debate which was more important to Mr. Fisher -
his name on a concert hall or the Center's ongoing accomplishment of its
artistic mission. Nevertheless, the pro-donor perspective would
immediately point to the naming condition as simply ending the debate.
Again, however, the Lincoln Center dispute highlights the problems that
past gifts will cause in the coming years. Despite Mr. Fisher's business
sophistication, the sophistication of the Lincoln Center, and the
magnitude of Mr. Fisher's gift, the agreement so heavily touted by the
family is actually fairly vague on the name condition. By all accounts,
3' See note 306 and accompanying text.
3 The firm's website continues:
In 1973, Avery Fisher made a substantial donation to Lincoln Center so that it
could renovate the hall at Lincoln Center used by the New York Philharmonic.
Mr. Fisher's gift was expressly conditioned upon the building being named
"Avery Fisher Hall" in perpetuity in the written agreement memorializing the
gift. This gift literally saved the Philharmonic for Lincoln Center - since the
Philharmonic was otherwise considering leaving Lincoln Center for another
location for acoustical and other reasons.
http://www.srz.com/averyfisher hall.asp, supra note 346.
'0 Pogrebin, supra note 338, at 6; see also supra note 339.
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Mr. Fisher's agreement with the Lincoln Center actually states that the
name Avery Fisher Hall "will appear on tickets, brochures,
announcements and advertisements and the like, and I consent in
perpetuity to such use."36' In light of the discussion in Parts V and VI
regarding malleability in construing conditions and applying equitable
doctrines, it is quite plausible to suppose that a court might read the
agreement's terms much less forcefully than the family would hope. In
this regard, note that in the charitable fundraising arena, charities often
request the right to use a major donor's name. This is often done in order
to facilitate and add legitimacy to the charity's drive for dollars.362 Given
the language employed by the parties in the Avery Fisher Hall matter,
who is to say today that Mr. Fisher was not just as (or even more)
concerned with conferring that benefit upon the Lincoln Center as he
was with blind service to his name? This line of analysis also undercuts
any effort to employ strict contractual analysis to the dispute, because
the suggested arrangement may well fall short of the type of bargained-
for exchange that underlies contract status to the exclusion of conditional
gift/charitable trust doctrine.3
Because of deference to individual donor intent, however, it is only
through concluding that Mr. Fisher had a general charitable intent - or
that he at least considered the naming condition subordinate and
charitable purposes primary - that the strictures of the name condition
can be properly modified under cy pres, equitable deviation, or some
other rule of construction. As will be likely with many disputes
concerning past charitable contributions, there is really no clearly correct
conclusion regarding Mr. Fisher's primary or general intentions. As
noted earlier with regard to cy pres, for example, some courts regard the
presence of a perpetual naming condition as implicating a general intent,
while others see indications of specific intent?6 Under the latter view, it
is not clear even under the new Restatement and UTC formulations
whether such a perpetual name provision might, in some circumstances,
be cited to rebut the presumption of general charitable intent. 6 What is
clear is that more flexibility in accommodating Mr. Fisher's name
" See Pogrebin, supra note 22, at El (quoting 1973 pledge agreement). Both the Lincoln
Center and counsel for the Avery Fisher family refused to provide further details on this
point.
32 See supra note 7.
See supra Part V.B.3.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part VI.A.1.
See supra Part VI.D (discussing presumptions under new Uniform Trust Code and
Restatement); see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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perpetuation desires - whatever their relative magnitude - would
better harmonize and serve the donor, societal, and specific charity
interests that are at stake.6 7
2. Community Assets
In any event, if Mr. Fisher did actually prefer name perpetuation at all
costs to the Lincoln Center, a donor intent-based perspective remains
unsatisfactory. An outcome premised on that basis suggests that, like in
Pedrotti,8 a donor who simply utilizes the Lincoln Center for his own
private name perpetuation desires or elevates those desires above a
larger charitable purpose is, in essence, authorized to purchase from the
public a perpetual right to control the pursuit of charitable mission,
notwithstanding the absence of foresight as to what effective
accomplishment of that mission might demand decades later.3
9
Charitable assets, the naming opportunities that help fund them, and the
flexibility to make the best mission-oriented decisions in the future are
community assets.3 70 Like natural resources, those assets should not be
exploited to eternal extinction simply because an immediate dollar is to
be gained for the present generation.
E. Revised Societal Demand
Regardless of whether name perpetuation represents a paramount or
subordinate intent, the foregoing disconnect supports a revised societal
position in these matters. Society should demand that a name not upset
the preservation of gifts purportedly made for charitable purposes.
Those courts that craft an alternative, but similarly charitably associated,
form of name recognition where the donor's charitable purposes are
otherwise continued have the analysis correct from a more exacting
societal standpoint.
3 71
"' See supra Part VI.C (concerning ways in which courts have authorized continuing,
but alternative, recognition of donor's name where continued adherence to precise
strictures of naming condition otherwise became problematic). For a discussion regarding
the argument that perhaps the donor cared more for the name than any charity, see infra
Part VILE (discussing alternative of focusing donor intent from outset).
' See discussion supra Part VI.E (relating to Pedrotti cases).
369 See also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
370 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. City of Quincy, 258 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. 1970).
371 See supra Part VI.C (concerning ways in which courts have authorized continuing,
but alternative, recognition of donor's name where continued adherence to precise
strictures of naming condition otherwise became problematic).
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In particular, donor naming conditions should be conceived (for future
naming opportunities) and enforced (for past naming provisions) with a
different focus. That focus should emphasize (1) charitable mission or
beneficiary class, and (2) society's interest in charitable flexibility over
time. If charitable naming opportunities and name deviation situations
were so evaluated, they would present a more straightforward dilemma.
A more up-front emphasis on the charitable requirement in relation to
private name perpetuation goals could eliminate speculation over donor
intentions. It would also avoid counter-productive and unduly
restrictive donor mandates that, at least for those with sophisticated legal
counsel, rule into perpetuity. Focusing donor intent would likewise help
to ensure that later invocations of equitable modification doctrines are
neither misplaced nor speculative in application.
An initial question in this regard pertains to defining that newly
focused donor intent. Simply stated, society should insist that donors
enter into long-lived naming arrangements with a paramount charitable
purpose. This does not mean that society should criticize or even care
about private motivations. Instead, it simply means that years into the
future, when considering whether a naming provision creates a contract,
a condition, or possibly implicates cy pres or equitable deviation, the
answer should be clear. That answer should hold that donors accept
charitable purposes as paramount with respect to applying rules of
construction and judicial modification doctrines precisely because the
donor made a contribution to charity in order to avail herself of positive
and perpetual name association.3 7 This result would make known to the
donor at the outset that charitable objectives and future circumstances,
not dead-hand control, will dictate the precise manner in which a name
is perpetuated over the long-term. Donor intent would, therefore, not be
subject to divination or rebuttal years later. In other words, the
charitable object of the gift will always be regarded as paramount.
Donor naming motivations or stringent name association requirements
will not be disregarded, but rather, they simply will not be allowed to
thwart the efficient pursuit of charitable objectives by causing forfeiture.
Even as applied to past charitable contributions, there is support for this
suggested encroachment upon previously stated donor demands.373
" For a discussion regarding the benefits and implications of charitable association,
see supra Part I and Part EE.
" See, e.g., Briggs v. Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 81 N.E.2d 827,837 (Mass. 1948) ("The doctrine
of cy pres is not unconstitutional. The gifts were originally made subject to the law
embodied in that doctrine. No property is taken. On the contrary, the beneficial use of the
property is secured to those for whom it was intended. No obligation of contract is
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Further, the flexibility proposed here poses less overall risk to disserving
speculative donor intentions in the case of past gifts. This is because
outcomes that foster continuation of both charitable and name
perpetuation goals should always bear some resemblance to the donor's
original design. Such outcomes are, therefore, less severely one-sided
than the forfeiture that could result from incorrect divinations of donor
intentions.374
Some might argue that such a societal imposition would "chill" future
charitable giving. Although scholars often recite that chill concern
without substantive support that it actually pertains in donor control
situations,375 more probing consideration suggests that the proposals
offered here are unlikely to have a chilling effect.3 76 Professor Johnson,
for example, recently concluded that "[ilnstead of chilling the creation of
charitable trusts, the expansive use of cy pres can result in the increased
creation of charitable trusts once [donors] realize that the ... assets will
be put to optimal use to benefit society beyond the period that the settlor
can foresee, consistent with the settlor's [charitable] intent." 37 Others
378
also agree with this premise.
Another proposition noted earlier has added relevance in the context
of this "chill" argument. Recall that name conditions do not foster
accomplishment of any charitable goal, apart from the occurrence of the
impaired."); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (2003) (providing that donor may "opt out" of UTC
default rules, but excepting from that opt-out power of court to modify or terminate trust
under UTC cy pres and equitable deviation provisions); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1106
(providing that UTC has retroactive effect and applies to trust created prior to its
enactment); see also supra Part VII.C (discussing Quincy decision).
See supra notes 149-150, 184-187 and accompanying text.
3n See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 123, at 641 ("The law cannot simultaneously maintain a
policy of friendliness towards charitable gifts and of disregard for conditions placed by
public benefactors upon [charitable] grants. If grantors were forewarned that the
conditions upon their gifts were to be disregarded, it is unlikely that they would have
made such gifts in the first place."); Eisenstein, supra note 196, at 1758 (discussing similar
assertions); Sisson, supra note 263, at 649 (same). For a recent assertion along these lines,
though in the context of donor standing, see Lisa Loftin, Note, Protecting the Charitable
Investor: A Rationale for Donor Enforcement of Restricted Gifts, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 385
(1999) ("Currently, charitable institutions, legislatures, and courts fail to protect the
interests of donors. As a result, donors may become more hesitant to contribute at all.").
376 See Sisson, supra note 263, at 650 ("The suggestion that slavish adherence to the
terms of charitable trusts would discourage their creation is untested, although . . .
historical evidence actually indicates otherwise."). For example, Professor Scott cites the
English experience that limitations upon donor control had no chilling effect on donor
contributions whatsoever. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 16, § 399.4; see also Sisson, supra
(discussing this aspect of Professor Scott's observations).
31 Johnson, supra note 14, at 357.
3 Id. at 357, 371, 380-87.
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contribution itself.379  Perpetual naming conditions are, thus, only
defensible as a facilitator of charitable contributions.-" Such conditions,
therefore, should not be allowed to defeat the continued charitable use of
property unless it can be definitely said that, absent strict control, donors
would truly be chilled in their desire to give. Simply stated, the noted
arguments indicate that it cannot be so definitively said that a donor chill
would follow the proposed societally-oriented charitable naming
framework.
F. Curbing Wholesale Charitable Opportunism
The foregoing suggestions do not mean, however, that donor name
provisions would be disregarded at the slightest inclination towards
charitable opportunism. Nor does it mean that donors would sacrifice
all control to unknown future charitable management and possibly
divergent charitable goals. There are three specific curbs on these risks.
1. Flexible Adherence to Naming Provisions
The first curb lies in the very nature of the proposed approach. That
approach affects only how naming contributions are viewed and
accommodated when circumstances inevitably change. The proposed
approach suggests neither wholesale abandonment of name recognition,
nor complete disregard of the desired charitable association. In
particular, that line of reasoning holding that both name perpetuation
and charitable ends are best served by flexible adherence to the
particulars of a naming condition would prevail when conflicts arise. 1
Cases that allow some alternative but similarly charitably-associated
name recognition where necessary would become the judicially
supervised norm. This is an acceptable outcome if any confidence is to
be reposed in our judiciary's ability to accommodate conflicting
viewpoints in a reasonable fashion where both parties' overriding interests
are clearly aligned - as such interests should be if donors are deemed to
have accepted the charitable dimension of their contribution where name
' See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
Although one could also cite respect for donor property rights (i.e., the ability to
give away less than what is owned), that argument is subsumed by that stated in the text,
because the principal reason for respecting such rights, perpetually and in this context, is
because respect for such rights allegedly fosters the dedication of such property to
charitable uses.
" See supra Part VI.C (concerning ways in which courts have authorized continuing,
but alternative, recognition of donor's name where continued adherence to precise
strictures of naming condition otherwise became problematic).
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perpetuation is desired .
2. Necessary Triggers Remain
Another curb on unwarranted charitable opportunism would be the
unaffected requirement that there be some "trigger" event warranting
departure from the donor's specific directives. The Lincoln Center, in
other words, would still be confronted with showing a sufficient change
of circumstances to warrant an alternative association with Avery
Fisher's name. The complete replacement or "gutting" of a facility for
renovation, for example, would implicate name deviation absent an
endowment adequate to address such changes.
Courts are not blind to unmitigated charitable opportunism and have
shown reluctance to acknowledge ill-conceived efforts by charitable
management to escape donor directives through specious allegations of
impossibility, impracticability, etc.? The requirement that such a trigger
support a proposed name deviation would shift the name deviation
inquiry away from subjective explorations of donor intent regarding
circumstances that may or may not have been foreseen. This approach
would also reduce unproductive moralistic posturing about honoring
agreements. The focus would instead concentrate on more objective and
presently discernable facts concerning whether perpetual adherence to a
strict view of a naming condition impedes the accomplishment of
charitable objectives. The Avery Fisher family and the Lincoln Center, for
example, would, therefore, not be distracted by disagreements over the
relative weight of Mr. Fisher's name perpetuation versus charitable
objectives.
This is not to say that disputes would not arise or that value
judgments can be altogether avoided. Unlike the present Avery Fisher
dispute, however, the suggested framework would necessitate a positive
dialogue about charitable mission and its accomplishment. Parties would be
32 Any added burden that this proposal might impose upon the judiciary should be
more than offset by the proposal's conclusions about focusing donor intent upon
paramount charitable objectives, because outcome-determinative, yet speculative, inquiries
into donor intent - as now seen in the application of cy pres and equitable deviation
doctrines - could be avoided.
" See, e.g., In re Plummer Mem'l Loan Trust Fund, 661 N.W.2d 307, 312-13 (Neb. 2003)
(refusing to apply cy pres or equitable deviation). The court thus denied the trustee's
request to use donor funds for scholarships where the donor's requirement that funds be
used for loans presented no problems in implementation as stated. The court concluded
that "the record does not clearly show that the purpose of the trusts cannot be given
effect." Id. at 312. In the author's opinion, the case presents an example of charitable
opportunism that was thwarted by a correct judicial result.
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forced to investigate more readily discernable facts and articulate a clear
vision in that regard. Debate would prove insightful and possibly draw
in the community and other donors, rather than leaving such third
parties as worried and slightly disgusted bystanders. Unjustified and
poorly articulated efforts to disregard donor agreements would be more
readily exposed as charitable opportunism under this redirected focus.
Surely there is sufficient practical experience with fundraising and
evolving charitable circumstances to provide a sound evidentiary
background for parties to frame their discussions and (as a last resort) for
courts to render decisions on the noted questions.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing consideration of donor bad actors and other name
deviation circumstances is not intended to show how a charity might
"win" or "lose" a name deviation case.3  Rather, the foregoing
discussion highlights the quite varied analyses that may apply when
deviation from a charitable naming condition is suggested. The
discussion here exposes the difficult and complex issues that confront
charities when circumstances suggest the possibility of a name deviation,
and by extension, when new naming opportunity proposals arise. Also
exposed is the potential uncertainty that even the savviest of donors face
when a perpetual naming condition is desired.
The analysis here questions the extent to which society should ever
wholly acquiesce to the strictures of a donor's name perpetuation
demands. The objections to such acquiescence are particularly strong
where those demands threaten to remove funds from the charitable
stream or restrict charitable decision-making for no greater purpose than
ensuring that a name endures precisely as contemplated decades ago.
The arguments posited in this regard suggest that society would benefit
if donor intent could be more clearly aligned with the public's interest in
retaining flexibility in the pursuit of long-lived charitable objectives. The
foregoing discussion suggests authority, rationales, and outcomes that
support both donors' and society's interests with regard to the resolution
In fact, winning the legal battle represents only one of a number of considerations a
charity would evaluate if name deviation were at issue. Likely public and donor reaction
to a name change represents a major consideration. See, e.g., Greg Allen, Enron's Legacy
at Univ. Missouri (NPR, Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/rundowns/
rundown.php?prgd=2&prgDate=24-Sep-2004 (last visited Nov. 19, 2004) (discussing
faculty, student, and other opinions in ongoing debates over possible name removal, fund
redirection, or return of university contributions received from various corporate
malfeasants).
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of charitable name deviation situations, even in the case of previously
established naming arrangements. Going forward, society should insist,
from the very conception of a charitable contribution scheme, that name
perpetuation requirements be subordinated to charitable objectives, as
defined by charitable mission or beneficiary class. All interests would be
served, in other words, if donor intent could be expressly tempered
when it comes to prioritizing private name perpetuation purposes
relative to charitable objectives. Doing so would avoid the well-
documented disadvantages of pervasive and self-interested dead-hand
control. Such acknowledged alignment of societal and donor purposes
would also avoid the uncertainties, judicial inefficiencies, and negative
public squabbling facilitated by intent-dependent, but much needed
modification doctrines.
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